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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Why Factions?
Many studies in the field of political science rely on the assumption that
parties are unitary actors, and focus on them as the unit of analysis. Indeed
political parties play a preeminent role in representative democracies. They
interact together in the electoral market or in the parliamentary arena, trying
to maximise their own rewards through processes of cooperation (e.g., building
coalitions) and conflict (even the most cohesive coalition faces internal strife).
In a word, parties matter: they affect government formation, portfolio allo-
cation and policy-making. Although reasonable the unitary actor assumption
is just a fictional representation of real world politics. For this reason it is
worth to relax such overstated claim, opening the black box of intra-party
decision-making to provide new and more realistic models of party politics.
Sometimes parties do behave as if they were united, nonetheless they are
actually divided into many subgroups. These subgroups, that might have
different shapes and attributes, have been identified under the label of party
factions.
Factions exist, many parties in many countries are indeed factionalized as
7
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lots of studies had shown. A growing branch of literature on party politics
has started to address the topic of party faction. After the 1990s these studies
increased providing evidence about the role played by factions in the party
system. Factions do matter indirectly, due to their influence on party strategy,
and directly, through the impact on the whole party system whenever they
decide not to follow the line (splitting during roll call votes or building a
new rival party before the electoral campaign). Hence the dynamics of inter-
factional bargaining and their consequences are a real world puzzle that could
help us to understand the evolution of party system, above and beyond the
anthropomorphic ‘unitary actor assumption’.
Party’s members are not equal among themselves. They retain non-identical
preferences and different perspectives on how party strategy and party plat-
form ought to be. As none of them is able, on its own, to gain control over
the party those members who retain the most similar preferences coalesce to
gain influence on internal decision-making. Within each group (party) several
members cluster together creating rival subgroups (factions) to enhance their
stakes. Intra-party politics then is characterized by a twofold process: on one
hand these subgroups face the incentive to compete against each other to share
the private goods (office, policy and electoral payoffs) while at the same time
they need to cooperate in order to preserve party unity, which is the public
good that allows to gain access to the payoffs.
Every time faction’s return is unsatisfactory, the subgroup faces the incen-
tive to leave the party joining another one or competing on its own to produce
the good. Every time a faction proves to be useless or damaging for the party
itself it will be sent off. In this sense the party is the arena where groups with
similar but non-identical preferences bargain to reach an internal equilibrium.
For the sake of preserving unity this equilibrium must take into account
the stakes of all factions according to their contribution to the public good.
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This factional agreement will be the shield behind which the party achieves its
unity to compete in the electoral market and in the parliamentary arena.
This is the reason why the present analyses will focus on intra-party de-
cision making. We will investigate the patterns of conflict and cooperation
between factions addressing how parties keep their unity and why do they
split. Accordingly, we consider the party as the endogenous product of intra-
party, inter-factional competition.
Factional preferences and intra-party dynamics in fact shape the party:
they impact on its unity, on the internal equilibrium and on the likelihood of
splits. As far as they affect party unity and party fission, factions shape not
only the party but the system as a whole. Our research question then deals
with the patterns of inter-factional conflict. We will investigate how parties
are ruled to find what bargaining dynamics drive them.
Does the party behave following a winner-take-all rule or does it allocate
resources in proportion to factions’ strength? Does the median faction play
a crucial role? Is the party leader allowed to exploit greater payoffs or is she
constrained by factions? And if so, under what circumstances and to what
extent? Having discussed the reasons why parties should pursue internal unity
we will be concerned with the motives of their breakup. Why do parties split?
Finally we will provide some contributions to check whether internal division
and fission do indeed affect the party system or if, to the contrary, party unity
is not at all a source of party strength.
Factions and fissions are the two crucial aspects of the present work. As
we will see these two features are common to many political systems. How-
ever they are endemic in some countries, like Italy. Hence this country is a
theoretically promising context to study the politics of factions and fissions.
In addition the high number of parties and factions provides a wide documen-
tation about intra-party politics that allows to extract a huge amount of data
9
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and to conduct large-N analysis. Moreover the broad changes experienced
by the Italian political system after 1992 allow to assess the impact of elec-
toral rules on intra-party politics. These reasons explain why the Italian case
is well suited for this kind of analysis, even though future researches should
investigate patterns of intra-party politics in a comparative perspective.
Within the Italian case study, we will address the questions presented
above, focusing on two main elements: preferences and rules. The present
work stresses the importance of policy preferences as determinants of actors’
choices, while controlling for the effects carried out by intra-party rules. Party
organization in fact provides actors with constraints and opportunities, shap-
ing the field where factional struggles happen. We believe that divergent policy
preferences are the basis for factional conflict and cooperation. However we
claim that different sets of rules might affect factional bargaining. Hence we
want to assess what are the primary sources of party behaviour testing which
of these two aspects is prevailing.
Does party structure affect the internal life of parties? Which rules are the
most relevant? How do they impact on intra-party politics? Do preferences
matter anyway? Do they interact with party organization leading to different
outcomes under different rules?
To test these effects we will gather data looking at party congress, that
represents the main arena where factions interact and fight against each other.
Indeed the congress is the battleground where latent subgroups might exploit
public visibility; it is also the place where each faction expresses its view about
party line (by means of a congress motions) and where each party member has
to make her own choice between one list of delegates or another one. The
sum of these individual choices provides a measure of the strength of each
faction. Moreover the party congress elects the party body and, directly or
indirectly, the party leadership. Finally the congress can ratify or modify
10
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the party statute, which is an all-inclusive set of rules that establishes party
organizational structure, sets up prohibitions and provides some arrangements
related to inter-factional competition: in a word, it defines the rules of the
game.
Exploiting information collected from party congress we are able to ana-
lyze both preferences and rules. We will take into account the first aspect,
preferences, through a new dataset that, by means of quantitative text anal-
ysis, estimates the policy positions of factions analysing the motion presented
during the congress. Then, looking at party statutes we will assess the impact
of internal rules on the inter-factional bargaining.
Taking into account alternative rules and contrasting and modes of party
organization, as well as different levels of internal heterogeneity, we will analyze
the nature of intra-party competition. In line with the idea of party as a
solution to collective action problems, we will provide a game-theoretic model,
based on the ‘exit voice and loyalty’ framework (Hirschman 1970), that help us
to conceive intra-party politics as an inter-play between party factions and the
party leader. In addition we will also take into account the role of exogenous
elements related to the electoral system and inter-party competition. Starting
from the implications derived from our theory and building on the existing
literature we will address several facets of intra-party politics, from the degree
of factionalism and the dynamics of payoffs allocation up to party split. After
having discussed how inter-factional conflict shape the party we will assess its
effects on the whole party system.
Summing up, the final aim of the present work is to contribute to ‘a new
model of party politics that abandons the unitary actor assumption and sees
the decision making “engine” of political parties as being driven by intra-party,
inter-factional competition’ (Giannetti and Laver 2009: 166).
11
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1.2 Literature on Intra-party Politics and Party
Factions
Factions exist: ‘Factionalism is a fact of life within most political parties’
(Harmel et al. 1995: 7). Indeed ‘most parties in the world have wings or
tendencies’ (Chambers 2008: 304). It could even be argued that ‘Political
parties are driven by the spirit of faction [. . . ]. [Hence] factions are ubiquitous’
(Heller 2008: 2, italic added). Accordingly literature on intra-party politics
has shown the presence of factions within several parties, all over the word.
Although the study of party factions started in the 1960s, it was a niche
topic until the 1990s while it has undergone a sharply increase in the new
millennium. Since then a bunch of case studies took into account intra-party
division and the role of factions in real world politics. They covered almost all
world’s regions, from Australia to Brazil, from Mexico to Japan, from Germany
to Israel and South Africa. Without leaving aside Italy, UK and the US.1
Obviously the mere existence of factions does not represent, per se, a suf-
ficient condition to make their study useful or desirable. If factions were not
‘thinking actors’ there would be nothing to analyze. Following Descartes’
claim, their existence would be ‘proved’ only if factions think and act (more or
less) consequently, thus justifying the need to study them. If this was not the
case we should revert to an individual level of analysis (i.e., the single member)
to understand the decision-making process within the party.
However, as we will show, factions are indeed rational actors. They are
1We track comparative analysis or single case study for at least 38 countries: Australia,
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, France,
Estonia, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South
Korea, Mexico, Nederland, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Additionally there are studies related to ‘factions’ within the European Parliament.
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able to take collective decisions and, likewise parties, often behave as if they
were a unitary actor. Revising Descartes in a rational choice framework we
can state that factions exist, therefore they think: sunt ergo cogitant.
Given that individual party members are rational choosers there would be
no point in creating or joining factions if these were irrelevant within the party.
In this sense the mere existence of a huge number of factionalized parties is a
proof of the relevance of factions.
Let us discuss more in depth this point. Although parties are an entity per
se they are also a sum of individuals: they are teams composed by a variety
of players that coordinate themselves to solve collective action dilemmas and
coordination problems (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Kiewit and
McCubbins 1991).2 Parties aggregate like-minded members that, compared to
rivals, retain partially common preferences, interests and beliefs (Aldrich 1995;
Aldrich and Bianco 1992).
Extending this reasoning inside the party we observe that, in turn, members
who share the most similar views tend to aggregate together (Bernauer and
Bra¨uninger 2009) in order to gain influence on party strategy, and maximize
their benefits. Parties are probably something more than a simple sum of indi-
vidual preferences: they are organization built through institutions that shape
and sometimes whip members’ desires. In the same vein factions are more than
an aggregate of activists. At the inner level (the intra-party arena) factions
behave like parties do at the outer level (the party system). They organize and
coordinate their members’ behaviour (Giannetti and Laver 2009) structuring
individual preferences in order to maximize individual payoffs (this is straight-
forward when thinking about splits on roll call votes or party fission);3 they
2Parties, for instance, coordinate their members to extract greater payoffs in the parlia-
mentary arena (through log-rolling and coordinated voting behavior) and in the electoral
market.
3See paragraphs 8.3 and 6.2 respectively.
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synchronize their adherents’ wills affecting individuals’ decisions and party’s
choices.
Indeed factions do matter. They affect several areas of politics, from party
competition to policy-making and cabinet formation. More precisely a number
of works managed to show the impact of factions on: coalition and govern-
ment bargaining (Giannetti and Benoit 2009; Laver and Shepsle 1990a, 1990b,
1996; Luebbert 1986; Maor 1998; Strøm 1994); portfolio allocation (Bouissou
2001; Debus and Bra¨uninger 2009; Leiserson 1968; Mershon 2001a, 2001b; Ono
2010); government duration, termination and reshuﬄe (Budge 1985; Boucek
2003a; Druckman 1996; Chambers 2008; Saalfeld 2009); patronage and cor-
ruption (Golden and Chang 2001; Kato and Mershon 2006; Zuckerman 1975,
1979); party position-taking and party competition (Budge et al. 2010; Cail-
laud and Tirole 2002; Giannetti and Laver 2009; Levy 2004; McAllister 1991;
Morgenstern 2001; Persico et al. 2011; Roemer 1999; 2001; Snyder and Ting
2002); policy-making (Depauw and Martin 2009; Giannetti and Laver 2009;
Mule´ 2001); party cohesion and discipline (Depauw and Martin 2009; Giannetti
and Laver 2009; Hix et al. 2005, 2007; Kam 2009; Desposato 2006a); party
switching (Kweit 1986; Heller and Mershon 2005, 2008; Desposato 2006b);
party change (Budge 1985; Duncan 2007; Harmel and Tan 2003); party fission
(Giannetti and Laver 2001; Kato 1998; Laver and Sergenti 2010; Park 2010;
Reed and Scheiner 2003) and party system as a whole (Kato 1998; Laver and
Benoit 2001, 2003; Sartori 1976; Zariski and Welch 1975).
It goes without saying that a plurality of these studies concerns Italy and
Japan, countries where the existence of subgroups is so unquestionable that
they are somehow integrated in the system. Struggle between factions in two
ruling parties like the Italian Christian Democratic Party (DC) or the Lib-
eral Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan are well known and widely analyzed.
However factions does not exist only among parties in office: in both countries
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the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) and the Japanese Socialist/Social Democratic
Party were highly divided, even when out of office. The same is true for Mex-
ico where the former dominant party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party,
was divided in many subgroups likewise one main opposition party, the Demo-
cratic Revolutionary Party. In turn factionalism is not a feature shared only by
one-dominant party systems. Italian and Japanese parties keep a considerable
degree of division still now that these two systems are experiencing government
alternation.
We find more or less organized and more or less durable factions also in
other countries like UK or Germany, whose parties are supposed to be stronger
and more cohesive. In the United Kingdom the three main parties, Conserva-
tives, Labour and Liberal Democrats, are composed by clubs, factions, wings
or tendencies. These clubs fight to take control over the party enhancing their
members’ career and faction’s policy view. In such context factional conflict
was the key element that pushed Labour right-wing factions outside the party
in 1981, to create the Social Democratic Party, that later merged with the
Liberals to form the Liberal Democrats. We observe something similar with
respect to Germany where party members are organized in kreis (circles) that
support their own different stakes. The fractionalisation of the German So-
cial Democratic Party proved its relevance when, in 2005, two splinter groups
composed by left-wing activists split and created the Labour and Social Jus-
tice – The Electoral Alternative (WASG). This group immediately fused with
the Party of Democratic Socialism, which was in turn highly factionalised, to
build a new party: The Left (Die Linke). Intra-party divisions within German
parties also allow to explain the end of Schro¨der’s government and the advent
of the Grand Coalition. Similar patterns can be found in other countries too;
it is worth to recall, just as an example, that in France the Socialist Party
has always been divided in factions that competed to elect the leader and to
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establish the line.
The term faction was already used in the 18th century by thinkers like
Burke, Hume and Madison as a forerunner for the concept of party, to iden-
tify competitive groups within the polity. However it acquired the current
meaning only later on. In 1949, analysing primaries among the US Southern
Democrats, Key (1949) referred to factions as intra-party groups. Notwith-
standing this, the term itself and its definition have long been contested in the
literature. Beside ‘factions’ (Duverger 1954; Key 1949, 1958) some authors
proposed alternative names like ‘tendencies’ (Rose 1964), ‘fractions’ (Sartori
1971, 1976), ‘currents’ (Belloni and Beller 1978) and ‘clusters’ (Reiter 1981)
as well as wings, rivalries and nucleus (e.g., Duverger 1951). Some of these
terms were only a matter of linguistic tastes while others tried to convey a
classification of intra-party groups.
Indeed a bunch of studies had provided definitions and taxonomies of dif-
ferent kinds of party factions according to some properties (Beller and Belloni
1978; Belloni and Beller 1976, 1978; Bettcher 2005, Boucek 2009; Chambers
1963; Hine 1982; Rose 1964; Key 1949, 1958; Nicholas 1965; Panebianco 1988;
Reiter 1981; Sartori 1971, 1976; Seyd 1972; Zariski 1960; Zincone 1972). They
distinguished factions by size, composition (faction as parliamentary subgroup
or as intra-party unit), organization (e.g., factional press and headquarters),
pervasiveness (local or national), autonomous linkage with voters and collat-
eral extra-party structures and organizations (i.e., trade unions); autonomous
access to resources (membership drive and fundraising); aim (ideology, clien-
telism, leader support); cohesiveness (agreement or division within the faction);
duration (long-term groups or temporary fluid aggregations).
Key (1949: 16) provided a first definition of faction as ‘any combination,
clique, or grouping of voters and political leaders who unite at a particular
time in support of a candidate’. Zariski (1960: 33) generalized this idea defin-
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ing them as ‘any intraparty combination, clique or grouping whose members
share a sense of common identity and common purpose and are organized
collectively - as a distinct bloc within the party - to achieve their goals’. Ac-
cording to Zariski, factions gathered for different purposes: patronage; pursuit
of local or interest groups’ requests; promotion of values; influence on party
strategy; control of party’s and government’s policies. Another definition was
provided by Nicholas (1965) who looked at them as ‘leader-follower’ groups.
He considered factions as personal troops tied to their General, with defined
tasks and hierarchy: members give support to the leader in intraparty conflict,
and they receive back job, function, and money. Other authors investigated
the relationship between factions and leaders. The International Comparative
Political Parties survey (ICPP) for instance operationalized factionalism ac-
cording to party coherence (Janda, 1979, 1980a, 1980b, 1993). These studies
highlighted that ideological factions and leadership factions are linked because
members mobilize behind a leader (Janda 1993).
Sartori (1971, 1976) defined factions as personalized power groups totally
committed to power manipulation. In brief, he distinguished between factions
of principles/values (ideologically oriented) and factions of interests/convenience
(office-seeking); however he overstressed the role of patronage claiming that
factions of principles maintain ideological elements only for instrumental pur-
poses and tend to transform into faction of interests. Bettcher (2005) shared a
similar view, while Passigli (1972; Sartori 1973: 48) claimed that, to the con-
trary, factions of convenience might create or stress the ideological framework
when their leader’s power is falling.
Contra Sartori other scholars (Seyd 1972; Rose 1964, 1974) emphasized
the role of ideology. Rose (1964) for instance distinguished between faction
and tendency. A faction is a group of parliamentary members established to
pursue a range of policies through an organized activity, and for a long-time
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period. Its main characteristics are ideology, leadership, technical expertise,
availability of resources and communication facility; therefore factions are well
structured and hold a defined organization chart (a similar point of view was
provided by Hine 1982). Conversely, a tendency is defined as a disorganized
set, built according to shared attitudes; these attitudes could persist along
time, even if the group who supports them is quite unstable and precarious.
This subgroup is therefore temporary and could easily disappear or convert
into a more stable faction.
Despite the undeniable differences in structure and organization between
types of factions, it is possible to provide a definition that encompasses all these
intra-party subgroups. Beller and Belloni (1978: 448) argued against the mere
categorization: ‘factions in villages if they exist will be village factions; in
Communist parties, factions will be Communist party factions’. Accordingly
they stressed the need to focus on similarities instead of differences: ‘what is
significant about factions ultimately is not their structural properties but their
activity and its consequences [. . . ] their dynamics and competitive politics’.
Hence they provided a general definition of the concept as: ‘any relatively
organized group that exists within the context of some other group and which
(as a political faction) competes with rivals for power advantages within the
larger group of which it is a part’. This approach toward the conceptualization
of factions has been retrieved by Boucek (2009: 468) who defined factionalism
as ‘the partitioning of a political party (or other organization and group) into
subunits which are more or less institutionalized and who engage in collective
action in order to achieve their members’ particular objectives’.
Besides looking for a definition many works on party factions analyzed
them as a dependent variable to assess where do they come from. Analysing
the determinants of factionalism they focused on party system competitiveness
(Boucek 2005, 2010, 2011; Golembiewski 1958; Sartori 1971, 1976: 86; Zarisky
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1960), on the incentives provided by the institutional factors like the electoral
systems (Boucek 2003b; Bowler et al. 1999; Carey 2007; Carey e Shugart 1995;
Cox and Rosenbluth 1993; Cox et al. 1999; Katz 1986a; Shugart 2001, 2005;
Strøm and Mu¨ller 2009; Zuckerman 1979), on the amount of resources available
within the party (Golden and Chang 2001; Zincone 1972; Zuckerman 1979)
and on intra-party rules (Rahat and Hazan 2001; Sartori 1971, 1976). Only
recently some authors highlighted the relationship between policy preferences
and intra-party divisions (Bernauer and Bra¨uninger 2009; Giannetti and Laver
2009; Spirling and Quinn 2010).
Another branch of literature stressed the impact of competing set of intra-
party attributes (related in particular with the level of internal democracy) on
intra-party organization and on the relationship between leadership, middle-
level activists (roughly factions) and party members (Katz 2001; Katz and
Mair 1994; LeDuc 2001; Mair 1994, 1997; Marsh 1993; Pennings and Hazan
2001; Rahat and Hazan 2001; Rahat et al. 2008). These studies seem to show
that although moderate level of internal democracy might have positive effects,
radical levels could harm party unity (Pennings and Hazan 2001) or even end
up fostering the leader in face of party members and factions (Rahat et al.
2008).
Conversely other works treat factionalism as an independent variable. In-
stead of analyzing elements that affect party unity they showed the impact of
factions on several topics (see above) ranging from coalition government and
portfolio allocation (e.g., Giannetti and Benoit 2009) to party position-taking
and party fission.
Existing literature highlights some features of intra-party politics. First of
all ‘it is difficult to discuss the making or breaking of parties without referring
to intra-party factions or groupings of some shape or form’ (Giannetti and
Laver 2009: 146). Factions, like any other political actor, care to some extent
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about office, policy and votes (Mu¨ller and Strøm 1999). They retain diver-
gent preferences; within the intra-party environment they bargain to reach a
compromise while competing to maximize their payoffs. This factional strife,
which develops under the threat of a party fission, is affected by internal rules
and party system dynamics; it shapes the party and, through the party, the
whole political system.
The present work will address all these topics. On one side we will discuss
the impact of factional preferences as well as the effect of internal rules. On
the other hand we will take into account the reciprocal interaction between
the factional system and the party system. On these bases we will investigate
all the main topics covered by the literature: the causes of factionalism, intra-
party portfolio allocation, party position-taking, the determinants of party
fission and finally the effects of intra-party divisions on the political system.
1.3 Intra-party politics and the Party System
The aim of the present work is to explain how inter-factional bargain-
ing takes place and what effects does it produce on the party and the party
system. To provide a complete description of internal dynamics we want to
observe them step by step, tracking the main phases of party’s internal life and
matching the main stages of the everyday course of the political system. Figure
1.1 depicts both arenas portraying the structure of representative democracy at
the inner level (the factional system) and at the outer level (the party system),
beginning with the basic unit of each system: party members and voters.
The elections are the starting point in the life of a representative democracy.
Voters exert the right to choose, among competing sets of candidates, their
delegates to the Parliament. Candidates are generally grouped into parties
20
1.3. INTRA-PARTY POLITICS AND THE PARTY SYSTEM
Figure 1.1: The Party System and the Factional System
that appeal to the electorate presenting their different policy views that can
be usually summarized along the ideological left-right scale. After votes have
been casted, the electoral system transforms them into seats determining the
electoral strength of each parliamentary party group. Group size and its policy
ideal point, are the crucial elements that allow parties to bargain in order to
form a new government, providing them with a share of cabinet portfolios
(office payoffs). The parliament and the cabinet in turn affect the policy-
making through bills and ministerial decrees.
Where is the party? Where are the factions? Likewise citizens in repre-
sentative democracies, parties usually allow their members to send delegates
to party body (the agency in charge of running the party). During the party
congress members that retain similar views about how party line ought to
be could gather together presenting a motion. In chapter 4 we will describe
this process underlining what rules affect the likelihood that competing sub-
groups will contest the congress presenting their own motion attached to a
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list of candidates to party body. Moreover we will investigate what elements
increase the number of competing factions. The congress establishes the in-
ternal equilibrium between the rival subgroups, setting the new party line and
electing (directly or indirectly) the party leadership with the task of enacting
this line and allocating (policy and office) payoffs among factions. Accordingly
in chapter 6 we will analyze how parties set their line; we will focus on the
role of factions policy preferences in interaction with the power exerted by the
party leader, which might vary under different party rules. The party plat-
form in turn is a key element for the party and has an impact on the party
system too: it allows parties to appeal for voters’ support during general elec-
tion. Party platform will be more credible as long as the party appears to
be unified around it. Presenting a cohesive front to the electorate might in
fact improve its electoral performance (this will be tested in paragraph 8.5).
The electoral system translates votes into seats defining the strength of each
party in the parliamentary arena. Parties’ size along with their platforms are
decisive elements during negotiations over government formation. In addition
party unity and party rules too could be key sources of bargaining power that
increases the party’s chances to join the new cabinet. Paragraph 8.4 will test
this claim. Then, if the party succeed in joining the ruling coalition it will be
awarded with a certain number of ministerial posts. These office payoffs have
to be shared between the different factions. Likewise during the inter-factional
bargaining over the party line, we argue that intra-party portfolio allocation is
affected by factional preferences and by party rules. In chapter 5 we analyse
these dynamics. After the legislature has began and office payoffs have been
distributed the everyday policy-making takes place. In paragraph 8.3 we test
whether intra-party divisions exert an effect on it altering the level of party
cohesion during roll-call votes.
So far we argued that intra-party politics affects policy, office and votes,
22
1.4. WHERE DO FACTIONS COME FROM?
and, through them, alters the party system. This is however a mutual relation-
ship insofar the party system contributes to shape the total amount of payoffs
available to each party. In turn policy office and electoral rewards, along with
the criteria adopted to allocate them, have an effect on intra-party equilib-
riums altering the extent of factionalism (as described in chapter 4) and the
likelihood of a party fission (this topic will be addressed in chapter 7). Figure
1.2 summarizes the main interactions between the two fields of politics.
Figure 1.2: Interactions between The Party System and the Factional System
In the following paragraphs we will deepen the explanation of our research
question introducing a short description of the topics investigated in each re-
lated empirical chapter (4 through 8). Then we will sketch a brief outline of
the whole dissertation.
1.4 Where Do Factions Come From?
As discussed in paragraph 1.2 many works tried to explain factionalism
as a dependent variable. In chapter 4 we will build on the existing literature to
answer the question: where do factions come from? We know that the party is
not a given entity. Following this reasoning we should be aware that factions
are not fixed as well. Instead they are an endogenous output of the intra-party
environment and the party system. Along this line we retain that it does not
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make sense to treat them as stable. Even organized factions in fact might
divide and recombine themselves across subsequent party congresses. Hence it
is reasonable to look there in order to map the party’s factional structure (see
chapter 3 for a detailed discussion). Provided that factions are neither stable
nor exogenous we will try to find the grounds of factionalism. Starting from
the existing literature and according to our theoretical framework (see chapter
2), we investigate, first of all, whether intra-party rules exert constraints on
the expression of internal dissent measuring their impact on the likelihood of
holding contested congresses. Then we estimate what attributes increase or
decrease the number of factions. Among the others, we will consider policy
heterogeneity (micro-founding in a sense the existence of factions within the
party), availability of resources and patronage, the impact of the electoral
system, as well as competing sets of organizational rules.
1.5 How to Allocate Portfolios among Factions?
Once we acknowledged that factions exist, the question about how payoffs
are shared among them flows out naturally. We will address this topic focusing
on office and policy payoffs. Starting from the empirical implications of our
theoretical model (that will be discussed in paragraph 2.2), chapter 5 will
improve on Mershon (2001a, 2001b) work by investigating the patterns of intra-
party portfolio allocation. Noticeably whenever a party is in office its leader
decide how to assign ministerial posts to party members. However payoffs are
not necessarily distributed at leader’s discretion because parties are internally
divided and factions try to influence such process (Ono 2010). Focusing on
portfolios allotment we will observe inter-factional bargaining testing whether
a kind of Gamson (1961) law applies to intra-party politics (see later for a
description). Conversely we can also control if the party leader is able to
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exploit her position to gain a larger share of payoffs. In addition we will assess
how formal and informal rules alter the patterns of bargaining. Finally we will
also take into account factional preferences to evaluate how they impinge on
payoffs allocation.
1.6 Who Sets the Party Line?
Chapter 6 bears a resemblance with the fifth inasmuch as both deal with
bargaining dynamics of payoffs allocation. Like the previous one, this chap-
ter develops the arguments presented in the theoretical chapter (number 2).
Considering the party platform as a policy payoff that has to be shared among
factions, here we try to understand who runs the party and who sets the line.
Does the leader rule on her own? Is she constrained by activists and factions?
We derive some hypotheses from the literature on party organization (see para-
graph 1.2) and from the theoretical model shown in paragraph 2.2. Then we
measure the relationship between factional preferences and party platform ac-
cording to contrasting models of party (mass, catch-all, cartel). We analyse
party position as the endogenous output of an inter-factional competition. Al-
though carried in a non-strategic setting, however we build bridges with the
dynamic theories of party competition developed after Downs (1957).
1.7 Why Does the Party Break Up?
Party unity can be reached even inside divided parties, as the present dis-
sertation will show. The previous chapters (5 and 6) highlighted how factions
bargain to reach a compromise and how the leader acts to preserve party unity.
Notwithstanding, sometimes the party breaks up. By definition, factionalism
deals with intra-party divisions. Disagreement could materialize in a threefold
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behaviour: splits on parliamentary votes, MP’s switching between different
groups,4 and party fission. In chapter 7 we focus on the latter to analyze the
determinants of factional breakaways (that are not such a ‘rare’ event as one
might think). Given the existence of strategies to keep the party together we
wonder why often the cooperation fails and factional conflict yields party fis-
sion. Under what conditions does this happen? To answer this question we will
start from the results shown in chapter 5 and 6. Following our game-theoretic
model (chapter 2) we will take into account the whole set of payoffs (policy,
office, votes) available to the factions along with features related to party and
party system that provide constraints (e.g., loyalty, disproportional electoral
rules) or incentives (lack of democracy, centralized candidate selection) for the
breakaway. In addition we will examine the effect of leader’s attitude toward
minorities, which is the product of party system competitiveness and leader
autonomy.
4Switching is the results of an individual MP’s choice to abandon its group joining an-
other one during the legislative term. Nonetheless looking at the Italian case until 1994
(namely for three quarters of the time of the present analysis) switches involved legislators
moving in clusters due to party mergers and splits (Heller and Mershon 2005; Verzichelli
1996). These changes often concerned factions’ breakaway within divided parties: e.g., the
breakaway of PSI left-wing in 1963, the fission of the Italian Social Movement (MSI) in
1976, whose moderate factions created National Democracy (DN), or the split of the left-
wing faction from the Italian Social Democratic Party (PSDI) in 1989. After the 1994
individual switching grew, however some of them were still related to factional membership.
For instance the split within the Italian Popular Party (PPI) in 1995 when the right-wing
abandoned the party to create a new parliamentary group, the Unified Christian Democrats
(CDU), or the two fissions occurred within the Communist Refoundation Party (PRC) in
1995 and 1998 that witnessed the breakaway of its right-wing parliamentary party factions
(Comunisti Unitari and Comunisti Italiani, respectively). Although weakened the linkage
between parliamentary switching and factional affiliation is still there: in 2007 a left-wing
subgroup broke away from the Democrats of the Left (DS) when the mainstream endorsed
party dissolution to merge with The Daisy – Democracy is Freedom (DL) in order to create
the Democratic Party (PD); similarly in 2009 a small splinter group exited from the PD and
built the Alliance for Italy (API); along the same vein in 2010 the minority faction within
the ruling party, the People of Freedom (PDL), broke away building a new group, Future
and Freedom for Italy (FLI).
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1.8 Does Intra-party Politics Affect the Party
System?
The last empirical chapter (number 8) focuses on the effects of faction-
alism on the party system. We measure the degree of division existing within
each party congress and we analyze its consequences. We know that all po-
litical actors care, to some extent, about policy, office, and votes (Mu¨ller and
Strøm, 1999) Accordingly we will measure the impact intra-party divisions
on these three domains of politics. First of all we account for their effect
on policy through an analysis of MPs’ cohesion during parliamentary roll-call
votes. Then we look at the relationship between factionalism and office to
assess whether a broader disunity damages the party in the process of govern-
ment formation, altering the likelihood of being involved in a coalition cabinet
and consequently decreasing the whole amount of payoffs available to party
factions. Finally we consider the effect of factionalism on votes to establish
whether party heterogeneity impinges on its electoral fortunes (positively or
negatively).
1.9 Outline of the Dissertation
So far we presented the research question explaining why it is worth to
investigate factionalism and its linkage with party fission. We summarized the
main features of this work, focusing in particular on the relationship between
factional preferences and party rules and on the interaction between intra-
party politics and party system. We overviewed the main literature on intra-
party politics and we briefly introduced the content of four empirical chapters,
showing how they allow to thoroughly describe everyday politics.
In the next chapter (the number 2), we will provide a theory of factional
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politics focusing on distributive bargaining and party unity. From our game-
theoretic model we will derive some general implications that will be tested in
the course of the dissertation through more specific hypotheses. In addition
we will better discuss the interplay between party leader and party factions
showing how contrasting leader selection procedures might establish different
intra-party environments. Later, in chapter 3, we will discuss the suitability
of Italy as a case study. We will illustrate the dataset, explaining how it has
been built and showing some measures of validity and reliability. As far as we
are dealing with a text analysis that encompasses 64 years of Italian history,
we will also discuss the changes in the political language across time.
Then we will illustrate the results of our work. First of all, in chapter
4 we take factions as the dependent variable investigating the causes of fac-
tionalism; Then we concentrate on intra-party bargaining: in chapter 5 we
extend Mershon’s studies on factional portfolio allocation taking into account
all the parties included in our dataset. In chapter 6 we deal with the ‘game’ of
party position-taking, analysing the role played by factions in shaping party
position. Having discussed how factions cooperate to maintain party unity,
in chapter 7 we investigate the determinants of party fission looking at fac-
tional breakaways. Chapter 8 measures the impact of intra-party politics on
the party system. We examine the effects of intra-party divisions on policy
(MPs cohesion in parliamentary votes), office (the likelihood of being involved
in coalition governments), and votes (parties’ electoral performance). Finally
in chapter 9 we conclude summarizing our main findings, with a focus on the
role played by factions’ preferences and intra-party rules, and we will carry out
a comparison between the theoretical expectations and the empirical findings,
as an attempt to validate our theory. Then we conclude building bridges for
future researches.
28
Chapter 2
Factional Politics: A Theory of
Party Unity and Party Fission
2.1 Introduction
In the present chapter we describe our theory of party unity and party
fission. Taking the cue from distributive bargaining games, like for instance
the Ultimatum game, we provide a game-theoretic model to describe the inter-
play between party leader and party factions. We will focus on the distribute
dynamics carried out by the leader in order to preserve party unity and to
avoid the breakaway of internal minorities following the ‘exit voice and loy-
alty’ framework.1 We assume that contrasting modes of leader selection (see
paragraph 2.3) might alter the degree of autonomy retained by the leader in
front of party factions, with effects on distributive dynamics and party unity.
Accordingly, we will provide alternative models to describe these two different
intra-party environments, depending on leader autonomy. Given that party
factions and party leadership are insider actors, we argue that they have full
1The ‘exit voice and loyalty’ game has been proposed by Hirschman (1970). Additional
details are discussed in chapter 7.
29
CHAPTER 2. FACTIONAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF PARTY UNITY
AND PARTY FISSION
access to information about payoffs, strategies, moves and nodes of the game.2
We also assume common knowledge between the actors. Hence we will repre-
sent intra-party dynamics through games of perfect (and complete) informa-
tion. Then, starting from the theoretical implications derived from the two
games, we will raise some expectations about the shape of intra-party politics
focusing on the degree of factionalism, on the distribution of (policy and office)
payoffs and on party fission. Across the related empirical chapters (4 through
7) we will test these expectation and finally, in chapter 9, we will sum up the
empirical results to provide a validation for our theory.
2.2 A Theory of Party Unity and Party Fis-
sion
All political actors care, to some extent, about policy, office and votes
(Mu¨ller and Strøm 1999). Being political actors, factions retain the same
desires; they are interested in all the three types of payoffs and they want to
maximize their share. Some authors focused on the idea that factions are
interested only in patronage. To the contrary we claim that they have a
care in policy too. We can easily demonstrate that factions hold different
preferences and conflicting views about party platform (Debus and Bra¨uninger
2009); in the present analysis differences between factions’ policy positions
within each congress are often statistically significant.3 Other authors already
shown that policy matters: preferences shape factional membership (Bernauer
and Bra¨uninger 2009) and voting behaviour (Cowley 2002; Giannetti and Laver
2009; Rosenthal and Voeten 2004; Spirling and Quinn 2010).
2This in addition helps to understand why it is so crucial for factions (i.e., for minority
factions) to get represented inside party body and party executive.
3In the 84% of cases (70 congresses out of 83) we have at least two factions whose positions
are statistically different. See confidence intervals in Appendix B.
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There is general agreement around this idea; even authors that emphasized
the role of patronage somehow recognize that factions could be arrayed along
the left-right scale and they indeed do so (e.g., Bettcher 2005; Golden and
Chang 2001; Zuckerman 1979). As an example, DC factions should be consid-
ered like typical actors interested only in patronage, given that DC was always
in power sharing office benefits and clienteles. Nonetheless scholars unani-
mously admit that DC factions retained divergent policy positions: Zucker-
man (1979: 110), for instance, aligned them along the left-right scale; Golden
and Chang (2001: 605) described them as ‘not ideologically distinct nonethe-
less [. . . ] they can be arrayed ideologically’; Bettcher, although stressing the
primacy of patronage, implicitly recognized that all factions care (at least par-
tially) to policy; he admits that DC factions shared similarities with factions
of principle such that they ‘identified themselves along a left-right spectrum’
(Bettcher 2005: 350). Indeed DC factions reverted to ideology as a glue for
their unity and as a source of legitimacy (Calise 2000: 87).
Following Sartori (1976) it could be argued that factions hold ideological
positions only for instrumental reasons. However we should remind that it
‘Doesn’t really matter for our purposes whether the public expression of policy
preference is sincere or not. What matters is that it is costly to turn back from
this. Thus a politician whose private desires deal only with getting into office
for its own sake must become inextricably associated with a particular policy
position in order to fulfil these objectives’ (Laver and Shepsle 1996: 249).
Obviously a faction, exactly like any other actor, ‘may well have an interest in
changing its policy position for all sorts of reasons’ (Laver and Shepsle 1996:
249). However to avoid loss of credibility these changes must be rare or limited
and, therefore, policy positions should be quiet stable. Factional array within
the DC was stable indeed; for instance left-wing subgroups were almost always
on the left-wing side (Bettcher 2005: 352). Furthermore this is true for many
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factions in many parties (see appendix B). According to this idea, stability
in left-right arrangement confirms that even instrumental preferences become
actual policy positions with real effects on politics.
We will regard factions as rational actors interested in maximizing their
payoffs. Inside each party, factions have to deal with reciprocal interactions.
They are involved in a common effort to produce a public good: keeping the
party together. Party unity in fact enhances party strength in the electoral
arena (e.g., McGann 2002; Snyder and Ting 2002) and during the negotiation
over coalition government (e.g., Ba¨ck 2009; Baron 1998), increasing the total
amount of payoffs that its members can exploit. On one side then, factions
need to cooperate reaching an agreement to foster the party. On the other side
they quarrel about how to share the private benefits derived from the public
good. In this sense intra-party politics is a matter of conflict and cooperation
with factions looking for an equilibrium between the two (Maor 1997). Some-
times these contrasting forces do not balance and the party breaks up. These
three aspects of intra-party dynamics that we investigate later correspond to
the three faces of factionalism (cooperative, competitive and degenerative)
highlighted by Boucek (2009).
We already discussed that parties, although considered unitary actors, are
composed by members and subgroups that retain divergent preferences. These
preferences are, by their nature, conflicting. Then divisions, compromises and
struggles are traits common to almost all parties. However in many of them and
most of the time ‘internal disagreements are resolved before party positions are
defined formally – as in party manifestos – or behaviorally – as in legislative
votes and speeches’ because ‘The incentives for parties to present a unified
front in the wider political arena are strong’ (Heller 2008: 2). In this sense
‘the display of party unity does not imply a lack of conflict inside the party;
rather it simply shows that party members have agreed to a party position
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that they all can support, or at least tolerate. The key question then is not
whether parties evince unity, but rather how they choose the positions around
which they unify’ (Heller 2008: 4).
We will discuss these negotiations focusing on office payoffs and party
position-taking. Here we present a theoretical framework that encompasses
both aspects. Suppose we have only two factions, i and j. They belong to
the same party and have to share the total amount of resources (office, policy)
available within their party. Each faction could propose to the other how to
share those payoffs. If they make a deal their benefit will be higher. On the
contrary if they fail to reach a compromise they will split; each faction will
try to affect the party system on its own but the payoffs will be lower. As a
consequence they will look for a compromise. The choice about how to share
payoffs (e.g., ministers) is not so different from the decision about how to set
party position; here we account for them both.
Each faction will be better off if the final agreement coincides with its ideal
point (e.g., if all cabinet posts are assigned to its members or if the party
position matches faction’s preference). This occurrence defines the extremes
of the Pareto set of all the achievable agreements: either faction i obtain 100%
of the spoils or faction j will do. Among these two extremes there are (in)finite
combinations that lead to feasible deals.
Which one will be picked up? Being able to measure their reciprocal
strength, the factions will grant to the opponent a quota of payoffs equal
to its contribution to the coalition (Gamson 1961; Warwick 2001; Levy 2004).
Factional strength is to be measured as the number of congress votes gained
by the faction: as far as one member equals one vote and each member is a
resource for the party (due to her membership drive and her physical work
within the organization) the total number of members that support one of the
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factions is the best way to measure the factional contribution to the coalition.4
In this sense proportional allocation is a rule of thumb, a kind of focal point
of the game recognized by all players as the one which is the most proper and
that corresponds to a sense of justice. This is particularly true considering
that in a legislative arena each faction would benefit from a split according to
the number of seats it retains (Gamson 1961 and on office payoffs; Warwick
2001 on policy payoffs). If this is the case a minority faction will accept only
a distribution of payoffs that is proportional to its power within the party.
This share equals the benefit of joining another party or contributing to the
government on its own. The faction will be indifferent among the two options
(to stay or to leave); however it will rather stay, avoiding to incur the cost
of leaving the party (this cost for instance is represented by loyalty or by the
need to create a new organization, and so on).
In the real world things are slightly complicated. So far we discussed only
the bargaining between factions, leaving aside the role of party leader. How-
ever, as far as we are dealing with the production of a public good (party
unity) we have to cope with the classic collective action dilemma (Olson 1965).
Although repeated interaction between factions fosters the emergence of co-
operative norms (Boucek 2003a) the party will need to select one actor that
organizes the subgroups to carry out the public good (e.g., Cox and McCub-
bins 1993). This role is played by the party leader who may be in charge of
dividing the payoffs among all factions. As far as leader’s first desire should be
to keep its status she will probably overpay her own faction, to avoid losing its
support and to minimize the risk of being dismissed from the office.5 Actually
4Size matters: talking about the strength of the median DC faction, Dorotei, Andreotti
noted that they were strong due to their size, ‘because size is power’ (from “La Repubblica”
July 8th, 2010, translation mine).
5Leaders face a kind of Madison’s Dilemma: ‘Agents who are placed in a position of
leadership [. . . ] can be expected to exploit it – to use the authority they have been granted
to advance their own interests’ (Kiewit and McCubbins 1991: 47).
34
2.2. A THEORY OF PARTY UNITY AND PARTY FISSION
this unequal allotment could be reasonable in light of the added value pro-
vided by the leader: a strong leader increases the spoils assigned to her party
granting more benefits to all factions. If this is the case it would be reasonable
to assign to her (i.e., to the faction linked to her) this surplus.6 The stronger
the leader, the greater her advantage.
We can model this idea following the classic ultimatum game, like in figure
2.1. There are two actors: the party leader, L, tied to the mainstream faction
(composed by her followers) and a minority faction, F, that gathers dissenting
members.
L has to split a total amount of payoffs equal to 10; she can make a proposal
that can be accepted or rejected by the minority group. If the minority refuses
the payoffs of both actors shrink to zero, like in upshots 2 (U2) and 4 (U4).
To give an idea: the law proposed by the leader is not passed or the party
is no longer able to join the coalition government, loosing policy and office
payoffs. Suppose that the two factions retain approximately 50% of party
members each. The leader might offer a fair deal (granting 5 out of 10 to the
minority faction) or otherwise she can propose an unfair sharing (retaining a
quota of benefits greater than her faction’s size). The minority faction may
either accept or refuse the proposal. The classic game-theoretic solution is
that the leader proposes the unequal distribution and the minority accepts the
deal leading to upshot 1 (U1): both actors maximize their payoffs given the
credible outcomes of the game.
However empirical evidence from real world politics and experimental eco-
nomics provided confirmation for the alternative solution (U3) according to
6This reasoning is analogous to the principal-agent paradigm: to solve the collective
action dilemma party factions should assign to the party leader (i.e., a political entrepreneur)
a remuneration that coincides with the surplus produced thanks to her contribution (Alchian
and Demsetz 1972).
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Figure 2.1: Inter-factional Bargaining as an Ultimatum Game
Note: L = party leader; F = minority faction. Leader moves first. Actors payoffs are
indicated in square brackets and kept separated by a semicolon. Leader payoffs are
indicated first, followed by faction payoffs.
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whom the payoffs will be split evenly (e.g., Gu¨th 1982; Nowak et al. 2000).
This could be due to many possible reasons. We argue that the degree of
leader autonomy, determined mainly by the leader selection procedures could
be the key element to explain these contrasting empirical results.
The party leader is responsible for payoffs allocation within factions. We
can face two paths: either the leader is voted by the party body or she is
directly elected by the rank and file (see figure 2.4 below). In the first case
her election might result from inter-factional compromise. This happens, more
likely, when the leader is nominated in small committees (smoke-filled rooms)
where any single activist can alter the equilibrium by changing her position.
In this context each faction retains a stronger veto power and the need for a
compromise will be greater. The appointed leader is nothing more than the
product of inter-factional arrangements and has to stick to the inter-factional
agreement on which her delegation was based on, given that any deviation
from the deal will lead to her dismissal. The leader has no autonomy and
plays no role, so that party factions will keep on dividing payoffs according to
their strength, as discussed before.7
Starting from the ultimatum game described above, in figure 2.2 we rep-
resent the decision-making process inside parties ruled by a bounded leader
(BL). We assume that the leader has to decide how to split the total amount
of (policy, office and electoral) payoffs that come from party unity, µ. However
she has simply no choice (or a very restricted room for manoeuvre). In fact the
leader must enact the factional agreement and she can only propose to faction
F a fair deal. L will grant to the minority a share of payoffs equal (or close)
to its size, α (that is the share of congress votes won by that faction). In turn,
F will accept the offer, leading the game to the equilibrium U3. Conversely, L
7Empirical evidence from Japan underpins this idea: after 1980 the LDP president (who
is in charge of allocating office posts) has been elected through factional bargaining; as a
consequence the fairness in portfolio allocation increased (Di Virgilio and Kato 2001).
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will keep the remaining share of payoffs (1−α times µ) per se (or rather, she
will assign it to the mainstream faction, composed by her followers).
Figure 2.2: Distributive Dynamics with Leader Bounded by Factional Agree-
ment
Note: µ = value of party unity; α = minority size. We assume that α ∈ (0,.5). L = party
leader; F = minority faction. Leader moves first. Actors payoffs are indicated in square
brackets and kept separated by a semicolon. Leader payoffs are indicated first, followed by
faction payoffs.
The previous game was useful to understand bargaining dynamics enacted
by non-autonomous leaders. As discussed so far, under a weak leadership,
factions’ vetoes exert insurmountable constraints. Their common interest in
the benefits coming from party unity enhances a fair distribution of payoffs.
Alternatively the leader could be directly elected by a wide ‘selectorate’
e.g., the rank and file or the whole assembly of delegates at party congress.
The broader turnout decreases factions’ veto powers; elements like name recog-
nisability, polls and the front-runner effect (Kenig 2009b) as well as the greater
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legitimacy granted by direct election (Michels 1911) foster the new leader in
front of middle-level activists (see figure 2.4).8 She will be stronger than fac-
tions and she will also provide the party with the added value of her personal
charisma. In such situation the leader will decide on her own how to assign
benefits. As long as she received the mandate from party members through a
direct election, the leader benefits of a larger degree of autonomy. She will try
to exploit such autonomy to increase her payoffs (and to reward her followers
on which her power relies on).
Considering the ultimatum game of figure 2.1 we contend that, in the first
stage, an autonomous leader (AL) will always try to make an unfair offer, as
an attempt to reward her followers and to avoid the risk of being dismissed by
the mainstream faction (which is responsible for her election).9 However the
leader’s proposal will not be implemented without factions’ consent.
We modify the previous game adding additional stages: after the leader’s
(unfair) proposal the minorities might accept or voice; then the leader might
look for a compromise or whip the dissenters and they in turn could decide
whether to accept the whip or to leave the party (figure 2.3).
There are still only two actors: the party leader, L, tied to the mainstream
faction (composed by her followers) and a minority faction, F, that gathers dis-
senting members. Minority’s size is equal to α, i.e., the share of congress votes
won by the faction (a positive value lower than 0.5). There is a total amount
of payoffs to be shared; these rewards include office (posts in party body or
cabinet spoils), policy (party position) and electoral payoffs (candidacies and
parliamentary seats). These returns correspond to µ, that expresses the value
8The rationale is that ‘the less consistently and intensively involved the participant in
the candidate selection process, the more he or she will be swayed by name recognition and
the more likely he or she is to take cues from the highly visible central leadership’ (Katz
2001: 291).
9The mainstream faction could in fact decide to replace her with another leader who,
due for instance to her stronger personal charisma, is more able to overpay her supporters
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of party unity. The greater this coefficient, the greater the sum of party’s pay-
offs. However to simplify our analysis we assume that the amount of payoffs
is fixed so that µ is constant and equal to 1. Furthermore any strategy that
undermines party unity or cohesion imposes costs on the actors.10
Figure 2.3: Party Unity and Party Fission Game
Note: µ = value of party unity; α = minority size; ν = cost of public voice; ε = cost of
breakaway; pi = difference in minority payoffs after breakaway; ω = cost of party breakup.
We assume that: µ = 1; α ∈ (0,.5); ε ∈ (0,.5); ω ∈ (0,.5); ν ∈ (0,.5); pi < 1; ν < α. F =
minority faction; L = party leader. Actors payoffs are indicated in square brackets and kept
separated by a semicolon. Faction payoffs are indicated first, followed by leader payoffs.
The leader proposes to the minorities a deal, trying to exploit her dominant
position to keep the whole set of benefits. The minority faction might accept
or voice. If the faction complies the gain will be zero (dissenters are excluded
10We distinguish between ‘unity ’, when factions stay within the party even though they
might openly support different views and strategies, and ‘cohesion’, when factions think
and act in a cohesive manner that is in agreement with the party line. Party unity refers
to the idea of keeping the party together. This could imply cohesion though the latter
is not required. We can observe unity with (when all factions agreed on party line) or
without cohesion (when several factions express their dissenting voices from within). We
observe a lack of unity when intra-party dissent erupts in a party fission. Vice versa we
refer to cohesion as the lack of dissent over the party line. Note that a cohesive environment
could be built by means of compromise (reaching an agreement) or through enforced (or
internalized) discipline and loyalty (see chapter 6). We refer to this concept when factions
are cohesive in supporting the party line (or in non opposing it) even if their support is not
sincere.
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from the allocation of rewards) and conversely leader’s payoffs will be equal to
µ (U1). Otherwise F can choose to voice; the whole party will pay the cost ν,
due to public expression of internal dissent (this cost is greater, for instance,
among undemocratic parties that do not tolerate internal dissent).11 Then L
can propose a new deal. She can reverse her choice, offering a compromise
(each faction will be rewarded on the basis of its strength) or she can stay
put, whipping the minority to keep the entire benefit. A compromise will
assign µ times α minus the cost ν to the minority faction, leaving to L µ
times (1 −α) minus ν (U2). Under the whipping option the game will reach
the final stage where the dissenters can either comply or pick up the exit
option, leaving the party. If they obey (U3) the payoffs will be very similar
to the first stage (when F chose accept) but they are lowered by the value
ν for both actors, because the public audience acknowledged the existence of
intra-party disagreements (arguably this minus value could be weighted by the
extent of the disagreement i.e., the share of dissenters within the party).12 To
the contrary if the minority faction breaks away (U4) its payoffs will be pi
minus the value ε (i.e., the costs of leaving the party). This upshot takes into
account the likelihood of being able to gain seats in the next election (e.g., a
function of the disproportionality of the electoral system) along with the price
for infringed loyalty and the leverage exerted by the minority. In case of split,
L will exploit the whole amount of rewards lowered by the contribution of the
11We could also differentiate the cost of voice for the leader from that paid by the minority
faction. The source of such cost might in fact come from alternative sources. However, as
we will discuss when talking about the operationalization of this parameter, we assume that
these sources are complementary in that the grater the cost of voice suffered by the leader,
the higher the price that minority faction will end up paying. In a sense, the extent of this
cost is the same for the whole party and for all the actors involved in the game.
12Note that heterogeneity could also strengthen the party in the electoral arena allowing it
to appeal to a broader public (Katz 1985; McAllister 1991; Morgenstern 2001; Shepsle 1972;
but see Alesina and Cukierman 1990). Nonetheless several authors argue that disunity is
damaging for party’s electoral performance (McGann 2002; Snyder and Ting 2002). Which
effect is actually prevailing remains a disputed question (Pasquino 1986). We will better
address this topic in paragraph 8.5.
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minority faction that now is lacking: µ times (1 −α). Compared to the case
of compromise after voice, the leader will not pay any cost for party disunity
because the split has canceled the previous disputes providing the party with a
clearer and stronger label’s value; however L will pay the price ω representing
a loss in image due to leader’s inability to keep the party together. This price
could be higher for a core party that loses its status because of the split or in
highly competitive party systems (Boucek 2010), mainly for ruling parties.13
According to figure 2.3, table 2.1 summarizes the four possible upshots of
the game and reports the payoffs obtained by each actor (F and L) providing
a brief description of the moves that leaded to each outcome.
Table 2.1: Upshots of the Game and Related Actors’ Payoffs
Upshot Description Faction (F) Leader (L)
U1 F accepts the unfair deal 0 µ
U2 F voices, L offers a compromise α× µ− ν (1 −α)×µ− ν
U3 L whips F, who complies 0− ν µ− ν
U4 L whips F, who breaks away pi − ε (1 −α)×µ− ω
From a backward induction we can draw some observations. In the final
stage F faces the choice between exit or accept ; for large values of ε or low pi
the minority will prefer to accept the whip instead of leaving the party. For
value of ω lower than ν the output will be the second best for L that can
exploit all the amount of payoffs sustaining the cost ν while F’s return is lower
than zero. However F knows that it would be better off choosing accept at the
first stage (because it avoids to suffer the loss due to ν) so that U1 would be
the equilibrium. This pattern resembles that of the dictator game where the
responder has no choice and can just accept the proposal. Although we claim
13This in turn could be proportional to the strength of the splinter group (α) under the
idea that the breakaway of a small faction does not damage the party too much. Note
however that even a small faction may be very powerful if it retains the power to make
or break governments (Boucek 2010). See also chapter 5, paragraph 8.5 and footnote 21,
chapter 7, for a deeper discussion on this.
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that minority group will have zero payoff, we would expect that (according
to economics experimental results) the leader allocates a non-zero share of
benefits. Anyway, this share will be considerably lower compared to the case
of bounded leaders (figure 2.2). To the contrary when ε is relatively small and
pi is wide F will choose exit at the last stage. In this context, whenever ω is
lower than ν the leader will carry the game up to that point, whipping the
dissenters in the previous stage and leading the game to U4. Finally, when
the costs ω is wide and pi − ε is positive L will try to reach a compromise
at the second stage to avoid the risk of suffering a party fission in the next
one, hence the final outcome will be U2. Table 2.2 sums up the upshots
related to each possible equilibrium. We distinguish between non credible
threat (when faction’s payoffs is greater inside the party), credible weak threat
(by splitting away the faction can only minimize its loss, compared to the
worst option available within),14 and credible strong threat (the faction would
rather break away gaining positive payoffs, unless the leader overpays it with
a larger amount of revenues).
Table 2.2: Summary of the Equilibriums and Related Upshots according to
the Value of Some Parameters
Leader Focus Faction Threat to Breakaway
Non-Credible Weak & Credible Strong & Credible
(ε > pi and (ε > pi and (ε < pi)
pi − ε < 0− ν) pi − ε > 0− ν)
Unity U1 U2 U2
(ω > ν) accept voice; compromise voice; compromise
Cohesion U1 U1 U4
(ω < ν) accept accept voice; exit; whip
Starting from the equilibriums described in these two games we can make
some points about the shape of intra-party dynamics. The models focus pri-
14Minimizing the loss could be a rational choice and, accordingly, the threat of split is
credible. However the cost of breaking away outweighs the benefit. Factions have to choose
between two options that will equally convey negative payoffs. This scenario then is weaker
compared to cases where factions gain strictly positive payoffs after the fission.
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marily on two facets. One concerns the distribution of policy and office payoffs.
In chapters 5 and 6 we will examine portfolio allocation and party position-
taking accounting for contrasting patterns of inter-factional bargaining. Our
aim is to distinguish elements that boost fairness and consensual dynamics
(i.e., compromise) from those that promote leader’s discretionality and favor
minority’s compliance (i.e., accept). The second topic that emerges from our
theoretical discussion is related to party fission. Chapter 7 addresses this ques-
tion to establish which conditions generate factional breakaways (i.e., exit). In
addition we can also draw some implications about the degree of factional-
ism (topic discussed in chapter 4) to assess features that favor or inhibit the
expression of dissent (i.e., voice).
As described in table 2.2, intra-party politics is a two-sided game. On
one hand we observe elements that impinge on faction’s choice, while on the
other we find those that affect leader’s reply. Each factor that alters the ratio
between ω and ν or between pi and ε, leads to contrasting outputs increasing
or decreasing the expression of dissent, the fairness in payoffs allocation and
the likelihood of party fission. In table 2.3 we record the expected effect on the
facets of intra-party politics (voice, compromise, exit) entailed by an increase
of each element (ω, ν, pi, ε), along with an intuition about what each value
refers to.
Furthermore, following our general theory, we would expect to observe
different outcomes depending on leader selection procedures. We argued that
such organizational attribute enables to build distinct party environments that
may even correspond to alternative patterns of party (see paragraph 2.3 for
a deeper discussion). To take into account such peculiarities in fact we pro-
vided two separate games (figure 2.2 and 2.3). Accordingly we will compare,
through the chapters, the dynamics among parties ruled by autonomous (AL)
or bounded leaders (BL). Our expectations about the effects of BL on intra-
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party dynamics are derived from the game in figure 2.2; the impacts of AL, on
the contrary, is related to the game shown in figure 2.3. Across the dissertation
we will assess similarities and divergences between these two patterns of party.
Moreover, we will also focus on the interaction between leader autonomy and
party system competitiveness (AL∗ω) raising hypotheses accordingly. Table
2.3 resumes all these elements along with their expected effect on the shape of
intra-party politics.
Table 2.3: Parameters of the Games and their Expected Effect on the Facets
of Intra-party Politics
Parameter Description Voice Compromise Exit
ε Exit cost: Loyalty and disproportionality – – –
pi Trade-off: Heterogeneity and minority leverage + + +
ω Breakup cost: Party system competitiveness + + –
ν Voice cost: Intra-party democracy and discipline – – +
AL Autonomous leader 0/– – +
AL∗ω Autonomous leader in competitive system 0/– + –
BL Bounded leader + + –
Here we provide some insights about the meaning of each parameter while
a more detailed description will be carried out in the empirical part of the
dissertation. The value ε expresses the exit cost, which increases for instance
when loyalty toward party structure and party symbols is very strong or under
political systems with disproportional electoral rules that exert barriers to the
entrance of new parties in the electoral market. The parameter pi represents
the ‘trade-off’, i.e., the net benefit available to minority factions after the split.
Due to membership costs (Snyder and Ting 2002), when party heterogeneity
is too large each faction would benefit from a split which should increase its
gain in terms of policy payoffs. The faction in fact will cease to suffer this
membership cost (which is proportional to its distance from the bulk of fac-
tions) and it will also profit from the enhanced clearness in party label. In
addition we account for the potential expected increase in office payoffs, which
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is related to the leverage of each faction: when the split increases the bar-
gaining power of a faction beyond its size, the net benefit of its breakaway
raises. However, when factions are already overpaid within their own party
the value of such parameter shrinks. The third element, ω, refers to party
system competitiveness: in competitive party systems any single split might
alter the balance of power between government and opposition (in the parlia-
mentary arena) or between rival parties (in the electoral market) raising the
cost of party breakup. Finally, ν, is the cost of voice that should increase when
the intra-party level of democracy is lower. When public voice is detrimental
for the party, the minority will pay a higher price for expressing dissent (due
for instance to whipping and sanctions); conversely the party leadership will
suffer for the lack of cohesion due to the public acknowledgement of internal
disputes. Here we summarize the general expectations derived from table 2.3
related to the three areas of analysis.
Voice – Factionalism, chapter 4. Elements that increase the exit costs (ε),
such as a strong party loyalty, should deter factions from disclosing their dissent
decreasing the degree of factionalism. Looking at table 2.2, when ε is larger
than pi in fact we record voice only in one equilibrium out of four while for small
values of ε the minority should always revert to voice as a strategy to enhance
its welfare. In turn, an increase in pi boosts factionalism: the minority tries to
exploit its stronger leverage through the voice option, to bargain a good deal
that might convey larger payoffs. Along the same vein we contend that under
competitive party systems (ω), where each subgroup might alter the balance
of power between rival parties, the leverage of minorities increases thereby
making voice more profitable. By definition, we expect that an increase in the
cost of voice (ν) will reduce its usage (we observe voice in only one equilibrium
out of three when ν is large). Finally, in parties whose leaders are bounded
by factions we should always observe voice. Factional bargaining in fact is
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the device adopted to select the leader and to allocate payoffs. Accordingly,
each subgroup should try to affect this process by building its own faction.
Compared to that case, we should observe slight dissent when leaders are
autonomous (voice appears in half of the equilibriums) although this difference
could be neglected under competitive conditions.
Compromise – Payoffs allocation, chapters 5 and 6. We raise an argument
considering policy and office payoffs altogether, insofar as we assume that
their allocation follows a common dynamic. When the exit costs (ε) are larger
minority has no longer a blackmail power on party leadership. Hence we expect
less consensual dynamics (in three out of four equilibriums the final upshot
should be to accept the unfair allowance) and low compromise. For opposite
reasons when pi is larger than ε factions exploit their wide leverage and there
would be more room for a compromise. However this is true only inasmuch
as party system competitiveness (ω) is strong too. Competitive conditions in
fact appear as the primary determinant of factional cooperation and uphold
the reaching of a compromise between party factions. Accordingly, we will
focus mainly on this aspect in the related empirical chapters. Conversely, the
cost of voice (ν) brings minorities to accept an unfair deal whenever they know
that the leadership is not willing to address their demands, and they are not
strong enough to carry their threat up to the breaking point. As a matter of
fact under parties ruled by bounded leaders the reach of a compromise should
be the rule: as discussed before, the leader is selected after an inter-factional
negotiation and she has to stick to such deal. Autonomous leaders, on the
contrary, try to enhance their own interests. However this is no longer true
when party unity is an issue at stake, i.e., under highly competitive political
systems when a fission could strongly harm the party.
Exit – Party fission, chapter 7. Noticeably, the cost of exit (ε) is expected
to exert a straightforward effect on the occurrence of party fission. All the
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elements that boost exit costs contribute to preserve party unity and in fact
from table 2.2 we do not observe exit when ε is larger than pi. Vice versa, larger
values of pi confirms that the threat of a breakaway is strong and credible and,
accordingly, the minority will pick up the exit option unless the party leader
is prone to heed its requests by overpaying it. This will not happen in low
competitive political systems (such as in a dominant party system) where
in fact we would expect more exit, while an increase in competitiveness (ω)
should decrease splits. A growing cost of voice (ν) yields as an effect the lack
of room for internal dissent and, on the other side, brings the leader to refuse
any compromise, trading unity for cohesion. As a consequence, we should
observe more frequent exit for large values of ν, when the minority faction
possesses a credible and strong threat. To conclude, we contend that, compared
to their bounded counterparts, autonomous leaders foster the likelihood of
splits. However, when facing competitive conditions, leaders should exploit
their greater autonomy to cater to minority factions in order to avoid damaging
splits and to preserve party unity.
The intuitions developed from the theoretical framework and described in
table 2.3 will be retrieved in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, whose subjects are in fact
directly affected by the implications that emerged from the game-theoretic
models (with respect to factionalism, payoffs allocation and party fission). In
each chapter we will raise and test more specific hypotheses, operationalizing
the parameters of table 2.3 through variables that are suitable for that spe-
cific context, following in many cases the suggestions provided by the existing
literature.
As an example, in chapter 4, when dealing with the causes of factionalism,
we will pay attention to party organization measuring most of the parameters
according to intra-party rules and including some other hypotheses drawn from
the literature. In chapter 5 we focus on portfolio allocation and accordingly we
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will adopt variables connected, for instance, with cabinet stability or with the
literature on the distribution of cabinet posts. In chapter 6, which is related to
party platform, we test the impact of our parameters focusing on intra-party
competition in the electoral arena, following the literature on party position-
taking. Finally, in chapter 7 we will be concerned mainly with intra-party
equilibriums, operationalizing the parameters accordingly.
We should note that, depending on their operationalization, the impact
of such variables might sometimes encompasses more than one parameter.
However, apart from few exceptions that will be discussed more deeply in each
chapter, the effects caught by these variables maintain a common direction.
For instance, a variable might entail an increase in pi and a decrease in ε in the
meanwhile. In this sense, whether due to one causal relationship or to both
of them, these variables will allow to assess the validity of our theory anyway.
Later, in chapter 9, we will resume the results of each chapter to analyze them
in the light of our game-theoretic model.
2.3 The Party Leader Selectorate: Autonomy
or Dependence
In the previous paragraph we introduced two different games to describe
intra-party dynamics under autonomous or bounded leaderships. We argued
that the two contrasting leader selection procedures described above give rise
to different party environments and even to alternative models of party: on
one side the mass party, with its strong linkage to membership, hierarchy and
bureaucracy, while on the other side we find a modern party structure, that
emphasizes the primacy of party leader and appeals directly to party members
or to the whole electorate, bypassing middle-level activists.
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Several authors suggested that direct forms of internal democracy might
allow party leaders to manipulate the members for their own ends (Katz, 2001;
Katz and Mair 1995; Kenig 2009b; Mair, 1994, 1997; Marsh, 1993; Michels
1911; Ostrogorksi 1902; Poguntke and Webb, 2005; Rahat et al., 2008). In this
vein we retain that, thanks to elements like name recognisability and the front
runner effect (Kenig 2009b), the direct election made by a wide and inclusive
selectorate paves the way to a ‘Bonapartist’ form of intra-party democracy
(Michels 1911) and to a less representative party environment (Rahat et al.
2008). As discussed below, we dichotomize the leader’s selection procedure
distinguishing between direct election (by members or delegates), which fosters
leader’s autonomy, and indirect election (by a small party body committee)
that keeps the leader tied to factional vetoes.15
We conclude the theoretical part of this work drawing figure 2.4 that de-
scribes the linkage between the election of party leader and her degree of
autonomy. This attribute has been already introduced in the game-theoretic
model discussed above and will be retrieved in the course of the dissertation
to test some hypotheses and interactions that flow from the game.
Figure 2.4: Leader Selectorate and Leader Autonomy
15In chapter 6 we will provide additional arguments related with this idea.
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The picture brings together two elements: the party leader in fact might be
elected directly by members or activists, or indirectly by a selected committee.
The dichotomy direct/indirect election overlaps with the inclusiveness of the
selectorate in that when the leader is directly elected, the selectorate is wide
and inclusive. On the contrary indirect election is usually carried out by a
small committee.
On the left extreme of the continuum we find wide and inclusive selec-
torates; they correspond to the total number of party members or even en-
compass party supporters and sympathizers (meaning anyone who is willing
to subscribe a declaration of identification with the party while casting the
vote to elect the party leader). So far in the Italian political system only the
Democratic Party adopted this mechanism to select its leader, twice, in 2007
and 2009.
Alternatively leader’s selection could be devoted to the party congress. In
this case the leader is directly elected by the whole assembly of party delegates
during the congress. Italian parties started to introduce this method at the
end of the 1970s and nowadays this is the most common way. The selectorate
is quite large given that usually around a thousand of delegates participate
to the national congress. In most of the cases the election is just a formal-
ity because the leader has already been elected by the party members: often
delegates ratify a choice that has already been done elsewhere, resulting from
the sum of votes casted at the local level. Sometimes the election is indeed
a ritual where the leader is appointed by acclamation (this happens in par-
ticular within personal parties, see later). In our sample approximately one
out of four leaders has been elected directly during the congress or through
‘primary’ elections. On the other side of the continuum we find smaller selec-
torates. The congress usually appoints a smaller selected committee, like the
National Council or the Central Committee, which is a kind of internal par-
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liament in charge of controlling the leadership. This committee is composed
on average by a hundred of members. They might elect the leader on their
own or, alternatively, her election could be demanded to the executive branch,
which is a tiny group composed by few members (at most a dozen of people).
They choose one of them as the new party leader and provide her with the
necessary assistance to run the party until the following congress. These two
latter procedures were the standard in past years.
The relevance of leader selection mechanisms is underpinned by an in-depth
examination of intra-party debates. Reading through the motions presented
during party congresses we observe that factions often complained about how
the direct election of leader had altered the shape of intra-party dynamics. We
report as an example some hints extracted from DC congress held in the 1980s.
In 1976 in fact the party started to select its leader by means of direct election
through a wider selectorate (composed by congress delegates instead of mem-
bers of the National Council). During the 1984 congress, Vincenzo Scotti, the
runner up party leader candidate (jointly supported by a moderate subgroup,
Impegno Riformista, and by a left-wing faction, Forze Nuove) warned against
the risk of transforming the DC into a plebiscitarian party ruled by charis-
matic leaders, after the introduction of direct election. Later, in the motion
presented in 1989, Forze Nuove was still complaining against plebiscitarian-
ism, arguing that the direct election had created a personalized leadership
that attempts to disempower middle-level activists by appealing directly to
the grassroots. Conversely during the same congress another left-wing faction,
Base, supported this organizational arrangement as a device to overcome the
idea of party leader as a primus inter pares, constantly bounded by factional
veto powers. We should note that factions have long been familiar with this
idea of a dualism, between a party ruled through factional agreements or led
by a strong leader able to promote the stakes of the mainstream (see on this
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point the motion presented in 1967 by Tavianei, which claimed for more leader
autonomy in spite of factional constraints).
The suggestions portrayed by this qualitative inquiry provide us with fur-
ther good reasons to analyze separately these two intra-party environments.
Across the dissertation then we will focus on the impact of leader autonomy,
conceived as the product of two features: the direct election of party leader
and the size of the selectorate.
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Chapter 3
Analyzing Intra-party Politics:
The Dataset on the Italian Case
3.1 Factional Politics: The Italian Case
The life of Italian parties has always been characterized by high level
of internal factionalism. Almost all the relevant parties during the Italian
First Republic (1946-1994) were continuously affected by factional quarrels and
compromises. Dorotei, Nuove Cronache, Base, Forze Nuove and many others
within the DC; Sinistra Socialista and Autonomia inside the PSI; Presenza
Liberale and Liberta` Nuova among those of the Italian Liberal Party (PLI)
and then Rinnovamento, Riscossa, Iniziativa, Democrazia, Impegno, Unita`.
These names, followed by an adjective (socialist, liberal, republican) to identify
their party affiliation, were equally spread across parties. Factions have long
been crucial for Italian politics. They were steadily mentioned in the everyday
political chronicles due to the impact exerted within their parties and in the
legislative arena. Many bill proposals were rejected due to the veto of some
factions. Many governments resigned for the same reasons while the fate of
others was strongly linked to the outcome of party congresses (Curini and
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Martelli 2009; Giannetti 2010; Mershon 1994).
Factions were indeed able to promote or to end governments and political
formulas; it is not by chance that the rise of the centre-left government coalition
in the 1960s had to wait until within the DC and the PSI those factions
favourable to start such alliance were strong enough to overcome the vetoes of
internal minorities (Curini and Martelli 2009). In fact the Fanfani IV Cabinet
was appointed with the decisive support of the socialists (February 1962) only
after the DC leader, Moro, won the party congress (January 1962) with a
motion favourable to the advent of the centre-left political formula.
Beside the DC, the Italian Socialist Party was factionalized as well. Since
its foundation in the 19th century the party was composed by several subgroups
(maximalists versus reformists) and it has repeatedly been weakened by the
breakaways of its moderate or extreme wings. During the First Republic only
the Italian Communist Party appeared to be undivided. This was probably due
to strict and undemocratic internal rules. The party was organized according
to the principles of democratic centralism, combining strong party discipline in
the external behaviour with (theoretically) wide freedom of thought within the
party body. Notwithstanding at the end of the 1960s some intra-party groups
formed. However, due to party rules, these groups were not allowed to stabilize
as organized factions. Only one, Manifesto, attempted to do so but was sent
off from the party in 1969 while others (i.e., the right-wing Miglioristi and the
left-wing Cossuttiani) survived as latent entities. Regardless of this exception
all the other parties (the social-democrats, the liberals, the republicans and
even the post-fascist MSI) were composed by organized factions (Lombardo
1972).
After 1994 a set of institutional changes leaded to the Italian Second Re-
public, with a renewed political system characterized by high fluidity and party
instability (parties die and birth at a crazy rate). In such context factionalism,
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although softened, seems to persist. Apart from personal parties (Calise 2010)
like Forza Italia (FI), Northern League (LN) or Italy of the Values (IDV), all
the main actors that characterize the Second Republic are internally divided.
We provide some examples. Within the far-left PRC several Trotskyists
factions fight against the party mainstream. The right-wing National Alliance
(AN) was divided in three for it a liberal-democratic faction, strongly linked
to the party leader Fini (Nuova Alleanza), was challenged by a group loyal
to the centre-right coalition leader Berlusconi (Destra Protagonista) and by
a third faction more attentive to pro-State issues on the economic dimension
(Destra Sociale). The centre-left DS has been affected, since its birth, by
factional struggles promoted by an internal left (Correntone) and a right-wing
group (Liberal); the mainstream faction in turn was not completely cohesive
due to quarrels between Veltroni’s partisans (Veltroniani) and the followers of
D’Alema (Dalemiani).
Both AN and DS are no longer alive because they merged with other par-
ties to form new rallies. Their subgroups however survived and brought their
pre-existing factional conflicts in the new parties. The DS merged with the
DL into the PD. Two left-wing factions that opposed this merger decided to
break away. Notwithstanding the new party was highly factionalized and the
conflict between Veltroniani and Dalemiani perpetuated inside it. The first
PD party leader, Veltroni, appointed in 2007 by a wide margin and with the
support of Dalemiani too, has been under attack by D’Alema followers since
the beginning and was forced to resign quite soon. In 2009 the new party
leader, Bersani, belonging to the Dalemiani faction Riformisti E Democratici
(RED), defeated the incumbent Franceschini (supported by Veltroni). After
the congress, Franceschini’s faction Area Democratica re-approached Bersani
in order to enhance party unity. Veltroni disappointed by this shift gath-
ered its followers together with other dissatisfied members and built a new
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organized faction, MoDem (Movimento Democratico), that overtly oppose the
mainstream group.
Something similar happened to AN. A few months before the fusion be-
tween National Alliance and Forza Italia into the PDL, a splinter group (D-
Destra) broke away from AN.1 The conflict between Fini’s partisans (Finiani)
and Berlusconi’s fans (Berluscones) that characterized AN internal life con-
tinued within the PDL. After AN 2002 congress factional conflict exacerbated
and the party leader, Fini, addressed this concern changing the rules. He
decreased the level of democracy (with a formal ban on factional grouping)
while building intra-party routines based on compromise (e.g., all the factions
retained ministers in the Berlusconi II Cabinet).
Within the PDL, on the contrary, reaching a compromise was harder. The
agreement set during the fusion assigned 70% of all spoils (within the party
body and the government) to former FI members while ex AN factions had
to divide the remaining 30%. Given that FI was a personal party tied to
Berlusconi, not familiar with internal dissent (Calise 2010; Poli 2001; Raniolo
2006), inside the PDL there was little room for Fini’s followers. They retained
around 10% of all charges.2 This percentage was not far from being proper if
we consider the pre-existing intra-party equilibriums in AN: indeed the three
main factions retained roughly 30% each of the 2002 congress votes meaning
that they should expect to receive one third of the quota of payoffs assigned
to former AN members in the new party.
However AN, contrary to FI, was an heavily organized party, more capable
to mobilize members and activists. For these reasons Finiani subgroups were
1This group in turn was born from the split of the right-wing faction Destra Sociale.
2They held roughly 8% of posts in party body: around 13 seats out of 172 in the board
and 3 out of 36 in the executive branch. In the Senate 10 out of 146 MPs were loyal to Fini
while in the House their percentage was slightly higher: at least 34 MPs belonged to Finiani
(around 12%).
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probably able to gain more than 10% of approval within PDL members.3 This
is why Lower House Speaker Fini demanded for a new congress where each
faction could have been weighted according to its share of members votes.
This constituted also a way to counteract the overriding power of the self-
enthroned (Kenig 2009a) party leader Berlusconi, who was ruling the party
on his own. This factional strife was revealed during a party meeting in April
2010, when Fini claimed for more consensual intra-party dynamics. However
the mainstream’s reply was to explicitly forbid any intra-party faction.
The conflict worsened in July when it became clear that public dissent was
no longer accepted by the leadership (likewise inside parties ruled by means
of democratic centralism). The executive party branch lowered the degree of
internal democracy stating that minority faction’s leader Fini was unfit to be
a PDL member, as long as his public statements released on several policy is-
sues (like justice, immigration, devolution, social policy and civil rights) were
considered to lay very far away from PDL platform and outside from its ide-
ology. It also imposed sanctions on three of his followers. Such punishments
immediately triggered the split of the Finiani faction from the party.
This parenthesis on the history of Italian factions confirms how pervasive
they are in the Italian political system. Indeed many works discussed the role
of factions within Italian parties (Allum 1997; Bettcher 2005; Boucek 2010;
Giannetti and Laver 2009; Giannetti and Mule´ 2006; Golden and Chang 2001;
Katz 1986a; Kato and Mershon 2006; Leonardi 1973, Leonardi and Wertman
1989; Mershon 1994, 2001a, 2001b; Pasquino 1980; Sartori 1973; Zariski 1962,
1965; Zariski and Welch 1975; Zuckerman 1975, 1979). Among these studies
3Finiani faction was organized through a net of associations and foundations, linked to
and somehow coordinated by Fini’s think-tank FareFuturo. Some of these subgroups were
more radical in their opposition to PDL leadership; among them we recall Generazione
Italia, leaded by Fini’s heir apparent, Italo Bocchino, and Libertiamo. Others were instead
moderate like for instance Area Nazionale or Spazio Aperto, created by Silvano Moffa (who
in fact broke away from the PDL in July 2010 but returned in the centre-right fold in
December).
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it is worth to recall two of them that will be mentioned in the course of the
dissertation.
One is related to factions during the First Republic while the other involves
divisions in the Second. Mershon (2001a, 2001b) investigated portfolio allo-
cation inside the Christian Democratic Party. She shown that cabinet spoils
(ministers and junior ministers) were distributed to each faction proportionally
to their share of seats in party body. This pattern held especially when DC was
ruling alone; in coalition governments to the contrary there was a slight ad-
vantage for the median faction and the same happened when the party leader
started to be elected directly by the congress instead of by the National Coun-
cil. She provided a partial confirmation to Gamson (1961) hypothesis (which
attests that office payoffs are distributed to coalition members according to
their contribution to the coalition i.e., faction’s size); she also highlighted the
role of intra-party preferences and rules, given that the median faction, due
to its strategic position, could be overpaid depending on the effective internal
rules. Another interesting contribution concerns the voting behaviour of MPs
belonging to the Democrats of the Left. Analyzing roll calls on foreign policy
issues, Giannetti and Laver (2009) shown that factional membership (deter-
mined according to the signature on motions presented during party congress)
affected MPs’ votes in the parliamentary arena.
All these reasons help to illustrate the explicative potential of the Italian
context. This case study fits the main topics of intra-party politics discussed
in the present dissertation. Italy is indeed a benchmark to study the politics
of faction (Zuckerman 1979) and it is well suited to analyze party fissions too.
Although splits (and factionalism) affect politics all around the world (e.g.,
Mair 1990) they ‘are endemic in certain countries, for example Japan and Italy’
(Laver and Kato 2001: 510). Sartori (1976: 81) stated that the Italian party
system ‘results from a process of ‘fission’. The Italian genetics of the case is
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that parties came first, and their fractionism grew and consolidate itself later’.
Along Italian history, party fission affected the political system several times.
We already mentioned the iterated waves of fission within the PSI, which
generated new rival parties like the Italian Communist Party and the Italian
Social Democratic Party, and the split of PDL that altered current Italian
politics increasing government instability and contributing to the dissolution
of the Berlusconi IV Cabinet.
The Italian context is promising for even more reasons. The huge number
of parties that filled its political history (around 10 within each legislature)
and the high number of factions (about 3 inside each divided party) allow to
collect a number of cases wide enough to carry a large-N statistical analysis.
The same holds for the high cabinet instability rate (60 governments in 64
years) that allows us to track reshaping in alliances, party policy positions
and allotment of office payoffs almost year by year. In turn the wide number
of general elections (17) held since 1946 under four different electoral systems
provides much information about electoral payoffs and allows to test the effect
of changes in the electoral laws.4
All these features will be of use in the course of this work. The key element
that has made this research possible however is another one: the availability
of a large amount of documents related to the internal life of Italian parties
and to party factions. Although several authors pointed out the importance
of collecting data about factions’ preferences (Budge et al. 2010; Giannetti
and Benoit 2009; Laver and Benoit 2001) finding information about them is
often a difficult task. Intra-party politics takes place in the shadow, it’s a sort
4The electoral rule has been a pure open list PR from 1946 to 1992 except in 1953 when
was added a majority prize (two third of seats) for the coalition able to gain a majority of
votes. Elections were held under a mixed system (75% plurality and 25% closed list PR)
from 1994 to 2001. Finally in 2006 and 2008 the electoral system was a closed list PR
with thresholds and a majority prize for the coalition that won a plurality of votes. For
this reason the Italian case is a kind of political laboratory suitable to generate and test
hypotheses (Giannetti and Grofman 2011).
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of ‘invisible politics’ (Sartori 1976). So far in fact only few works managed
to measure factional preferences (Debus and Bra¨uninger 2009; Giannetti and
Laver 2009; Spirling and Quinn 2010) but they do so only for a single party or
for a limited lapse of time. The present research tries to fill this gap providing a
new dataset that contains information about factions’ policy positions among
Italian parties from 1946 to 2010.
For the Italian case, as Sartori (1971: 24) recognized, there is a bunch of
documentation available: ‘although dispersed, [. . . ] exists, rather, it is copious.
The question is how to detect and to make use of such documentation in
order to transform “banal data” into information that enables us to solve the
matter’. In the next paragraph we will address this concern explaining how we
can exploit such information, to build a dataset that represents a first attempt
to systematically gather data on party factions and intra-party struggles. This
dataset then will be analyzed to shed light on factional conflict and intra-party
bargaining.
3.2 Party Congress Arena: where Factional
Bargaining Takes Place
To assess intra-party equilibriums and dynamics we need to gather data
about the factional structure of parties. In particular we need to know the
number, the strength and, most important, the preferences of each faction.
According to Boucek (2009: 467): ‘Depending on available data for any given
party, the unit of measurement may be faction parliamentary memberships
(the number of MPs affiliated to each faction), the voting strength of individ-
ual factions on party decisional bodies such as party congresses (using motion
votes as indicators of factional strength) or on party executives (using indi-
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vidual factions’ seat shares) or in cabinet (based on the number and type of
portfolios received by each faction) or in legislatures (based on factions’ com-
mittee memberships and chairs, etc.)’.
Likewise we can determine policy positions of subgroups looking at party
body or analyzing their behavior in the legislative arena. Although some au-
thors shown that it is possible to estimate factional preferences through roll-call
votes (Cowley 2002; Rosenthal and Voeten 2004; Spirling and Quinn 2010), it
has been argued that ‘content analysis on texts drafted by [. . . ] intra-party
groups seem to be the best choice to identify their respective preferences, in
particular if the research question deals with changes of the positions of polit-
ical actors over time’. (Benoit et al. 2009: 443; Benoit and Laver 2006; Ba¨ck
et al. 2011). In a congress motion each faction is (almost) completely free
to present its view about party platform; in this context the discipline (Laver
1999) only plays a limited role in bounding the expression of factions’ prefer-
ences so that text analysis should be less influenced, compared to roll call votes
(Spirling and McLean 2007). Moreover not all votes are roll-call votes, thus
they do not provide a complete picture of voting behaviour. We know that
the decision to call a roll-call vote may also be strategic and biased according
to the issues or the group that call it (Carrubba et al. 2006; Giannetti and
Benoit 2009: 233). In addition roll-call analysis is strictly related to voting
behaviour, which provides actors with a limited set of options: “yes”, “no” or
“abstention”,5 while there could be a variety of preferences behind a similar
voting behaviour: actors may say “yes” or “no” for very different (and some-
times opposite) reasons. Text analysis helps scholars to discover and highlight
the actual positions of political actors by providing a broader set of informa-
tion about their preferences. For all these reasons we will analyze factions’
5Due to parliamentary rules, in the Italian context the voting behavior includes the
absence as a fourth alternative (Curini and Zucchini 2010; Landi and Pelizzo 2006). When
strategic, in fact, the absence allows to express a policy position (see paragraph 8.3).
63
CHAPTER 3. ANALYZING INTRA-PARTY POLITICS: THE DATASET
ON THE ITALIAN CASE
positions through text analysis focusing on party congresses.6
Scholars suggest to refer to party congress as a source of data (Boucek 2009,
2010; Giannetti and Benoit 2009; Giannetti and Laver 2009; Mershon 2001a,
2001b; Reiter 2004). Indeed ‘Many gains in understanding intra-party politics
may derive from analysis of internal party organisation, such as formal and
informal factions’ (Giannetti and Benoit 2009: 235) in particular by examining
‘debates at party congresses between different party factions’ (Giannetti and
Benoit 2009: 234). With respect to the Italian context this is even more true.
Indeed the only ‘hard data’ about factions are those related to party congresses
(Giannetti and Laver 2009; Sartori 1976).
The party congress represents the key moment in party’s internal life, like
general elections are the crucial starting point for representative democracy.
Indeed ‘For factions, the closest approximation to that sort of competitive
arena is internal party elections, since it is there that factions organize teams
of candidates and appeal to people enjoying the right to vote for one team or
another’ Mershon (2001a: 561). During the party congress those subgroups
prone to organize as a faction present a list of candidates to party body. Often
this list is attached to a ‘motion’, i.e., an omnibus policy document that aims to
shape party strategy and ideology. Motions set out factions’ ‘opposing views
on the ideological direction of the party’ (Giannetti and Laver 2009: 154).
After a public debate party congress’ delegates vote on the policy principals
and establish the new party line that the leadership should pursue. They
appoint members in party executives and party body (a committee in charge
of running the party); elect (directly or indirectly) the party leader; ratify
the party statute; set the new party line and strategy casting a vote on a
6It could be argued that talk (and language) is cheap. However Giannetti and Laver
(2009) found some relations between politician speeches during party congress and their
consequential political behaviour in the parliamentary arena. Therefore, ‘if the politician
speaks and behaves in a consistent manner, [. . . ] may well become associated with a par-
ticular position on a particular dimensions’ (Laver and Shepsle 1996: 248).
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motion that commits the leadership to some general policy statements, until
the next congress. In fact ‘party delegates vote on the policy principals in
an annual conference whereas the balance of power between faction, that is,
the proportion of votes that each faction receives, is translated into policy
recommendations’ (Levy 2004: 251).
During the competition for gaining members’ support, the party splits in
many subgroups. The party congress however is not only a source of division, it
is also the place where the party tries to reach its unity through a compromise
among its factions. Either the bargaining is successful or the party will more
likely incur in a breakup. Many fissions indeed take place during the congress
or soon after.
The party congress is the arena where those who want to distinguish them-
selves from party mainstream can exploit visibility towards party members
and voters, in order to show that they retain a different policy position. For
these reasons party congresses can be used systematically to map the factional
structure of parties (Giannetti and Laver 2009). Data drawn from congresses
provide us with objective criteria to analyze intra-party divisions. Information
that flows from official sources is the only way to overcome scholars’ personal
beliefs about the actual number of factions inside parties.7 In addition these
data provide a measure of the strength of each faction, through the number of
congress votes gained by each list or the number of members elected in party
body (when data on members’ votes are lacking). Finally they allow to assess
policy preferences of each faction by means of a content analysis; in fact re-
cent developments in quantitative text analysis can be exploited to estimate
factions’ ideal point analyzing congress’ motions.
For these methodological reasons related to data collection, and given the
7As an example, Pasquino (1972) counted four factions within the PSI in 1971, Sartori
(1971) to the contrary argued that they were five and other scholars enumerated up to seven
subgroups.
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need to identify intra-party subgroups according to objective criteria, we con-
sider as a faction each party subgroup that contested the congress presenting
its own list of candidates attached to a policy motion (following Giannetti and
Laver 2009). As far as we are dealing with divided parties we excluded from the
analysis actors like ‘personal parties’, where the leader exerts a strong impact
on members and activists (e.g., Raniolo 2006). Here we would expect lower or
null level of polarization. Even if those parties were internally polarized, such
divisions would not emerge as organized factions given that those actors are,
by definition, parties without factions (Lombardo 1972).8 Indeed those parties
held congresses very seldom and these meetings are almost never contested.
They are nothing else than conventions devoted to celebrate internal unity and
party leadership.
Similarly unitary congresses, meaning those where there is no competition
between lists of factions and the delegates agreed to approve a common mo-
tion of intent, are excluded from the analysis. We do not claim that there is
a lack of factionalism inside parties whose congresses are unitary. Sometimes
minority factions might refuse to present their motion and their list, for what-
ever reasons; they might agree with the mainstream or they do not feel to
be strong enough to defy the leadership. Indeed the previous game-theoretic
model proved that the existence of internal dissenters is not a sufficient condi-
tion for the emergence of voice (i.e., minority motions).
This does not happen only in the presence of strong and autonomous leader
but also when the party is ruled through inter-factional compromise. Such
agreements in fact could be reached either after the congress (then we will
observe internal conflict) or before. In this latter case we will not be able
to measure intra-party division and conflict (even though they exist) because
8Hereby we would face atomization of intra-party preferences rather than factionalism;
the analysis of such atomization however is behind the scope of this dissertation.
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they have been already solved: the unitary congress motion (as well as the
division of party body’s spoils) expresses a common equilibrium on which all
subgroups agreed. We do not investigate this preemptive agreement assuming
that it should not follow a different logic from other intra-party bargaining
dynamics. Admittedly some groups contest the congress together, presenting
a common list and a common motion, but they join forces only to be stronger
during the struggle, raising more votes (and sometimes bypassing thresholds
established by electoral rules). However we do not investigate the process
that leaded to such alliance between factional subgroups. We measure their
common position and their common strength assuming that within the party
they will bargain as a unitary actor (this is not completely far from being true
if we recall our previous statement about how instrumental preferences might
became actual and stable policy positions).9
Finally, for analogous reasons, we did not include those (few) congresses
where factions competed without presenting motions.10 We could have re-
verted to speeches delivered by factional leaders during the party congress to
measure policy preferences of each subgroup. However this is unfeasible due
to methodological reasons related to the automated tool for textual analysis
we adopted. In fact the linguistic features of speeches are different from issued
documents, like motions or manifestos.11 Analyzing these two different kinds
of document together would produce biased estimates (see Debus e Bra¨uninger
2009, 131).
We gathered motions from official proceedings related to national con-
9This was done also for analytical purposes. To estimate actors’ positions we need a
policy document like congress motions. Had we considered factional subgroups we simply
wouldn’t have found data about their policy positions and we would have been forced to
treat them as missing cases.
10Among them: DC 1973, PSI 1976, and PD 2007 congresses.
11Accordingly we excluded from the analysis other congress documents whose linguistic
features were divergent (for instance, in 1961, Pertini contested the PSI congress writing a
‘letter’ to party members using attributes typical of personal correspondence).
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gresses edited by parties and from parties’ official newspapers or reviews.12
Motions related to the most recent congresses have been downloaded from the
official parties’ websites.13
We tried to collect data about parties’ factional structure analysing the
whole population of party congresses held by the Italian parties (approxi-
mately 300). However some of them (roughly 50%) should be excluded for
the methodological reasons discussed so far. Unfortunately, due to lacks in
data sources we were not able to find information on the whole population of
contested congresses. After the collapse of the Italian party system, in 1992-
1994, many of the existing parties disappeared and their archives disappeared
as well; moreover issues of some parties’ newspapers are not always available.
We have been able to find information on approximately 50% of the total
number of contested congresses. Overall we gathered 254 motions related to
83 congresses of 18 parties. Almost two hundreds of them (nested in 64 con-
gresses) concern the First Republic while the remaining data (19 congresses
with 56 motions) belong to the Second Republic. On average the number of
motions per congress is three. Table 3.1 shows more details about the motions
gathered.
For several parties (AN, PD, PDA, PDCI, PS, PSIUP, UDC) we have data
concerning only one congress. Conversely the maximum number of congresses
analyzed pertains to PSI (12 congresses) and to DC, PLI, PRI (with 11 con-
12We referred to the newspaper “L’Avanti” for PSI, “La Giustizia”, “L’Umanita`” and
“Critica Sociale with respect to PSDI, “L’Unita`” for PCI and DS, “La Voce Repubblicana”
for PRI and “Il Secolo d’Italia” to gather data on MSI factions.
13Information on AN and DS were available respectively on www.alleanzanazionale.it
and www.dsonline.it even though we revert to the Internet Archive (www.archive.org)
to visualize most of these pages. We found data about the Greens on www.verdi.it;
NPSI motions are available on www.socialisti.net; data about PD has been gathered
from http://beta.partitodemocratico.it; PDCI motions were displayed at www.comunisti-
italiani.it; information about PRC congresses was found at www.rifondazione.it; we referred
to www.partitosocialista.it for data on PS; finally data on UDC were found on www.udc-
italia.it.
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Table 3.1: List of Parties, Number of Congresses and Motions Included in the
Analysis
Party Congr. Contested Available % on % on Missing N of Average
Held Congr. Data Held Contest. Cases Motions Motions
AN 3 1 1 33 100 0 4 4
DC 18 13 11 61 85 2 41 3.73
DS 4 4 4 100 100 0 12 3
FV 18 16 2 11 13 14 6 3
MSI 18 7 5 28 71 2 20 4
NPSI 6 2 2 33 100 0 4 2
PCI 16 3 3 19 100 0 8 2.67
PD 3 3 1 33 33 2 3 3
PDA 2 2 1 50 50 1 3 3
PDCI 5 1 1 20 100 0 2 2
PLI 18 11 11 61 100 0 35 3.18
PRC 8 6 6 75 100 0 20 3.33
PRI 22 15 11 50 73 4 25 2.27
PS 2 1 1 50 100 0 3 3
PSDI 24 21 9 38 43 12 25 2.77
PSI 24 12 12 50 100 0 38 3.17
PSIUP 4 1 1 25 100 0 3 3
UDC 3 1 1 33 100 0 2 2
Total 198 120 83 42 69 37 254 3.06
gresses each). We found also 9 PSDI congresses and 6 related to PRC. One of
the latter is not actually a congress although it looks like. In 1998 the PRC
mainstream split and during a party body meeting four factions competed to
take control over the party in order to set the new line; each faction presented
a motion voted by members of the party National Political Committee. For
this reason we managed to analyze it as if it was a real congress. In general
the present database is unbalanced because it contains more information about
some parties and only few cases related to others: there are 38 motions nested
in 12 PSI congresses but only two motions presented in the unique contested
congress held by PDCI and UDC. This feature however does not affect the
analysis as we will discuss later.
Column seven provides an estimate about the number of missing congresses,
considering only the contested (or presumably contested) congresses that we
were not able to account for. Among the parties included in the analysis we
have 37 missing cases whereas the number of contested congresses amounts
(presumably) to 120. The percentage of missing cases then is around 30%.
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With a few exceptions we cover the entire set of contested congresses for a large
number of parties. There are multiple missing congresses only for two parties:
PSDI and the Greens. The PSDI merged its archive with PSI (after 1966) but
some data get lost; the Greens hold a National Assembly approximately once
a year and their internal life is particularly tangled so that it was not possible
to gather data on past congresses. On the other side we have been able to
account for a huge part of internal debates within parties like DC, PLI, PRI
and PSI and we collected almost all data about congresses pertaining to DS
and PRC. In the next section we will illustrate how these textual documents
have been analyzed in order to get factions’ policy positions.
3.3 From Words to Fact(ion)s: Measuring Fac-
tions’ Policy Positions through Wordfish
To extract factions’ policy positions from the motions they presented dur-
ing party congress we need to apply techniques of text analysis. The oldest
foremost method of analysis consisted in the hand-coding of textual docu-
ments, as carried out for instance by the Manifesto Research Group and the
Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP). The CMP analysed electoral mani-
festos presented by parties through manual coding (see Budge et al. 2001
for more details). For each manifesto, human coders divided the text into a
number of quasi-sentences and assigned them to one of the 56 pre-determined
categories, according to a classification scheme. Noticeably this technique is
too much time consuming particularly when the amount of text to analyze
is quite large. Given the high number of motions gathered (and their wide
length) we could not adopt such procedure to analyze our data.
To cope with this concern scholars started to develop semi-automated and
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automated techniques of text analysis. Among the others we find Wordscores
(Laver, Benoit and Garry 2003), Rhetorical Ideal Points (Monroe and Maeda
2004) and Wordfish (Slapin and Proksch 2008; Proksch e Slapin 2009a). They
provide quicker (but still reliable) means to determine political actors’ ideal
points. We decided to analyze our data through Wordfish, due to some tech-
nical advantages that will be explained soon.
Wordfish is an automated scaling technique, developed to run with the
R statistical software, that produces estimates of policy positions comparing
several textual documents. This method has already been applied to different
text sources (manifestos, speeches, statements and pledges) measuring policy
positions of parties and interests groups in Germany, Japan and the European
Union (Klu¨ver 2009; Proksch and Slapin 2009b; 2010; Proksch et al. 2011).
Wordfish assumes that the words usage provides information about the
policy position of each document with respect to others.14 It further assumes
that, for each word, the probability to appear in a document is independent
of the presence of other words,15 therefore it treats each text as a vector of
randomly distributed words.16 Then, looking at the frequencies of words con-
tained in each text, this package allows to determine the differences between
alternative documents scaling them on a common latent dimension thereby
measuring their relative policy position.
This calculus is worked out by something like an expectation-maximization
(EM) algorithm, that is an iterative method that allows to find maximum like-
14It could be argued that single words are uninformative about policy positions. This
is far from being true because words matter. To cite an example, during the 2009 PD
congress some critics argued against Bersani (one of the three candidates) claiming that his
victory would have transformed the PD into a social-democratic party. The PD president
Rosy Bindi (allied with Bersani) addressed these criticisms claiming that ‘Bersani’s motion
does not contain the word “social-democracy”.’ (from “La Repubblica” August 15th, 2009,
translation mine).
15Although this assumption is false in real world, it has proved to properly perform clas-
sifications.
16The authors proved that Wordfish estimates are robust to its main assumptions (Slapin
and Proksch 2008).
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lihood estimates in the presence of latent variables.17 The algorithm compares
the actual frequency of each word with their expected values. The software
assumes that words follow a Poisson distribution, in agreement with the main
literature on content analyses;18 being skewed the Poisson is perfectly suited
to analyze the distribution of words in textual documents, which is skewed
as well. The Poisson is defined by one parameter only, provided that the
mean and the variance of the distribution coincide. This allows to simplify the
analysis decreasing the computational effort. The distribution then could be
summarized as follows:
yijt ∼ Poisson(λijt) (3.1)
Where yijt measures how often the word j appears in the document related
to party (faction) i at time t. The parameter λ, in turn, is described by the
following equation:
λijt = exp(αit + ψj + βj × ωit) (3.2)
These four parameters, measured by the algorithm, represent respectively
the document position (ω) at time t, along with its fixed effect (α), the words
discriminating parameter (β) and the word’s fixed effect (ψ), that is the logged
17Despite Slapin and Proksch’s claim, this is not an actual EM algorithm ‘because there
is no random variable whose expectation could be taken. The model contains only fixed
effects.’ (Lowe and Benoit 2011: 11). On the contrary Lowe and Benoit (2011) shown that
Wordfish corresponds to a multinomial choice model.
18For a review: Slapin and Proksch (2008: 708).
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mean count of each word across all the documents. This latter parameter helps
to control the higher or lower usage of certain words across different texts.
For instance, common words not associated with any political meaning (i.e.,
articles, prepositions, etc.) appear frequently but are uniformly spread across
documents. Hence they carry a strong fixed effect while their discriminating
power will be close to zero. Conversely the fixed effect helps to assure proper
estimates of rare words. As a matter of fact words that appear only in one
document should carry a theoretically infinite discriminating power because
they are sufficient to identify that document. To cope with this issue the
software decreases the β values of uncommon words (that appear for instance
in one document only). Thanks to this property Wordfish allows to analyze all
the words contained in each text without the need to exclude some of them.
On the other side, the document’s fixed effect discounts the different length of
the texts analyzed to make sure that this feature does not alter the results.
Starting from these fixed effects the algorithm evaluates the two parameters
of interests: ω and β.19 The first parameter, ω, represents the policy positions
of textual documents (with mean 0 and standard deviation equal to 1). Given
that we are dealing with congress motions, the software extracts the estimates
of factions’ policy positions. Factions’ ideal points are scaled along a single
latent dimension whose meaning is to be interpreted ex-post according to the
political connotation of the texts submitted to the analysis. For instance,
if documents are related to a single issue (e.g., environmental policy) this
topic will define the policy continuum. To the contrary, when the statements
encompass the whole spectrum of policy issues (like in our case) the latent
dimension extracted should be interpreted as a more general left-right scale.20
19In the first step the algorithm estimates the party parameters conditional on the expec-
tation for the word values. In the second step it keeps fixed the former and estimates the
new words parameters. Then it repeats this iterative process until the convergence.
20The software can also allow to build multidimensional spaces producing estimates of
actors’ preferences on different issues. To do so the documents should be divided into
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The other parameter, β, is the word discrimination parameter. It measures
how much each word is helpful in classifying documents; it also corresponds to
the word’s placement along the policy scale showing whether the word stands
on the left or on the right of the continuum. As we discussed above, words
that appear with an high frequency across all documents have a discriminating
power close to zero while words that appear only in a few documents are
highly helpful to distinguish between documents that are on opposite sides
of the scale. These words will retain an higher absolute value of β and will
be located on the extremes of the policy dimension. β values are important
because they allow to carry a first diagnostic of the results; by comparing the
estimated policy position of words with their actual usage in real world political
language, scholars can make sure that the software succeeded in understanding
the substantial political meaning of such words.
When compared to other techniques of content analysis Wordfish retains
some advantages. With respect to hand coding (where for instance the same
document analyzed by two different coders might lead to different results)
Wordfish assures replicable estimates of parties positions that are more reliable
and unaffected by any possible coder’s bias.21 In addition Wordfish is more
suitable than other automated techniques. The main improvement consists
in the ability to produce time series estimates, an aspect that is particularly
relevant for our purposes. The algorithm assumes that words usage is constant
over time.22 Documents related to the same actor at different points in time
are considered to be independent with respect to each other. Therefore the
single issue sub-sections (including statements related only to one topic, e.g., foreign policy)
running distinct analyses on each.
21Curini (2010) shows that expert’s surveys could be biased according to the expert’s
policy preferences. The same logic might as well apply to coders’ judgments during hand
coding.
22Wordfish is able to account for changes in word usage when new words enter the political
arena or older words disappear from it but not when the meaning of words switches (i.e.
from the left side to the right or vice versa).
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position of one actor at time t does not affect its placement at time t+1.
Its position will be similar across time only if its word usage has remained
unchanged. To the contrary whenever the content of documents related to the
same actor varies over time the program will be able to detect such changes;
any modification will produce adjustments in actors’ position that are not
artefacts of the model. A further element validates the choice of this tool in
the present dissertation. Compared to Wordscores, another technique of text
analysis based on words usage, Wordfish does not require finding a reference
text to anchor the documents in order to define the extremes of the scale.
Finding a text that is common to all the documents would be hard, especially
in our case given that we are dealing with a wide temporal extent. In addition
this software does not require to build dictionaries that define the political
meaning of words that are on the extremes. To the contrary it analyzes all the
words contained in each document assigning a substantial political meaning to
them, without any ex-ante judgement. Finally, Wordfish provides confidence
intervals of the estimates through a parametric bootstrap.23
For all these reasons Wordfish proved to be suitable to carry our analysis. It
has been shown that Wordfish’s outputs are highly correlated with the results
of other methods like expert surveys, hand coding or content analysis software
(Klu¨ver 2009; Slapin and Proksch 2008). Furthermore it represents a faster
way to estimate time series policy positions of actors that are usually more
reliable when compared to other techniques (e.g., Proksch et al. 2011).
As we said, Wordfish requires to assume that words usage has remained
23For large datasets the bootstrap technique is very time consuming and might take sev-
eral days or even months on a standard computer. Therefore scholars are developing new
tools to quickly assess the standard errors of the estimates. For instances, the R package
‘Austin’ (Lowe 2011) managed to do that. By reverting to a multinomial-Poisson (MP)
transformation that connects the Poisson with multinomial regression models, this package
allows to easily compute the uncertainty around the estimated parameters. ‘Standard er-
rors derived this way tend, empirically, to be very slightly larger than the standard errors
provided by a parametric bootstrap according to the procedure recommended by Slapin and
Proksch, but effectively instantaneous to compute.’ (Lowe and Benoit 2011: 12).
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relatively constant over time. Our analysis encompasses a temporal horizon
that ranges from 1946 up to 2010. The congresses included in the dataset
are spanned from the end of the II World War, through the Cold War, the
Protests of 1968, the fall of Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism, until
Tangentopoli and the advent of the Italian Second Republic. For this reason we
want to control for any possible alteration in words usage. To make sure that
our research fits the requirement of language stability we split our documents
into two datasets choosing the 1989 as the break point.
Far from producing the end of history (Fukuyama 1989, 1992) the down-
fall of communism certainly yielded changes that affected several issues like
foreign policy (due to modification in the structure of international system) or
the economic dimension (the left extreme of the state-market continuum dis-
appeared from the options available). These changes have reasonably altered
the political meaning of some words; this effect could be even more consistent
in a political context, like the Italian one, where the Communist Party was
quite strong both in the electoral and parliamentary arena and the debate over
communism was an issue of the political agenda so that even centre-right par-
ties (like PLI and MSI) usually emphasized their anti-communist positions.
This choice became controversial at the end of the 1980s; just to make an
example the internal debate within the MSI developed around the need to de-
fine the party as something else than a mere barrier against the communism.
Furthermore the Fall of Berlin Wall was the first factors that contributed to
alter the Italian party system at the beginning of the 1990s, in particular with
respect to the renewal of the Italian Communist Party (Giannetti and Mule´
2006). In sum, this event promoted the beginning of the Italian transition
(Bufacchi and Burgess 1998; Bull and Rhodes 1997; Pasquino 2000; Tranfaglia
2003); ‘according to many scholars the Italian transition began the day af-
ter the fall of the Berlin wall (November 8th, 1989). As long as the Italian
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politics was dominated by the cleavage communism/anticommunism and by
the belonging to the Western bloc, the end of the international strife leaded
to adjustments in party competition and redefined the protagonist of such
competition’ (Pasquino 2000: 204, translation mine). In addition the end of
western-eastern struggle caused two other events that Pasquino recalls as cru-
cial moments of the transition: the already mentioned transformation of PCI
into PDS and the electoral success of the Northern League in 1992, made pos-
sible because moderate voters were no longer ‘forced’ to support the classic
anticommunist parties like DC and its allies (Pasquino 2000: 207). After five
years of transition (1989-1994) the Italian political language and the dynamics
of political communication were changed indeed (Antonelli 2000; Dell’Anna
2010; Gualdo 2004); the transition leaded to the rise of new styles of language
and communication and fostered trends that were already began in the pre-
vious decades (Dell’Anna 2010: 79) as will be shown later. All these reasons
then support the choice of 1989 as the break point.
Dividing the sample allows to control for any possible change in language
usage, however it decreases the number of documents analyzed altogether and
the number of unique words used to estimate positions. This problem might
concern centre-right parties, particularly in the second period (after 1988) be-
cause there are only few documents that express their positions and the number
of words helpful to identify them is lower as well (overall only one third of our
data is related to the second period). For this reason we supplemented these
documents including in the analysis other texts that retain similar linguistic
properties. More explicitly we included few party manifestos of centre-right
parties. Excluding these documents anyway leads to very similar results.
We carried two separate analyses using Wordfish to get estimates of fac-
tions’ positions. In both analyses our documents cover the whole spectrum
of the left-right continuum. In the first period (1946-1988) we analyze mo-
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tions of factions belonging to the left-wing Italian Socialist Party of Prole-
tarian Unity (PSIUP) as well as documents related to congresses held by the
far-right post-fascist Italian Social Movement (MSI). Similarly for the second
period (1989-2010) our data include texts belonging to the far-left Communist
Refoundation Party, born from a fusion between the left-wing heirs of PSIUP
and the left-wing heirs of PCI, and motions of National Alliance (that in turn
represents the continuation of the MSI).
Figure 3.3 plots the policy positions of all the factions included in the analy-
sis.24 We labeled them according to the party they belong to and we clustered
their parties by the political family they stand for, in order to get a better
visual representation. In details, we find post-fascist parties (MSI and AN)
located on the far-right (black); the liberal-democratic family (PLI) is placed
on the centre-right (blue); Christian democrats (gray) stand mainly in the cen-
tre during the first period (DC) while they are more on the centre-right side
in the second period (UDC); the family (orange) that gathers together social-
democratic and non-Marxist left (PSDI, PDA, PRI, DS, PD, NPSI, Greens)
appears located on the centre-left side, although it shifts toward the centre
in the 1980s and during the second period; finally, on the left-wing (red) we
find socialist and communist parties (PCI, PSI, PSIUP,PRC, PDCI). From
this picture we observe that, first of all, the software has been able to distin-
guish between parties and political families. At a first sight we find a ‘red’
spot on the left, and ‘black’ and ‘blue’ ones on the right. Across the political
families the single dots (party factions) rarely overlaps: we hardly ever find
socialist factions to the right with respect to Christian-democratic or liberal
party subgroups. Accordingly we almost never find Christian-democratic fac-
tions more on the left than social-democratic ones. In a sense, this additionally
24We replicated the analysis using the R package ‘Austin’. These results are firmly corre-
lated (0.99) with those shown in figure 3.3.
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proves that our analysis recognized the latent dimension as a left-right scale.
Indeed this scale usually represents a proxy for ideology (Downs 1957; Ieraci
2006) that in turn is the clue to distinguish political family. They appear to
be properly located hence we can argue that the latent dimension on which
factions are arrayed has been correctly detected.
Figure 3.4 confirms this idea; it shows the weighted mean of all the factions’
positions within each party congress (considering only major parties). Like in
the previous graph we find socialists and communists on the left, although we
observe a moderate shift of the PSI (see later). Once again the DC is located on
the centre, the liberals and the post-fascists on the centre-right, the democrats
and social-democrats mainly in centre-left positions. This is true for both
time periods. This graph also allows to monitor changes in party position over
time. We observe, for instance, that DC position is closer to the centre-left
in the 1960s, when the centre-left formula was adopted with the entrance of
the PSI in the coalition government. We also note that after the 1970s and
more deeply during the 1980s many parties followed a rightward drift. This
feature affects in particular PSI, PSDI, PLI and PRI (whose positions however
are not shown in this picture). This shift is consistent with the changes in the
economic policies due to the international crisis burst in 1972-1973 and with
the need for a deflationary policy able to drop inflation and to cut government
spending in order to stop the growth of public debt. All this features will
be discussed more in depth in the next paragraph, where we will assess the
validity of the present dataset.
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Figure 3.1: Factions’ Position on the Left-Right Scale in the First and Second
Period (Parties Clustered by Political Family)
Figure 3.2: Weighted Mean of Factions’ Position within each Party Congress
in the First and Second Period (Main Parties Only)
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3.4 Assessing the Validity and the Reliability
of the Estimates
First of all we provide some details about the analysis. Both in the first
and in the second period the word count matrix contains approximately 35,000
unique words that help to distinguish between documents. Figure 3.5 reports
the kernel density of the number of words per text.
Figure 3.3: Kernel Density of Documents Length
The length of each single text largely differs; on average it is equal to
5,403 words, however it ranges from a minimum of 70, contained in one of the
motions presented during the PDA congress in 1946, to a maximum of 32,849
words wrote by the PRC mainstream in 2002. Roughly 50% of documents
contain more than 3,400 words while only 37 (14%) are below the threshold of
1,000 words (most of them are related to PRI congresses).25 The number of
25One thousand words is the typical number of ‘scored words’ contained in speeches anal-
ysed by Giannetti and Laver (2009) through Wordscores. That software however scores only
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words included in each text seems large enough to provide valid estimates of
their positions.
A first analysis to get a diagnostics of our results is done looking at words’
β parameters. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 display the parameters of each word sep-
arately for the first and second period. We highlighted some words as an
example. In the first period we find on the right side words like god, moth-
erland and family (“dio”, “patria” and “famiglia”) that are traditionally as-
sociated with conservative values, while on the left we have class (“classe”),
solidarity (“solidarieta`”), nationalization (“nazionalizzazione”). We can also
distinguish words used by party members to refer to each other: comrades
(“compagni”) used within socialist and communist parties, stands on the left;
friends (“amici”) used among DC members is located in the centre while com-
panions (“camerati”) the epithet adopted by fascist movements appears on the
right. In the second period no-global, collective bargaining (“concertazione”)
and peace (“pace”) stands on the left while meritocratic (“meritocratici”),
soldiers (“soldati”) and devolution (“devoluzione”) are recognized to be right-
wing words that help us detecting right-wing parties. On both side of the scale
we find words that refer to different issues (e.g., economic, social and foreign
policies). For instance concerns about unemployment (“disoccupazione”) and
redistribution (“redistribuzione”) are attributed to left-wing parties while on
the right side we find disinflation (“disinflazione”) and privatization (“privatiz-
zazioni”). When it comes to social policy, the left stresses laity (“laicita`”) and
defends homosexuality (“omosessualita`”) against any discriminations, while
the right criticizes euthanasia (“eutanasia”) and emphasizes birth-rate (“na-
talita`”), along with many words related to law and order such as crime (“crim-
inalita`”). The same holds for other issues; considering foreign policy the left
words contained in both ‘virgin’ and ‘reference’ texts. To the contrary Wordfish runs the
analysis considering all the words included in a text.
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claims for peace and disarmament (“disarmo”), while the right speaks about
gulag and want to support the soldiers (“soldati”). These examples confirm
that β values assigned by Wordfish are coherent with the actual meaning of
words in the Italian political language, so that they appear on the proper side
of the left-right scale.
Figure 3.4: Beta Coefficients and Diagnostic of Words’ Estimates (First Pe-
riod)
The following step to assess the validity of our results is to consider the
estimates of factions’ positions. We need to check that inside each party left-
wing and right-wing factions are properly located. Then we want to make
sure that, overall, factions belonging to left-wing parties stand on the left
with respect to factions in right-wing parties. First of all within each party
congress we arrayed factions from left to right according to the literature (e.g.,
Giannetti and Laver 2009; Mershon 2001a) and newspaper reports. We com-
pared these expected ordinal positions with factions’ observed rank, measured
83
CHAPTER 3. ANALYZING INTRA-PARTY POLITICS: THE DATASET
ON THE ITALIAN CASE
Figure 3.5: Beta Coefficients and Diagnostic of Words’ Estimates (Second
Period)
through Wordfish. The polychoric correlation between two scales is strong and
significant (0.68).26
Factions seem to be accurately located along the whole left-right scale too.
In both time periods the mean position of factions belonging to the same party
is coherent with the party expected placement. Figure 3.8 and 3.9 display, for
each party, the mean (along with the 95% confidence interval) of its factions
positions separately for the first and the second period (major parties only).
26We also managed to catch adjustments in factions’ placement across time. Although
factions’ location along the internal left-right scale tends to be steady (as discussed in chapter
1), scholars report a couple of exceptions. Within the DC for instance Nuove Cronache (tied
to Fanfani) moved from left to right while Andreotti’s faction (Primavera) temporarily
shifted from right to left in 1980 and back to the right afterwards (Bettcher 2005; Boucek
2010). Conversely, the left-wing Forze Nuove moved to the right in the early 1980s when it
firmly opposed the idea of a ‘Historic Compromise’ (i.e., a coalition deal between DC and
PCI) in continuity with the ‘National Solidarity’ formula, which ruled Italy between 1976
and 1979 through the external support of PCI. Forze Nuove was instead more favorable to
restore the alliance with the PSI, which in turn opposed any attempt to include the PCI in
the ruling coalition during the 1980s (see Curini and Martelli 2009). Our data succeeded in
tracking these three shifts (see Appendix B for more details).
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Figure 3.6: First Period. Average Position of Factions over Party
Note: 95% Confidence Interval reported. The y-axis is only used for illustration purposes
and has no substantial meaning.
Figure 3.7: Second Period. Average Position of Factions over Party
Note: 95% Confidence Interval reported. Main parties only. The y-axis is only used for
illustration purposes and has no substantial meaning.
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So far we assessed that overall our estimates are valid. We also tried to
check their reliability. To do that we compared DC factions’ positions, esti-
mated through Wordfish, with the estimates of a sample of 32 DC motions
analyzed by means of hand-coding, following the coding scheme provided by
Curini and Martelli (2009, 2010).27 The hand-coding estimates have been
measured through the vanilla method (Gabel and Huber 2000) as described in
chapter 6. We find a positive correlation (.50) between hand-coding data and
Wordfish estimates. Figure 3.10 plots the estimates together with a fitted re-
gression line.28 This result seems to confirm that Wordfish outputs are reliable
when compared to alternative techniques of measurement.
Figure 3.8: Comparison between Wordfish and Hand-coding Estimates for a
Sample of 32 DC Factions
Note: The black line indicates the linear fit.
27To ensure an unbiased estimation the motions have been analyzed by an external trained
coder. The coding scheme here adopted is similar to that provided by the Comparative
Manifesto Project (CMP). However the number of categories of the CMP dataset has been
extended to take into account some peculiarities of the Italian political context (such as
positive or negative references made by parties to the Catholic Church). See chapter 6 for
a more detailed description, and in particular footnote 15, chapter 6.
28The coefficient of the OLS regression is .629 (standard error: .199).
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As a final point we will show that the present analysis is also able to track
changes in party placement at several point in time, matching the evolution of
the party system. In particular we will discuss the trajectories made by the PSI
(figure 3.11) and the heirs of PCI (figure 3.12) who chose moderate platforms
converging toward the centre in order to gain a more strategic position. To
start with, PSI factions shifted from left to the centre according to the evolution
of PSI that began in the 1960s and increased during the 1980s (Curini 2011;
Curini and Martelli 2009, 2010). Since 1946 the PSI median faction retained
a left-wing position. After the party split, in 1947, two social-democratic
factions broke away from the party and the median faction moved towards the
left, reaching the most extreme position in 1949 when the left took control
over the party pushing other moderate factions to leave. After ten years of
unitary congresses, held under a regime of democratic centralism, in 1959 three
factions battled presenting three alternative motions. The moderate group,
Autonomia, won the congress and the PSI started to move toward the centre.
The shift continued during the 1960s when the PSI was involved for the first
time in a centre-left coalition with DC, PSDI and PRI. After the 1963 congress
a splinter group left the party to create the PSIUP (that unsurprisingly held a
more leftist position). In the next congress the PSI moved again reproaching
with the other ruling parties. This movement yielded to a fusion with its twin
social-democratic ally, PSDI, in 1968. Finally a deeper change was enacted
after the 1978 and 1981 congresses, when Craxi was elected as party leader.
Under his leadership the reformist factions continuously moved to the centre
and the whole party moved accordingly, in order to gain a strategic policy
position (Curini and Martelli 2009: 154) that enables Craxi to be appointed
as the first socialist prime minister in the history of the Republic.
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Figure 3.9: PSI Shift from Left towards the Centre
Note: Median Faction Position with a 90% Confidence Interval
Figure 3.10: Trajectory from Left to the Centre Made by the Heirs of PCI
Note: Median Faction Position with a 90% Confidence Interval
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Something similar happened to the Italian Communist Party and to its
heirs. At the beginning of the 1990s the PCI debated over the need to change
its name and ideology (Ignazi 1992). It enacted such striking change trans-
forming itself into the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS). The median faction
however kept a left-wing position; ‘looking at the part elite level, from 1991
onwards there have been substantial changes in PDS-DS policy positions, with
the party moving progressively toward the centre of political spectrum’ (Gian-
netti and Mule´ 2006: 462). Indeed our database is able to catch these changes.
In 1998 the party merged with small parties and adjusted its label from PDS
to DS, removing any residual linkage with its communist past. Within this
new party the median faction retained a more moderate ideal point. This shift
goes on and on: in four DS congresses the median group has continuously
moderated its stance. In 2007 the DS merged with DL creating the Demo-
cratic Party. After that, once again, the median faction moved far away from
the left.
3.5 Changes in Political Language and Com-
munication
In this chapter we argued that the beginning of the Italian transition
(1989-1994) altered the dynamics of political communication and the use of lan-
guage (Antonelli 2000; Dell’Anna 2010; Dell’Anna and Gualdo 2004; Gualdo
2004). Several features contributed to these changes: new policy issues en-
tered the political arena filling the agenda with new words; adjustments in the
characteristics of the political system altered the nature of the game and its
protagonists; the rise of new parties and the processes of ‘presidentialization’,
personalization and ‘spectacularization’ of politics modified language, lexicon,
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rhetoric and content of political discourse. As long as our database is built
through text analysis of written documents we can investigate these changes
to assess, from a quantitative point of view, what is really changed and what
is not. As we said, the documents included in our analysis cover 64 years of
political language and we divided them, before and after 1989, precisely to
account for words usage change during the Italian transition. Here we will
make sure that language has indeed changed, but we can also take advantage
of our data to assess the quality and the magnitude of such changes through a
comparison between the use of political language before and after the Italian
transition.
We revert to Wordfish’s outputs in order to measure adjustments in words
usage. In particular we can compare any single word measuring whether its
usage across all documents has changed, on average, before and after the 1989.
So far, most of the qualitative studies about language has focused on changes
in speeches; here to the contrary we focus on written texts. This feature allows
us to assess whether the changes in political language have been different or, to
the contrary, alteration in written communication is different from the findings
pertaining to the oral discourse.
Our dataset does not include all the motions written in the history of Ital-
ian party congresses, however the number of words included in the sample is
large enough and it includes parties that encompass the whole political spec-
trum.29 For this reason we can assume that our data allow to properly track
the relevant changes. Figures 3.13 through 3.17 provide a comparison between
words included in texts related to the first or the second period analyzed. On
the y-axis we report the word fixed effect (ψ), which is the logged mean count
of each word across all the documents as measured by Wordfish. Words that
29The number of unique words analyzed in the first and second period is very similar:
32,585 against 35,391 respectively.
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more commonly appear across all documents will retain an higher fixed effect.
Words whose fixed effect has increased, when passing from the first to the
second period, could be considered as more common and more often used in
the new context (and vice versa). In each picture we reported some of them
as an example to compare and discuss the nature of changes.
To start with, we claimed that during the transition new policy issues have
entered the political agenda (figure 3.13).30 Undeniably one of these topics is
related to the ‘Europeanization’ of politics and policies (e.g., Franchino and
Radaelli 2004). This change affects political communication too (Della Porta
and Caiani 2006). It goes without saying that the enactment of Maastricht
treaty in 1992 is one of the crucial events that fostered Europeanization en-
hancing Europe as a community. This happened in the middle of the Italian
transition, fostering the need to bother about Europe as a content of political
communication. In fact even when looking at party congresses we observe that
the usage of words related to the European Union has dramatically increased
in the second period. The fixed effect of all those words that refer to the
concept of EU grew. Figure 3.13 shows the change in the usage of the word
Europe (“Europa”) itself, which became in the second period one of the most
widely used across all parties.
Another topic that entered the policy agenda in the 1980s, growing across
time, concerns the environmental dimensions. These themes were stressed by
the ecologist movements and by the Greens, a single-issue party that formed
in the 1980s (although was formally founded in 1990) from a fusion of several
Greens’ lists.31 This reason in turn contributes to explain why the environ-
mental dimension has emerged and its salience broadened (Curini and Martelli
30Note that this does not affect Wordfish estimates as we highlighted before.
31Within some parties there are also subgroups that, acting as single-issue factions, stress
the environmental topic above the other. This happened for instance within the DS where
the faction Ecologisti DS presented its own motion during the 2005 congress.
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2009, tab. 1.2). Overall the fixed effect of words related to the environment,
like ecology (“ecologia”), has expanded in the second period, attesting that
parties tend now to include more frequently this issue in their political dis-
courses.
Something similar concerns the devolution of power from the state to the
regions. Likewise the Greens’ lists , another single-issue movement born at
the end of the 1980s and entered the parliamentary arena gaining a few seats.
This movement was focused on devolution and subsidiarity arguing about the
need to reform the Italian Constitution and administration in order to build a
federal state. Groups belonging to this movement joined together and created
the Northern League, which was officially founded in 1989. Although the
issue of decentralization was brought inside the agenda by this single-issue
movement, later on it overflowed to the whole policy arena so that almost all
parties felt the need to address the matter of the federalist reform. Accordingly
the mean count of words related to federalism (“federalismo”) is higher during
the second period. Note that in our database this effect is not due to the
presence of the Northern League, because this party is not included in the
analysis. This increase reflects the growing relevance that this topic retains in
the agenda.
Linked to the federal reform we highlight another issue that emerged during
the transition i.e., the debate over the Constitutional reform of the Italian
political systems (see Curini and Martelli 2009, tab 1.2). Once again the topic
was introduced in the agenda during the 1980s, by the PSI leader Craxi, and
developed later on. Although an agreement around a Constitutional reform
was never reached, the Italian political system was altered due to the reform of
the electoral system, promoted by two referenda held in 1991 and 1993. This
change in turn is one of the focal aspects of the Italian transition. Besides the
idea of a majoritarian reform of the electoral system other potential reforms
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were debated in the 1990s to increase the government’s powers trying to build
a presidential (or semi-presidential) republic. Figure 3.13 confirms that the
salience of this topic increased in the second period when the word count of
presidentialism (“presidenzialismo”) is considerably higher.
Finally one last issue, related to the corruption scandal called Tangentopoli
(bribesville), gained relevance in the early 1990s and contributed to sustain
the transition. In 1992 the opening of the judicial inquiry Mani Pulite (clean
hands) shed light on the linkage between politics and business discovering that
the party system was permeated by political corruption. Actually some scan-
dals related to briberies emerged already in the 1970s and the issue of ethical
behavior of politician was introduced by the communist leader Berlinguer, at
that time. However the salience of this topic increased only after the 1992
when the post-communist PDS tried to exploit its advantage on this valence
issue to seize the power (Curini and Martelli 2009, 2010). Indeed we registered
a slight increase in the usage of words like scandals (“scandali”) and corrup-
tion (“corruzione”) during the second period when, after Tangentopoli, the
conflict between politicians and the Bench blown up (the leader of the centre-
right coalition Berlusconi was often charged of corruption and his governments
often passed laws to increase cabinet control on the judicial).
The Italian transition was sustained by changes in the political system
that in turn affected shape and content of political discourse. The new mixed
electoral system experienced from 1994 to 2001 and the PR with majority
prize adopted in 2006 and 2008 changed the structure of party competition
and the way electoral campaigns are conducted. The party-centred approach
toward electoral competition was replaced by the rise of pre-electoral coalitions
and candidate-centred campaigns (from 1994 to 2001 for general elections and
during the whole Second Republic for local elections). These changes upheld
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Figure 3.11: Logged Mean Count of Words related to New Policy Issues. Dif-
ferences between First and Second Period
the process of personalization of politics increasing the relevance of charismatic
leaders up to the birth of personal parties. Accordingly the centrality of the
parliament decreased in favour of a greater level of government agenda power.
All these features altered the political communication and are caught by our
analysis as we can see from figure 3.14 and 3.15.
Figure 3.15 in particular provides a clearer description of the variation in
words usage before and after the transition due to changes in the attributes
of the political system. Positive values indicates an increase in the words
usage in recent years while negative values illustrate words that were more
widespread in the past. Indeed the word parliament (“Parlamento”) seems to
be less used nowadays while government (“governo”) receives more quotations.
Correspondingly the word party (“partito”) is now less mentioned than it used
to be. On one side this is due to the decreasing role of parties which are now
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Figure 3.12: Logged Mean Count of Words related to Political System Changes.
Differences between First and Second Period
Figure 3.13: Differences in the Logged Mean Count of Words related to Polit-
ical System Changes
Note: Negative values indicate words that were used more frequently during the first
period while positive values assess an increase in word usage in the second period, after the
transition
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less pervading than during the First Republic. The neologism “partitocrazia”
(partitocracy) was coined precisely to indicate the overwhelming supremacy of
parties over the political life that is one of the features of the First Republic.
This word appears to be used more frequently after the transition with the
intent of criticizing such ‘old regime’.
Furthermore, to cut any linkage with the partitocracy the new Italian par-
ties ceased to use the label party and refer to themselves through other words
like alliance (e.g., National Alliance, Democratic Alliance, Alliance for Italy),
movement (Movement for Autonomies, MPA), league (Northern League), pact,
federation, union, people (i.e., People of Freedom) or they even use simply a
noun or an adjective (Forza Italia, The Daisy, Democrats of the Left and so
on). In the Second Republic only few groups still maintain the word party in-
side their labels (the communists PDCI and PRC although they now are fused
in the Left Federation, the Democratic Party and the two small heirs of the
PSI). All said and done however the word party is still there and factions still
adopt it in their congress motions. We observe something similar concerning
the word factions (“correnti”): its usage decreased during the second period
even within factionalized parties; nonetheless Italian politics is still dealing
with them and this word is still used in the political language.
Conversely the rise of pre-electoral coalitions increased the citation of words
that denote the alliance, like pole (“polo”) or coalitions (“coalizioni”). Finally
the trend towards the personalization of politics appears clearly evident: for
instance the usage of the word “leader” is strikingly increased but also the
word candidate (“candidato”) is widely used in the second period confirming
the shift to a candidate-centred politics. The role of candidates over parties
was enhanced by the electoral districts (from 1994 to 2001) and by the elec-
tions for majors and ‘governors’ (from 1993 up to date). In addition there is
an effect played by the party (or the coalition) leader due to the frontal clash
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between coalitions that characterized Italian politics after 1993. As an exam-
ple, under the current electoral system the majority prize assigns relevance to
the coalitions and to their leaders, whose name must be indicated before the
elections; moreover the name of party leader is often included in the party
logo.
Figure 3.16 provides a mixture of the attributes considered so far. We in-
vestigate more in depth the changes in the dimensions of electoral competition
and in personalization. To simplify the communication with the voters, par-
ties usually summarize the struggle along one dimension represented by the
traditional left-right scale. This dimension in turn is generally associated with
ideological views. Some scholars claimed that the role of ideology is declining
nowadays. If this is true we should observe a reduction of the words associ-
ated with it. Looking at figure 3.16 we observe that, with few exceptions, the
use of such words (i.e., socialism, communism, liberalism and conservatism) is
diminished. However ideology is still there and parties keep it alive in their
internal debates.
The second aspect that we want to deepen concerns personalization. It has
been argued that modern politics emphasizes the role of party leaders; then we
would expect to find more citations of their names during the second period
compared to the first. Looking at politicians’ names we note an overwhelming
number of quotes concerning Berlusconi and Prodi. Surprisingly all the other
leaders of Second Republic’s parties (e.g., Bertinotti, Bossi, D’Alema, Rutelli,
Veltroni) are mentioned as much as their counterparts during the First Re-
public (e.g., Andreotti, Berlinguer, Craxi, Fanfani, Nenni, Saragat). To sum
up it seems that ideology is slightly declining, however it is not disappeared
at all. As far as leaders are concerned, intra-party debates do not appear to
be more focused on them now than in the past; the only exceptions are the
two long-standing leaders of the centre-left and centre-right coalitions: Prodi
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(from 1996 until 2008) and Berlusconi (from 1994 until 2011). This is in line
with the new bipolar party system and seems to indicate that personalization
is really increased at the top level of the pre-electoral coalitions, whose leaders
attract a large share of the political discourse.
Figure 3.14: Logged Mean Count of Words related to Ideology and Personal-
ization. Differences between First and Second Period
Finally one last comparison between the pre- and post-1989 communica-
tion concerns the use of language. From figure 3.17 we note first of all a
strong growth of English terms. For instance references to “welfare” strongly
increased attesting that what has long been called ‘stato sociale’ is now being
referred to with its English translation. Similarly words like “antitrust” or
“boom” are more common now than in the past. Other English words ap-
peared for the first time only in the second period, among them “privacy” and
“authority”. This pattern somehow contrasts with the idea of a political lan-
guage closer to the common citizen. Some scholars argued that politicians try
to simplify the language (Antonelli 2000) even through the use of dialects. To
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the contrary in congress motions we do find an extensive use of foreign terms
whose understanding should be theoretically harder for the broad public. Any-
way it must be noted that motions are usually addressed to party members
and activists whose knowledge of technical terms imported from other lan-
guages should be greater compared to wider (but less skilled) audiences. As
far as the use of bad language is concerned we did not find many examples;
its usage is in fact more typical in the oral language while we are dealing with
written texts. Anyway the words stupid (“stupido”) and bastard (“bastardo”),
likewise other minor offences, are more mentioned now. It goes without saying
that in recent years the use of mass media has sharply increased altering the
content of political discourse and, accordingly, references to media like televi-
sion (“televisione”) or new media (i.e., internet) are now often included in the
motions presented during the congress.
Finally a last feature highlighted by Dell’Anna (2010: 81) refers to the
dynamic old-new. Since the collapse of the First Republic, politicians try
to ride the wave of political scepticism, “antipolitica”, (which is indeed a
word that characterizes the Second Republic) setting them apart from the
old regime. This implies the vast use of words related to the concepts of new
(“nuovo”), change (“cambiamento”) and future (“futuro”). Parties want to
ride the change, presenting themselves as something else, something new, a
modern entity oriented towards the future, up to the point that one of the
newcomers in the Italian party system has included this word in the label,
calling itself Future and Freedom for Italy.
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Figure 3.15: Logged Mean Count of Words related to the Use of Political
Language. Differences between First and Second Period
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Chapter 4
Where Do Factions Come
From? The Determinants of
Factionalism
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we investigate the determinants of factionalism. We will
present some hypotheses drawn from the existing literature and connected
to our theoretical framework to attest what elements contribute to increase or
reduce the number of factions inside parties. However we know that our defini-
tion of ‘faction’ is somehow endogenous to the observed intra-party dynamics.
In fact, as discussed before, the only objective criterion to assess the number
of faction is to count how many subgroups contested the congress presenting
a motion. Noticeably this is possible only if the congress is contested while
we do not observe a measurable value when intra-party dynamics lead to hold
a unitary debate. Consequently our dependent variable, the number of fac-
tions, is observed only when the congress is contested. We must be aware of
this potential selection bias in order to properly handle it. Depending on its
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causes and its magnitude, such bias could theoretically affect our results and
the validity of our claims. Here we will detect the occurrence of this selection
bias. Stressing the effect of party’s rules and organization we will investigate
what elements impacts on the likelihood of observing unitary or contested
congresses. Then, focusing on the latter, we will examine the variables that
affect the number of factions that present a motion. Being aware of this sam-
ple selection, in the rest of our dissertation we will be dealing with contested
congresses only, generalizing our results only to that extent.
4.2 The Role of Rules: Party Organization
and Intra-party Representativeness
In the previous chapter we mapped intra-party divergent policy positions
showing that factions do not retain exactly the same preferences. As a matter
of fact, they also retain distinct internal rules. Contrasting organizational
structures end up building party environments that grant different degrees of
representativeness to intra-party minorities. As long as we are dealing with
fractionalization, in the present chapter we will focus mainly on the effect of
party rules and organization.
Here we provide a summary to describe the attributes of different party
statutes. We detail information related to four intra-party rules: dispropor-
tional internal electoral system, democratic centralism, direct election of party
leader (leader autonomy) and factional ban. We distinguish them according
to the degree of representativeness they allow. For instance, we assign a low
(L) degree of representativeness to statutes that enact highly disproportional
rules, strong ban on factions, direct election of party leader or organize the
party through democratic centralism. Conversely an high (H) representative-
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ness is assured by the lack of such attributes, while for two attributes (internal
electoral system and factional ban) we might also find medium (M) levels of
representativeness when the enactment is not so strict. The lower the degree
of representation granted to internal minorities, the greater the advantage re-
tained by party mainstream.1 Table 4.1 reports the percentage of contested
congresses held under each rule (among those included in the dataset, whose
total number is 83).
Table 4.1: Intra-party Rules and their Level of Representativeness (Percentage
of Congresses Held under Each Rule)
Rule Representativeness
Low Medium High
Disproportional Internal Rule 14 22 64
Factions Ban 41 7 52
Democratic Centralism 2 n.a. 98
Direct Election (Leader Autonomy) 27 n.a. 73
Table 4.2 details, per each party, the percentage of congresses held under
the different rules. They vary by party, but also across time within the same
party. For instance, the DC switched from a majoritarian system to propor-
tional representation in the 1970s, and then step back introducing thresholds
and majority prize; in those years they changed also the mode of leader’s
election. After having abolished democratic centralism, the PCI modified its
statute again during the last congresses, to promote internal debate. Other
parties too repeatedly adjusted the statute to alter the level of representative-
ness.
These variables will be resumed in the course of dissertation to assess their
impact on several domains of intra-party politics. For the sake of establishing
1We consider the direct election of party leader as a rule that favors the mainstream in
spite of internal minority. See Rahat et al. (2008) for a similar point of view about how an
inclusive selectorate might decrease the representativeness.
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Table 4.2: Details about Internal Rules per Party (Percentage of Congresses
Held under Each Rule)
Party Representativeness
Disproportional Factions Ban Democratic Direct
Internal Rule Centralism Election
L M H L M H L H L H
AN 100 100 100 100
DC 55 45 55 45 100 45 55
DS 100 100 100 100
FV 100 100 100 100
MSI 100 100 100 80 20
NPSI 100 100 100 100
PCI 33 67 33 67 100 100
PD 100 100 100 100
PDA 100 100 100 100
PDCI 100 100 100 100
PLI 27 55 18 100 100 100
PRC 100 100 100 100
PRI 73 27 100 100 100
PS 100 100 100 100
PSDI 10 45 45 100 100 100
PSI 100 25 75 8 92 8 92
PSIUP 100 100 100 100
UDC 100 100 100 100
which element, between preferences or rules, is the best predictor of intra-
party dynamics, at the end of this work we will retrieve this information to
compare the effects of intra-party representativeness, granted by the rules, and
intra-party division, conveyed by factions’ preferences (see paragraph 9.1).
4.3 The Determinants of Factionalism: Liter-
ature and Hypotheses
Literature on intra-party politics investigated the causes of factionalism.
Many studies addressed the topic analyzing the role played by rules and at-
tributes of the party and the party system. No studies however accounted
for a comprehensive explanation of the phenomenon. This lack concerns, in
particular, the effect of policy preferences as a source of intra-party division.
Although recent studies confirms the existence of divergent policy views, they
do not investigate how such differences affect the degree of factionalism within
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the party. Beside summarizing the hypotheses proposed by the existing lit-
erature we will also provide other arguments about the elements that might
affect the likelihood of a contested congress testing the existence of a selection
bias and its determinants. We will provide a comprehensive explanation of
the causes of factionalism; a first group of hypotheses deals with the number
of factions while another group (indicated by the letter ‘b’) focuses on the
likelihood that the congress is contested. This latter set of variables is related
exclusively to internal rules, to assess whether the modes of party organization
lead to different patterns of bargaining (i.e., uncontested congresses) and to
the emergence of a selection bias in our sample.
The debate on the sources of factionalism was opened by Sartori who fo-
cused on the impact of internal electoral rules on the number of factions. Sar-
tori (1971; 1976: 86) applied Duverger’s Laws to intra-party politics claiming
that proportional representation (PR) is a sufficient (but not unique) condi-
tion for the growth of intra-party fragmentation: PR ‘does become a sufficient
cause of the multiplication of fractions’. Under disproportional intra-party
electoral rules (like majoritarian systems, PR with high thresholds and rules
that establish a majority prize for the first ranked group) factions should face
the incentive to merge together in order to take advantage of the electoral sys-
tem increasing their weight (and consequentially their strength) inside party
body. Accordingly we would expect a greater number of factions within parties
whose electoral rules are purely proportional.
Hypothesis 4.1: Disproportional internal electoral rules decrease the
number of factions
Additionally, because of disproportionality, minority factions will find it
harder to get represented inside party body. Hence dissenting members could
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refuse to openly defy the party mainstream, avoiding to contest the congress,
with the hope that unitary intra-party dynamics will leave them with a decent
share of seats in party body.
Hypothesis 4.1b: Disproportional internal electoral rules decrease the
likelihood that the congress will be contested
We can also assume that parties enact disproportional rules when the cost
of ν outweighs ω. In line with this idea, discussed in chapter 2, we should
observe low or no voice, as suggested in H 4.1 (a and b).
Besides rules Sartori (1976, 79) accounted for the impact of intra-party
preferences. He hypothesized that inside polarized parties the number of sub-
groups should be greater. To overcome the lack of data and tools useful to
measure factions’ ideal points and party polarization, he suggested using the
effective number of parties as a proxy for it. He anticipated the idea that
‘Shared preferences are important bases of political parties’ (Aldrich 1995: 29)
claiming that the greater the number of parties, the greater the number of op-
tions available; therefore any potential party member might find a party that
is relatively close to her (up to the extreme case where each voter builds her
own party). As a consequence the need to cultivate intra-party fragmentation
decreases and each party will be barely polarized. Other scholars hypothesised
that the heterogeneity of party’s rank and file might increase the number of
factions (Bogaards and Boucek 2010; Reiter 2004).
Thanks to our database we are able to directly test this hypothesis, mea-
suring intra-party preferences without the need to rely on the proxy variable
suggested by Sartori. We will contend that an increase in internal polarization
leads to a growth in factionalism. In addition we should remind that polariza-
tion, due to the cost of membership (see paragraph 2.2 and chapter 7), impacts
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on the ratio between pi and varepsilon thereby encouraging factions to pick
up the voice option in order to extract a wider amount of payoffs.
Hypothesis 4.2: Intra-party polarization increases the number of fac-
tions
In addition the literature investigated other possible causes of intra-party
fractionalization. One of these features is related to the resources available
within the party (Golden and Chang 2001; Zincone 1972; Zuckerman 1979)
meaning in particular money, clienteles and patronage. Zincone (1972) high-
lighted the importance of an autonomous access to resources that is crucial
to build, organize and maintain alive a faction. Factions that have their own
headquarters, collect membership drive and issue their own newspapers and
magazines will be able to survive and to growth.
Indeed many Italian party factions printed magazines to promote them-
selves, to express their views and to inform members about party’s and fac-
tion’s meetings and decisions. Factional magazines were so important that
one strategy to decrease factionalism was precisely to forbid printing them.
Often faction and magazine’s name coincided. The first DC faction, Cronache
Sociali, was named after the homonym review; the DC left-wing faction Base
published a periodical called exactly ‘rank and file’; within the MSI the left-
wing faction linked to Rauti changed its name from Linea Futura to Spazio
Nuovo and modified its magazine accordingly. In turn the PCI group Mani-
festo took its name from the monthly issued in 1969. Nowadays some factions
still retained their own press like ‘Aprile’, review that was linked to the DS
faction Correntone or ‘Area’ that expressed the views of the ‘social right’,
Destra Sociale, within AN. The web of course decreases the cost of publishing
periodicals so that Aprile became soon issued only via internet, being called
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‘Aprile on-line’ ; similarly the Finiani faction published on-line its review ‘Fare
Futuro Web Megazine’.
Nevertheless, it is not easy to find measures of the financial autonomy of
factions. Anyway we argued that parties divide resources between activists
(and factions). Thus we can reasonably assume that inside parties whose
monetary capabilities are greater factions might exploit a larger amount of
resources. There is room for more subgroups and they will be able to persist.
We can hypothesise that, the greater the party revenues the higher the number
of factions within it. The same logic concerns the number of party members;
they have to pay a quota for their membership, thus parties with a greater
number of members will have more financial resources and will end up being
more divided.
To measure party resources we can also adopt its size, measured through the
number of votes gained in the last elections, as a proxy. According to Pasquino
(1972) ‘The elections represent, at any level, [. . . ] a crucial opportunity to
boost the faction, as long as gaining seats constitutes a mechanism to multiply
the resources available to the faction itself’ (Sartori 1973: 87, translation mine).
The bigger the party, the greater the number of factions.2 Additionally, the
internal structure of big parties will be more complex, leading to an increase
in factionalism (Reiter 2004; Ko¨nig 2006). Intuitively large parties attract a
wider number of members. Hence, despite they coalesce on the basis of policy
preferences (Aldrich 1995; Krehbiel 1993; Snyder and Ting 2002), their internal
polarization should be greater.
Hypothesis 4.3: The number of factions increases along with party size
and with the availability of resources within the party
2A number of studies shown that large dominant parties are highly factionalized (e.g.,
Bogaards and Boucek 2010).
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Furthermore several authors discussed the impact of the electoral system
on factionalism. This effect has been tested with respect to the Japanese
case, where the changes in the electoral system altered the factional structure
(Cox and Rosenbluth 1993; Cox et al. 1999). According to the Italian case
scholars focused on the role played by preference voting (Katz 1986a; Katz and
Bardi 1980; Pasquino 1972; Wildgen 1985) arguing that it fosters intra-party
competition. By providing factions with the access to parliamentary seats (and
to the resources they supply), preference voting grants them a place where to
growth and replicate increasing party heterogeneity. In addition, preference
voting decrease the price of ν and, as a consequence, should boost the adoption
of voice in intra-party dynamics.
Our dataset allows to test this aspect comparing Italy before and after the
electoral reforms experienced since the 1990s. These changes allow to perform
a comparison between systems based on open list PR, before 1994, and those
adopted afterwards (Carey and Shugart 1995). Since 1994 Italy experienced
two different electoral rules: a mixed systems (1994-2001) with a 25% closed
list PR quota and the remaining 75% of seats assigned via ‘first-past-the-post’,
and a closed list PR with thresholds and majority prize (in 2006 and 2008).
Furthermore between 1994 and 2001 the selection of candidates elected under
plurality districts has been centralized being transferred from the regional to
the national level (Di Virgilio 1998; Di Virgilio and Kato 2001). Both these
systems have in common a closed list PR (at least for a proportion of seats)
and shared the idea of a centralized representation.
Intuitively, open list PR boosts the dispersion of authority and multiplies
the power structures within the party. When district magnitude is very high,
like during the First Republic, intra-party competition for preference votes fos-
ters the incentive to break the monolithic party structure (Carey and Shugart
1995; Shugart 2001; 2005) so that candidates try to exploit their factional link-
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age in order to get elected. To the contrary under closed list systems, or when
the candidate selection procedure is highly centralized, party elites retain a
greater control over candidacies, decreasing the relevance and the number of
factions (Pasquino 1972; Cox et al. 1999; Carey 2007)
Hypothesis 4.4: Closed list PR and centralized candidate selection de-
crease the number of factions
Following Sartori categorization between factions of interests and factions
of principles it could be argued that the former growth only inside parties in
office, to exploit the payoffs coming from cabinet membership. Then inside
parties in office we should observe a wider number of factions because, beside
factions of principles, other subgroups will originate solely to take advantage
of office payoffs available within the party.
Hypothesis 4.5: The number of factions is greater within parties in
office
Finally we want to check the role of intra-party rules (other than the in-
ternal electoral system). We focus on party statutes to detect features related
to party organization. According to Sartori (1976: 85) ‘party statutes con-
tain, roughly, three major elements: a set of prohibitions, the organisational
structure, and the electoral arrangements’. We will evaluate whether each ele-
ment affects the degree of factionalism or the likelihood of observing contested
congresses.
First of all statutes might prescribe an explicit ban on the existence of
organized factions. We argue that such explicit prohibition should increase
the cost of voice decreasing the number of subgroups that contest the congress
110
4.3. THE DETERMINANTS OF FACTIONALISM: LITERATURE AND
HYPOTHESES
and even leading to a unitary congress. We also contend that such ban could
be adopted inside parties whose leaders are focused on enhancing cohesion (ν
is greater than ω) thereby reducing factionalism.
Hypothesis 4.6: An explicit ban on factions should decrease their num-
ber
Hypothesis 4.6b: An explicit ban on factions should decrease the likeli-
hood that the congress will be contested
A second element deals directly with party organization. Some parties,
especially those based on Marxist ideology, are organized according to the
principles of ‘democratic centralism’. This is something different from the mere
absence of organized factions. Under democratic centralism party members are
theoretically free to discuss and support different views about party strategy
and ideology. However the dissent must be expressed only inside the party.
Once the party body sets the line, its choice must be enacted even by dissenting
members. In the Italian context the PCI has been adopting this rule for almost
all the extent of its life (actually its statute was modified only at the end of the
1980s precisely to leave room for inter-factional competition). The PSI adopted
the same rule from 1949 until 1957, under the orthodox leadership of Morandi.
During the Second Republic only one party, the communist PDCI, retains a
similar organization although the People of Freedom and the Northern League
portray a similar structure. In congresses held under this rule we would expect
a lower level of factionalization or even a complete absence of dissent due to
the large value of ν. The public expression of dissent jeopardizes the idea of a
cohesive party (granted by democratic centralism) weakening the leader who
in turn will be likely to impose cohesion through discipline, which raises the
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voice cost for dissenters too.
Hypothesis 4.7b: In parties organized through ‘democratic centralism’
the likelihood that the congress will be contested is lower
The third and last element we will account for concerns the strength and
the autonomy of party leader. When the leader is elected directly by a wide
selectorate (e.g., party members) she can improve her autonomy to unify the
whole party behind her. To the contrary, leaders appointed in smoke-filled
rooms will end up being hostage of party factions. In a small committee in
fact the vote of any single activist might be decisive to appoint one or another
leader. Hence even small subgroups of activists might want to exploit such
incentives by gathering together. We would expect a lower number of factions
and contested congresses within parties whose leader are stronger and more
autonomous.
Hypothesis 4.8: Leader autonomy (fostered by direct election and wide
selectorates) should decrease the number of factions
Hypothesis 4.8b: Leader autonomy (fostered by direct election and wide
selectorates) should decrease the likelihood of a contested congress
When leader autonomy reaches the extreme i.e., inside personal parties, we
should not find any observable disagreement. Charismatic leaders in fact boost
party loyalty, which increases the exit costs (ε) thereby making the voice option
pointless. Hence, despite the existence of heterogeneity, the party congress will
probably be unchallenged.
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Hypothesis 4.9b: Within ‘personal parties’ the likelihood that the
congress will be contested is lower
4.4 Data and Methodology
In the previous chapter we presented the details of the motions collected
showing that, among the parties included in the dataset, the medium number
of motions presented during each congresses is equal to three. There are no dif-
ferences between the First and the Second Republic; whenever the congress is
contested we observe, on average, three factions competing together. Similarly,
for any decade analyzed we registered a mean of three motions per congress.
Differences between parties are tiny. We observe a number of factions closer
to four within DC and MSI-AN while there are only two factions inside UDC,
PDCI and NPSI and approximately two factions within the PRI, whose inter-
nal life has been often characterized by a dualism between the mainstream and
a minority group. This is coherent with Sartori’s claim about the maximum
number of ideological faction, which should be three. According to Sartori
(1971, 1976) a party may have at most one pivotal mainstream faction, one
left-wing and one right-wing. It is not straightforward clear why it should be
so, given that in multiparty systems we hardly find only three parties located
on the left, right or at the centre of the policy space. However, let us take
this statement for true. The mean number of factions in our data is indeed
three.3 Figure 4.1 confirms that this value represents the mean, the mode and
the median. However, the picture indicates that some variation exists. Un-
3Our factions could be defined as ‘factions of principles’ because we retain only factions
that contested the congress presenting a motion. Nonetheless, as already discussed, all
factions care to some extent about policy. Although we include factions that Sartori would
label as ‘factions of interests’, these are in turn ‘factions of principles’, at least in part. In
other words, our dataset refers to factions tout court and their average number equals three.
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der different conditions the number of factions that contest a congress might
increase or decrease.
Figure 4.1: Number of Factions (Motions) per Congress
In figure 4.2 we provide the effective number of factions (ENF) within each
congress. The ENF has been calculated using the Laasko and Taagepera (1979)
formula to measure the effective number of parties, as suggested by Boucek
(2009). The two measures of intra-party fractionalization, NOF and ENF, are
strongly and positively correlated (.80).
In two third of cases the ENF ranges between one and two (which is the
mean value of ENF). This path seems to underline that it is unlikely to find par-
ties divided into many factions that retain approximately the same strength.
Conversely even when the majority faction is quite strong we often find a
considerable minority group that holds around 20% of congress votes.
To test what elements affect the number of factions we built a dataset that
includes all the contested congresses of parties listed in table 3.1 for which we
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Figure 4.2: Effective Number of Factions per Congress
were able to find data; this total amounts to 83 cases. The dependent variable
(y) is NUMBER OF FACTIONS (NOF), which corresponds to the number of
motions presented by factions during the congress. We will test the previous
hypotheses by means of an OLS. As far as we have multiple observations
nested within each party across time they might not be independent. To
cope with this issue we clustered observations by party estimating standard
errors on clusters. Clustered standard errors in fact are heteroskedastic and
autocorrelation consistent (Rogers 1993).
However the results of such OLS analysis would be biased if there exists
a problem with sample selection. To assure unbiased estimates then we need
to run an Heckman (1979) model. To do so, we retrieved the parties listed
in table 3.1 and for each of them we pooled together all the congresses held
during its entire life. We built a database that contains information about
both contested and uncontested congresses whose total number of cases is 198
(as shown in table 3.1).
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On this dataset we apply the Heckman model that estimates the parameters
through two stages. In the first stage the model assesses the effect of some
variables on a dichotomous variable (z). The variable z is a dummy that
determines whether our dependent variable y is observed or not; it takes value
1 when the outcome is observed and zero when it is not. Then the second
stage estimates the impact of another set of variables on the expected value
of y, conditional on it being observed. Whenever the error terms of the two
analyses (the first one on z and the second run on y) are correlated (ρ 6= 0)
there exists a selection bias that would confirm the need to revert the Heckman
model.
In our analysis the first stage estimates the impact of some variables on the
likelihood that the congress will be contested. The z variable is CONTESTED
CONGRESS, a dummy that takes value 1 when the congress is contested and
value 0 when it is unitary. Within this dataset there are 120 contested con-
gresses (60% of the total). At this stage we include four independent variables
to assess whether they affect the probability to observe y. These variables are
the following. DISPROPORTIONAL RULE (H 4.1b) a categorical variable
that takes value 0 when the party congress electoral rule is a pure PR; it takes
value 1 when the voting rule is a PR with majority prize and a low threshold
(5%); it assumes value 2 when the congress is held under a majoritarian sys-
tem or under a PR with majority prize and high threshold of representation
(20%).4 FACTIONS BAN (H 4.6b) that equals 1 when the statute enacts
an explicit ban on the existence of organized factions, it takes values 2 when
even temporary tendencies are banned while it assumes value 0 when there is
no explicit ban; DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM (H 4.7b) takes value 1 when
party organization follows this guideline and 0 when not; LEADER AUTON-
OMY (H 4.8b) is equal to 1 when the party leader is elected during the party
4Such partition has been chosen following Sartori (1976: 89).
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congress directly by party delegates or party members while it takes value 0
when the leader is appointed by a small committee.
Then the second stage estimates the impact on the dependent variable
NOF testing the hypotheses discussed before. At this stage we add a few new
variables to some of the previous ones.5 We test the impact of: DISPROPOR-
TIONAL RULE (H 4.1); INTERNAL POLARIZATION (H 4.2), measured as
the absolute value of the distance between the two opposite extreme factions
within each party congress; PARTY SIZE (H 4.3), the percentage of votes
gained by the party in the last election before the congress (which accounts
for the amount of resources available within the party); OPEN LIST (H 4.4),
a dummy variable that measures the impact of the preference voting; it takes
value 1 when the electoral system is an open list PR (from 1946 to 1992) and
value 0 when the electoral law includes a closed list PR (for the whole amount
of seats like in 2006 and 2008 or limited to the 25% quota assigned through
PR from 1994 to 2001). Our dataset however includes parties that are out of
parliament; thus to assess the impact of this latter rule on parties that hold
parliamentary seats we add a control variable, EXTRAPARLIAMENTARY,
that equals 1 when the party is out of parliament and 0 otherwise. The remain-
ing variables are: PARTY IN OFFICE (H 4.5), a dummy that assess whether
the party is involved in the government (value 1) or not (value 0); FACTIONS
BAN (H 4.6) and LEADER AUTONOMY (H 4.7).
So far we analyzed almost 200 congresses (120 of whom are contested).
However we know that the total number of congresses held by Italian parties
after 1946 is around 300 units (as discussed in chapter 3). For some of them
5To reach a convergence the Heckman model usually requires inclusion of at least one
variable that affects z without affecting y. At the first stage of our analysis we focused
only on the role of intra-party rules, then variables like PARTY SIZE, OPEN LIST and
INTERNAL POLARIZATION (that can be measured only when y is observed) have been
excluded. Among the four variables included at the first stage we discarded DEMOCRATIC
CENTRALISM at the second stage, assuming that its main impact involves the nature of
the congress itself. There are in fact only 2 contested congresses held under this rule.
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we were not able to find any information at all while for others we managed to
assess some details. In particular we gathered information from party statutes
(measuring those variables tested in the first stage of the Heckman model) and
we were able to attest whether the congress was contested or unchallenged.
Therefore we are able to extend our dataset increasing the number of cases
beyond the range of parties shown in table 3.1, providing a more comprehensive
description of the effects of party statutes on the likelihood to observe unitary
or contested congresses.
This larger sample contains information about 221 cases. It includes parties
that played an important role during the Second Republic. Among them we
find the post-communist PDS; the Italian Popular Party, heir of DC, and its
successor, DL, as well as some personal parties like IDV, LN or FI and its
heir PDL (Calise 2010; Raniolo 2006). Insofar as almost none of them has
ever hold a contested congress we are not able to consider them in the course
of the dissertation and those parties would not even enter the second stage
of the Heckman analysis.6 However, given that some of them are personal
parties, we are now able to test the impact of H 4.9 through the dummy
variable PERSONAL PARTY that equals 1 when the party is firmly loyal to
its leader; we consider as personal parties Forza Italia, the People of Freedom,
the Northern League and Italy of the Values.7
6Only the PPI held a contested congress but we were not able to find motions about it.
Hence we could not measure the degree of internal divisions.
7All the other variables remain the same as before, except DEMOCRATIC CENTRAL-
ISM. On this variable we assign an intermediate value of 0.5 to LN and PDL as far as their
party structure, although not officially organized according to this dictate (value 0), bears
many resemblances with this type of party (value 1), for instance through the ban on any
public expression of dissent.
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4.5 Analysis and Results
Table 4.3 reports the results of our analysis. Column one shows the coef-
ficients of the OLS regression on the selected dataset (model 1); column two
presents the results of the Heckman model on the whole dataset (model 2);
column three estimates Heckman model on the larger dataset (model 3). The
Heckman model has been estimated through Maximum Likelihood; observa-
tions have been clustered by party and standard errors are estimated on cluster
to cope with the issue of the independence of observations (repeated congresses
within the same party).
To start with we comment the results of the Heckman model on the selec-
tion equation. The rho is statistically different from zero meaning that there
is a matter of sample selection and the coefficients of the OLS could be biased.
The first stage tells us that, among the parties analyzed in the dissertation,
only one variable seems to alter the likelihood of observing the outcome (i.e.,
a contested congress): DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM in fact decreases such
likelihood, while impact of the other variables is not significant.
When including other parties into the dataset we find statistically sig-
nificant coefficients for three variables: DISPROPORTIONAL RULE, like-
wise DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM, decreases the likelihood of a contested
congress. PERSONAL PARTY too shows the same effect as none of the per-
sonal parties has actually held a contested congress. LEADER AUTONOMY
does not appear to be significant after controlling for PERSONAL PARTY;
finally FACTIONS BAN does not have any effect on the nature of the congress.
We turn now to comment the results of the outcome equation. Model 2
and 3 report almost identical results. DISPROPORTIONAL RULE is sig-
nificant and decreases the number of factions. On the contrary INTERNAL
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Table 4.3: The Determinants of Factionalism
(1) (2) (3)
OLS Heckman Heckman
MLE MLE
outcome eq. (NOF)
DISPROPORTIONAL RULE -0.472*** -0.425*** -0.415***
(0.103) (0.112) (0.111)
INTERNAL POLARIZATION 1.777*** 1.783*** 1.781***
(0.294) (0.275) (0.272)
PARTY SIZE 0.0194** 0.0197*** 0.0197***
(0.00776) (0.00733) (0.00726)
OPEN LIST 0.509 0.513* 0.514*
(0.304) (0.285) (0.282)
EXTRAPARLIAMENTARY 0.037 0.091 0.092
(0.395) (0.348) (0.344)
FACTIONS BAN 0.039 0.028 0.018
(0.110) (0.108) (0.105)
LEADER AUTONOMY 0.390 0.449 0.465
(0.365) (0.326) (0.325)
PARTY IN OFFICE -0.358 -0.369* -0.368*
(0.209) (0.198) (0.196)
CONSTANT 1.827*** 1.993*** 2.003***
(0.244) (0.213) (0.214)
selection eq. (CONTESTED)
DISPROPORTIONAL RULE -0.314 -0.363*
(0.207) (0.211)
FACTIONS BAN 0.148 0.206
(0.196) (0.184)
DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM -1.922*** -1.949***
(0.254) (0.244)
LEADER AUTONOMY -0.332 -0.395
(0.412) (0.414)
PERSONAL PARTY -6.160***
(0.348)
CONSTANT 0.465 0.407
(0.333) (0.321)
ρ -0.378*** -0.379**
(0.145) (0.149)
Number of congresses 83 198 221
R2 0.414
Log pseudo-likelihood -197.057 -201.612
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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POLARIZATION has a positive effect on NOF: the greater the range of pol-
icy views within the party, the greater the number of factions that will con-
test the congress. Resources play a role as well: the coefficient of PARTY
SIZE is positive and significant, meaning that parties whose amount of re-
sources is greater face higher factionalism. OPEN LIST too contributes to
increase NOF, breaking the monolithic party structure, while being an EX-
TRAPARLIAMENTARY party has no effect on internal divisiveness. Surpris-
ingly PARTY IN OFFICE is negative and significant; among ruling parties
the number of factions is lower, denying the idea that a larger share of spoils
leads to a growing factionalism. Finally the role of party rules like FACTIONS
BAN and LEADER AUTONOMY does not seem to yield significant effects
on the number of factions.
When comparing these results with those of the OLS we note that two more
variables (OPEN LIST and PARTY IN OFFICE) became significant while
overall the coefficients are not much affected by the selection bias. To provide
a proper interpretation of the coefficients, table 4.4 shows, according to model
2, the effect of each variable for the predicted value of NOF (conditional on y
being observed), as well as the effect on the predicted probability of y being
observed. We report the elasticities, measured as the ratio of the incremental
change of the dependent variable with respect to a proportional incremental
change of each independent variable.
4.6 The Determinants of Factionalism: Find-
ings
In this chapter we focused and the causes of factionalism to determine
what elements increase or decrease the number of factions within a party during
121
CHAPTER 4. WHERE DO FACTIONS COME FROM? THE
DETERMINANTS OF FACTIONALISM
Table 4.4: Elasticities after Heckman MLE
outcome eq. (NOF)
DISPROPORTIONAL RULE -0.094***
(0.020)
INTERNAL POLARIZATION 0.274***
(0.037)
PARTY SIZE 0.073***
(0.026)
OPEN LIST 0.134*
(0.073)
EXTRAPARLIAMENTARY 0.002
(0.008)
FACTIONS BAN 0.018
(0.032)
LEADER AUTONOMY 0.032
(0.028)
PARTY IN OFFICE -0.060*
(0.034)
selection eq. (CONTESTED)
DISPROPORTIONAL RULE -0.117
(0.094)
FACTIONS BAN 0.077
(0.017)
DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM -.077***
(0.017)
LEADER AUTONOMY -0.067
(0.093)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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contested congresses. Through an Heckman model we handled any possible
bias due to sample selection. We tested whether intra-party rules make the
difference, assessing the impact of a set of party organizational attributes on
the likelihood that the congress will be contested or unitary. Our results reveal
that some rule do indeed play a role while others do not affect the expression
or the degree of dissent within the party.
First of all DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM (H 4.7b) has a clear effect on
intra-party dynamics. Such undemocratic party rule acts like a deterrent for
contested congresses. This come as no surprise given that democratic central-
ism, by definition, forbids any public expression of dissent. For instance, the
PCI had to change the statute at the end of the 1980s when it decided to
hold contested congresses in order to involve minorities in the decision mak-
ing around structural changes of party ideology. The statute however was
changed only to grant equal opportunities to all the competitors for it demo-
cratic centralism allows (theoretically) intra-party struggles (unless they lead
to fractionism). In fact a party that adopts democratic centralism may hold a
contested congress (like PDCI in 2008 and PSI in 1949) however this is simply
less likely.
On the contrary an explicit ban over the existence of organized factions has
no impact on factionalism. FACTIONS BAN does not yield unitary congresses
(H 4.6) nor does it decrease the number of factions (H 4.6b). This result is far
from being unexpected. First of all factions took advantage from the unclear
definition of their concept to survive the ban. Actually even the most heavily
organized factions often do not call themselves ‘faction’.8 They usually prefer
to adopt other names like ‘association’, ‘foundation’, ‘area’ and so on (Venditti
8In 2008, when Veltroni was the PD leader, his main opponent, D’Alema, created the
association Riformisti E Democratici, and claimed that RED was not a faction but a resource
for the party. One year later Pierluigi Bersani, member of RED, was appointed as the
new party leader. In October 2011, during a meeting of the PD minority faction MoDem,
Veltroni, the head of this new subgroup, stated that the MoDem was not a faction as well.
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1981). Hence it is not easy to accuse a group of factionalism. Within the party,
lawmakers and receivers coincide (Zincone 1972), then party members might
decide which rule to enact and which not. It is more difficult to skip a stricter
rule, like democratic centralism, than other directives related to faint concepts
as for instance the ban on factions. Indeed the ban does not assure that
factions do not arise and organize inside the party and such prohibition was
often ignored: DC factions persisted despite the ban and the same happened
within other parties. To quote an Italian saying, “capons do not celebrate
Christmas”; factions often agreed on banning themselves in order to promote
internal cohesion but, following a prisoners’ dilemma logic, none of them was
the first to demobilize, and such rule was hardly ever applied.
The LEADER AUTONOMY too does not affect factionalism (H 4.8; H
4.8b). Even though a directly elected leader could be autonomous from party
factions, this does not imply that her opponents will not challenge her leader-
ship demanding for a contested congress. Only when the leader has completely
prevailed over internal dissent the likelihood of contested congresses will de-
crease, as the variable PERSONAL PARTY showed (H 4.9).
Inside personal parties the direct election of the leader is carried to an ex-
treme so that she is not even formally voted by delegates but just elected by
acclamation. Indeed personal parties are so strongly tied and loyal to their
leaders that it is often difficult to express dissent and organize to contest the
congress challenging the leadership. They are not only less likely to hold con-
tested congresses but often they do not celebrate congresses at all. For instance
the Northern League, that for ages has been firmly loyal to its leader Bossi,
has not been holding a national congress since 2002; Forza Italia (Berlusconi’s
party) celebrated only two (uncontested) congresses in 15 years; Italy of the
Values, a party created by the former attorney Di Pietro (famous after Tangen-
topoli scandal), held its first congress in 2010, 12 years after its birth; despite
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the existence of some forms of internal dissent its minority faction (called La
Base – Idv, that means, ‘rank-and-file’ – Idv) failed to present its own motion
and the congress has gone uncontested. These examples confirm that when
leaders are stronger factions remain latent and leaders’ power results in unitary
intra-party dynamics (at least on fac¸ade).9
Beside elements contained in party statutes we tested the impact of another
rule related to the party congress electoral system (H 4.1; H 4.1b). DISPRO-
PORTIONAL RULE seems to decrease the likelihood of a contested congress.
Minorities knows that their strength will be disempowered by the internal elec-
toral system. Hence they would find lower incentives to defy party mainstream.
They will try instead to reach an agreement with the majority faction well be-
fore the congress so that the distribution of payoffs will not be demanded to
factional competition during the congress but will be the result of an ex-ante
bargaining between the mainstream and the minority faction. However this
result is quite ambiguous because this effect does not hold among parties in-
9Actually we can observe divisions even though these might remain latent so that politi-
cians claims that their parties are not factionalized. Within the Northern League a new
tendency, Maroniani, arose in 2011 gathering the followers of Roberto Maroni, who was
the Minister of the Interior at that time. This faction contested many local LN congresses
presenting its own candidates in opposition to the party mainstream leaded by the found-
ing father Bossi and informally labeled Cerchio Magico (Magic Circle). At the peak of
such factional strife, in January 2012, Maroniani requested to the leadership to call a new
national congress (that would be the first in 10 years). Despite the absence of organized
factions, there are some division inside the PDL too. We already discussed the breakaway of
the Finiani and the formal ban on internal factionalism enacted in 2010. Notwithstanding
in 2011 the followers of the former Minister of Economic Development, Claudio Scajola,
organized and built the Cristoforo Colombo Foundation that represents a kind of faction
composed mainly by former DC politicians. In order to force the Prime Minister Berlusconi
to resign, a few MPs belonging to this faction switched off from the PDL in autumn 2011
and created a small parliamentary group affiliated with the new Italian Liberal Party. In-
side the PDL there are also other associations and foundations like Riformismo E Liberta`
that includes former PSI politicians, the conservative Magna Carta Foundation, the network
Rete Italia (tied to the Catholic group Comunione e Liberazione), the right-wings Destra-
PDL and Nuova Italia Foundation, as well as many others. However these ‘factions’ do not
publicly manifest themselves during a national congress, so far. This is in line with the find-
ings discussed in the present chapter about the likelihood to observe contested congresses
within personal parties. Moreover, for the methodological reasons discussed in chapter 3,
these cases are excluded from the present analysis. Nonetheless in chapter 9 we will address
this point building bridges for future researches that might enable to investigate intra-party
dynamics even in absence of contested congresses.
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cluded in our original dataset (model 2). Conversely the effect of the internal
electoral system on the number of factions is more straightforward. Dispropor-
tional rules result in a lower chance for small factions to get represented inside
party body. Therefore they will face the incentive to merge in order to contest
the congress together, enhancing the opportunity to overcome the threshold or
to win the majority prize. Arguably factions might feel free to divide soon af-
ter the congress (and in some cases this happened indeed). Anyway, once they
contested the congress together signing a common motion, they are perceived
as a unitary actor so that breaking the factional alliance will not be costless
(e.g., in term of credibility).
The role of electoral rules, confirmed by our results, is strongly emphasized
when looking at real world politics. For instance left-wing factions within the
DC have always battled to get proportional representation for the election
of congress’ delegates (Boucek 2010; Venditti 1981: 40; Zincone 1972). In
1954 the left subgroup Forze Sociali proposed a motion to introduce the PR;
this motion however was defeated by a small margin and the PR system was
enacted only ten years later in 1964. At the end of the 1970s, when the system
was modified to include a threshold and a majority prize, left-wing factions
complained and fought once again to re-introduce a pure PR (Venditti 1981),
which allowed them to exert a stronger influence over party mainstream.
Apart from formal rules other features contribute to the growth of fac-
tionalism. First of all the heterogeneity of policy preferences matters (H 4.2).
INTERNAL POLARIZATION increases the number of factions. When the
congress is contested broader levels of divisiveness lead to an higher number of
factions that decide to run in the internal elections. Policy heterogeneity is al-
ways a source of factionalism. If we include in model 2 the interaction between
INTERNAL POLARIZATION and PARTY IN OFFICE, this coefficient will
not be significant, meaning that there is no conditional effect. The impact
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of policy motivation remains the same even within parties in office, contrary
to the idea of ruling parties composed mainly by factions of interests, which
should not care about policy payoffs.
The availability of resources (H 4.3) is another element that boosts faction-
alism. We measured this variable through PARTY SIZE (the share of party
votes). We could have measured party resources using two other variables: the
number of party members or the financial budget (i.e., the party revenues). We
gathered these data even though it is difficult to find information about (there
are in fact many missing values). Anyway the correlation between PARTY
SIZE, members and revenues is strong and statistically significant. In the
dataset with 198 congresses PARTY SIZE is correlated with membership (.85)
and revenues (.90). This data confirms that PARTY SIZE is a suitable proxy
for the amount of financial resources.
When it comes to our H 4.5 we found that, contrary to our expectation, be-
ing a cabinet member decreases NOF. After controlling for rules, preferences
and size we observe that the total number of subgroups within PARTY IN
OFFICE is lower. This effect might be related to the results shown in para-
graphs 8.3 and 8.4, and in footnote 33 (chapter 7). Party unity is a source of
bargaining power that increases the party’s appeal as a partner of a coalition
government. Then less divided parties are more likely to get in office (Warwick
1996). Once in office they will face even more incentives to keep their unity
in order to exploit patronage and to improve government effectiveness (Katz
1986b). In addition the cost of division increases because the life of ruling
parties is more under public scrutiny compared to opposition parties. Accord-
ingly, and in line with our theoretical model, we could expect an increase in
the cost of voice (ν) among ruling parties, which yields as a consequence a
decrease in factionalism (minorities will be less prone to resort to the voice
option). These elements seem to explain why, within our data, parties in office
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appear to be less factionalized.
Finally the data confirm that the electoral system (H 4.4) provides incen-
tives for factionalism: open list PR grants to a wider number of factions the
opportunity to gain parliamentary seats allowing them to perpetuate.
In sum we found confirmation for the role of policy preferences as a source
of factionalism. In addition the availability of resources within the party con-
tributes to feed factions, although there seems to be no added value from
cabinet participation and, conversely, parties in office are less factionalized
due to the growing incentives for unity and cohesion. The electoral system
has an effect: when changing from closed list to open list PR the number of
factions increases. Finally the impact of intra-party rules seems less clear.
Formal rules play a role, especially when they are strictly enacted, although
sometimes party might decide to escape them. With the exception of the in-
ternal electoral system, that seems to work according to Duverger’s laws, the
rules related to party organization seem to affect more the shape of intra-party
conflict than its extent.
Overall undemocratic party rules (like democratic centralism) or undemo-
cratic party structures (like those of personal parties), do indeed exert con-
straints on the expression of internal dissent. Actually we cannot say nothing
about the degree of factionalism within those parties simply because we are
not able to observe it. Although there might exist heterogeneity of preferences,
the way these parties are organized is effective in decreasing the probability to
observe internal struggles. Within these parties the conflict could probably be
observed only when it erupts producing visible consequences like party splits.
This chapter shown that, if a bias exists, it is limited to undemocratic
party structures characterized by DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM or to PER-
SONAL PARTY. Accordingly we will proceed with caution when generalizing
the results of the empirical chapters to these parties, whose internal dynamics
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might not follow the classic form of factional competition through congress
motions. Instead, we will focus more on intra-party conflict and bargaining
within factionalized parties.
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Chapter 5
Portfolio Allocation among
Italian Factions
5.1 Introduction
The topic of portfolio allocation dynamics has been widely studied. Gam-
son (1961) seminal work opened the debate on how government coalitions dis-
tribute office payoffs to their members. He hypothesised that payoffs are dis-
tributed proportionally to the amount of resources provided by each member
of the coalition (Gamson 1961: 376). That is: in multiparty governments, cab-
inet portfolios (y) are allocated to parties proportionally to their share of seats,
measured as percentage (x) of the total seats held by parties that support the
governing coalition. Later studies found empirical support for this idea (among
them: Browne and Franklin 1973; Browne and Frendreis 1980; Druckman and
Roberts 2003; Laver and Schofield 1998; Schofield and Laver 1985; Warwick
and Druckman 2001, 2006). The empirical evidence leaded scholars to refer
to such hypothesis as Gamson’s Law. Indeed Laver (1998: 7) pointed out
that Gamson’s Law boasts ‘one of the highest non-trivial R-squared figures in
political science’. Notwithstanding, another branch of the literature raised an
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alternative hypothesis built on bargaining theories (Ansolabehere et al. 2005;
Baron and Ferejohn 1989; Fre´chette et al. 2005; Morelli 1999; Snyder et al.
2005). These scholars argue that the formateur party i.e., the first party in
charge of building a coalition, can exploit its strategic role ‘to pivot between
alternative minimal-winning coalitions’ (Carroll and Cox 2007: 300) in order
to obtain a share of posts greater than its share of seats. Despite these the-
ories, recent empirical studies confirm, overall, the results of Gamson’s Law
(Carroll and Cox 2007; Laver et al. 2010; Warwick and Druckman 2006). So
far we summarized the literature on portfolio allocation between parties. Con-
versely we will focus on the intra-party dynamics to assess how cabinet posts
are assigned within the party.
5.2 Intra-party Bargaining over Office Payoffs:
Literature and Hypotheses
Most of the quarrel between Gamson’s Law and bargaining models is
carried out looking at the inter-party level of analysis while the intra-party
facet of portfolio allocation has received less attention. There are few, though
important, studies related to distribution of office payoffs between factions.
These works usually concern Italy and Japan and investigate the patterns of
portfolio allocation within two dominant parties: the Italian Christian Demo-
cratic Party (Mershon 2001a, 2001b) and the Japanese Liberal Democratic
Party (Adachi and Watanabe 2007; Bouissou 2001; Kohno 1997; Leiserson
1968; Ono 2010; Sato and Matsuzaky 1986; Wada and Schofield 1996), or
both of them (Kato and Mershon 2006).
We will consider the party as a coalition of factions that have to split
the whole amount of party payoffs (Leiserson 1968; Panebianco 1988). To
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keep unity and soften the opposition of rival factions the party leader should
allocate portfolios among all party factions. In this sense we would expect that
Gamson’s Law holds, ruling inter-factional bargaining within the party.
Most of the critics of Gamson’s Law pointed out that this is just an em-
pirical regularity with a huge need for theoretical foundation (Warwick and
Druckman 2006: 660). Carroll and Cox (2007) started to fill this lack, de-
veloping a theoretical model that underpins the adoption of a proportionality
criterion in portfolio allocation among members of pre-electoral coalition. The
party, like a pre-electoral coalition, has an incentive to keep its unity (which
is the public good) and to coordinate the behaviour of its members during
the negotiation over cabinet formation. By establishing an internal rule of
thumb that assigns proportional payoffs to each faction, the party pushes all
its subgroups to work together maximizing party’s strength and bargaining
power, like pre-electoral coalitions do. For instance ‘By agreeing ex ante to a
more Gamsonian division of office spoils ex post, the coalition can motivate its
members to campaign harder, thus conferring external benefits on all.’ (Car-
roll and Cox 2007: 301). With respect to factions this might concern both the
electoral campaign (particularly when factions compete for preference voting)
and the everyday life of parties that involves also fund-raising and member-
ship drive, which are directly linked to factional power and party strength. If
this is the case we would observe that, overall, office payoffs are distributed
proportionally to each faction size.
Hypothesis 5.1: The faction share of portfolios should correspond with
its share of seats in party body
Mershon (2001a, 2001b) tested this hypothesis with respect to the Italian
Christian Democratic Party. Her work confirms that, overall, cabinet posts
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are awarded in proportion to faction size. Analyzing data on 145 DC factions
she found that a unitary increase in the share of seats held in DC National
Council raised the faction’s share of ministers by 0.78; this path seemed even
stronger when considering data on junior ministers: for 74 factions analysed
she found a perfect proportionality, meaning that one point increase in the
share of seats yielded a 1.05 gain in the faction’s quota of undersecretaries.
Nevertheless, apart from confirming Gamson hypothesis her analysis also
revealed the existence of ‘variations across groups of governments [i.e., obser-
vations] and across types of factions that are masked by the overall pattern’
(Mershon 2001a, 573, italic added). These deviations were related to changes
in party rule (among them the shift to PR in party congress elections and the
direct election of party leader), strategic faction’s position (being the median
faction or one of the wings) and party system features (number and nature
of DC allies). Here we will expand Mershon work to include these and other
possible explanations.
First of all we provide alternative hypotheses related to the bargaining
theories. As long as we are dealing with a unidimensional space we can argue
that within each party the median faction might exploit its strategic bargaining
position to increase its share of office payoffs well above its actual size (Bouissou
2001, 584). Indeed Mershon (2001a ,2001b) already observed that the median
faction within the DC was overpaid. Similarly we can adapt the concept of
formateur party drawn by bargaining theories to the factional context. We
assume that the party leader is the agent who has the power to allocate payoffs.
Like in a setter game she can propose to the factions one among several possible
distributions of payoffs that they might accept or reject. Obviously the party
leader wants first of all to keep her status, but also to recompense her followers
and to enhance their strength within the party. Moving first, the leader can
propose to other factions an almost right deal (close to perfect proportionality)
134
5.2. INTRA-PARTY BARGAINING OVER OFFICE PAYOFFS:
LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES
that is hard to be rejected, even though she can exploit its discretionality to
grant to her factions a more than proportional reward. Thus the faction to
whom the leader belongs to can theoretically take advantage of its linkage
with the leader and we will consider it as a kind of ‘formateur faction’. If
this suggestion holds true, we would observe an increase in its share of cabinet
posts above the gamsonian prediction.1
Hypothesis 5.2a: The median faction should gain a share of portfolios
that is more than proportional to its seats share
Hypothesis 5.2b: The party leader’s faction should gain a share of port-
folios that is more than proportional to its seats share
This idea of a setter game is related to what discussed in chapter 2. Retriev-
ing those concepts we would expect that the formateur faction’s gain will be
greater when the leader is more autonomous from factional constraints (i.e.,
when there is a direct election). This point was already raised by Mershon
(2001a, 2001b) who showed that the direct election of party leader decreased
the degree of proportionality in portfolio allocation within the DC.2 Such con-
cept is also related to the idea that autonomous leaders are less likely to be
challenged or removed from their charge. This is particularly true for lead-
ers that are popular among voters and whose factions are stronger within the
1Boucek (2010: 127) highlighted that majoritarian arrangements within the LDP pushed
intra-party politics toward a bipolarized model of competition. In such context, even if
minority groups were not excluded from payoffs allotment, the mainstream factions (those
who supported the winning party leader) won the lion’s share of portfolios (Boucek 2010;
Di Virgilio and Kato 2001).
2Kato and Mershon (2006) pointed out that contrasting modes of leadership selection lead
to different patterns of allocation. In the Japanese LDP the party leader was elected, until
the 1980s, by the congress and under such context portfolio allocation followed ‘winner-take-
all dynamics’. Afterwards, LDP internal rules changed and the leader was chosen through
factional negotiation. These dynamics forced the leader to comply with the factional deal,
thereby increasing the fairness in portfolio allocation (Di Virgilio and Kato 2001).
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party: they can exploit a huge degree of discretionality in assigning office pay-
offs (Ono 2010). We can test the effect of this party rule in interaction with
hypothesis 5.1 and 5.2b as follow:
Hypothesis 5.3a: The degree of proportionality in portfolio allocation
should be lower among parties whose leaders are more autonomous
Hypothesis 5.3b: The party leader’s faction should gain a share of port-
folios that is more than proportional to its seats share when the party
leader is more autonomous
Another intra-party attribute might affect this outcome. Mershon investi-
gated the impact of the party congress electoral rule; overall her results indicate
that proportionality was greater under PR internal electoral systems. However
those results were controversial as she highlighted that direct election of party
leader seems to matter more. Here we can double check this hypothesis to
make sure whether non-proportional rules foster a ‘winner-takes-all’ allocation
of payoffs. An highly disproportional internal electoral system might allow one
faction to gain a full majority within the party body, so that it can exclude
the minorities from the distribution of cabinet spoils. In fact, as we argued in
the previous chapters, disproportional internal rule might increase the cost of
voice (ν) thereby denying room for the achievement of compromise.
Hypothesis 5.4: The degree of proportionality in portfolio allocation
should be higher when the party body electoral rule is strictly propor-
tional
As we have just suggested, cooperative norms can foster proportional al-
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location of payoffs despite the internal electoral rule. Repeated interactions
between factions might lead them to discover the advantages of cooperation,
fostering proportional distributive dynamics (Boucek 2003a). Indeed some
scholars underlined how LDP factions developed proportionality norms as time
went (Bouissou 2001; Sato and Matsuzaki 1986).
Hypothesis 5.5: The degree of proportionality in portfolio allocation
should be higher among older parties where cooperative norms are es-
tablished
In addition we want to control any alteration in bargaining dynamics due to
factions’ blackmail power. Intra-party minorities might increase their bargain-
ing power threatening to defect, leaving the party. Indeed Wada and Schofield
(1996) argued that the shift towards proportional allocation within LDP fac-
tions has been fostered by factional leaders’ threat of exiting from the party.
The mainstream faction then should cater to the minority as much as possible
in order to avoid a fission that could damage the party (Boucek 2003a, 2010;
Hirschman 1970). Similarly, Mutlu (2011) highlights how party leaders use
pork-barrel politics as a strategy to keep their party united. In this sense we
can hypothesise that minority factions will be overpaid; their share of posts
will be greater than their size.
This will happen however only under two conditions: the threat to defect
must be credible and harmful for the party. To be harmful the threat must
involve at least a medium sized minority faction. To be credible that faction
should gain only a limited amount of policy payoffs from party membership
(larger policy payoffs in fact reduce the trade-off and therefore credibility of a
split).
We know that party members (and factions) incur a cost for joining a
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party (Snyder and Ting 2002). This cost increases along with the distance
between faction’s and party’s positions. In this vein we can hypothesise that
the greater the distance, the higher this cost and, similarly, the higher the net
benefit of a breakaway (pi). Therefore the probability of a breakaway growths
as the distance enlarges (see chapter 7 on this point). Accordingly, factions
whose ideal point is far from the bulk of party members must be overpaid in
the allotment of cabinet posts to balance their lower policy returns (at least
when the leader wants to prevent them from breaking away). Warwick (1998)
suggested a similar reasoning for coalition governments: a greater distance
between one party and the cabinet’s ideal point requires an higher attribution
of cabinet posts to bring the party inside the coalition. Following this logic we
would expect that medium sized factions whose preferences diverge from party
mainstream will be overpaid while smaller factions will be underpaid because
their threat is not harmful (although could be credible when they are located
far away from the median faction).
Hypothesis 5.6: Minority factions’ share of portfolios should increase
along with their size and their distance from the median faction (i.e.,
the likelihood of their breakaway)
To conclude, we will take into account the impact of party system com-
petitiveness on allocation dynamics. We contend that in a low competitive
parliamentary arena, where the ruling coalition retains a safe margin on the
opposition parties (ω is low), leaders will not fear the risk of losing office due to
potential defections of minority factions. Accordingly, they will try to overpay
their followers
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Hypothesis 5.7: The party leader faction should be overpaid when the
cabinet retains a safe parliamentary support
5.3 Data and Methodology
The analysis carried out in the present chapter closely resembles what
already done by Mershon on portfolio allocation within the DC. The database
here used is built following most of the criteria she adopted in her work. Like
Mershon (2001b: 285–286) we disaggregate data as follow: for each party
congress our unit of analysis is the faction share of portfolios within any single
government that was in power until the following party congress. This allows to
increase the number of observations and makes this analysis comparable with
other studies in the field of portfolio allotment. Following Mershon, we ascribed
factional affiliation to party ministers referring to the official proceeding issued
by the party after the congress, checking whether a minister had signed one of
the motions presented by party factions (see Giannetti and Laver 2009 for a
similar approach). In a few cases factional affiliation has been inferred looking
at newspaper reports, ministers’ biography or sources of data provided by the
literature (e.g., Venditti 1981).
The present work however presents some non trivial changes and improve-
ments. First of all, Mershon analysis relied on one party only while here we
investigate the patterns of portfolio allocation considering a wide number of
parties. With respect to those listed in table 3.1, we analyze only parties that
have been involved in at least one cabinet after the congress. Hence the num-
ber of parties included in this dataset is equal to nine: we track almost all
parties that held ministerial posts during the First Republic (DC, PLI, PRI,
PSDI, PSI) as well as a few factionalized parties that have been in office dur-
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ing the Second Republic (AN, DS, NPSI, PRC). Mershon’s analysis covered
at most 20 governments and 163 cases (factions); our dataset instead includes
information on 331 factions spread along 49 Italian governments, whereas the
total number of governments in office from 1946 to 2010 is 61.
With respect to Mershon there is only one difference concerning the method
of data gathering for it we do not consider factions as given. We use data
drawn from party congresses with a twofold purpose: to detect the factions
and to assess the ministers who belong to each of them. Mershon indeed
referred to data from party congresses only for the second purpose while she
counted DC factions as given. This is why the number of DC factions in our
dataset is slightly lower (151 versus 163) although we analysed DC intra-party
equilibriums in a broader number of congresses (11 against 6) and governments
(32 instead of 20). All these features clearly highlight that our dataset is much
more complete and tracks the patterns of intra-party bargaining over office
payoffs in a widely comprehensive perspective (see table 5.1 for more details).
Table 5.1: Details on the Data Analyzed: Number of Observations per Party
Party Governments Cases
AN 3 10
DC 32 151
DS 3 10
NPSI 1 2
PLI 9 30
PRC 1 5
PRI 13 28
PSDI 18 44
PSI 14 51
Total 49 331
There are also further improvements provided by this research. Mershon
investigated the impact of intra-party policy preferences according to strategic
factional placement on the internal left-right scale. She evaluated the differ-
ent distributions of payoffs considering whether the faction was the median or
it was located on the wings. However she measured the median faction only
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looking at the traditional qualitative ordinal array of DC subgroups. Here we
can improve this point evaluating the impact of policy preferences on office
payoffs. First of all we will determine the median faction using the quantita-
tive estimates of factions’ positions presented in chapter 3. Moreover we can
account for the role of preferences considering, for each subgroup, the distance
between its ideal point and the median faction. Then we can assess whether
this distance affects the intra-party bargaining or not.
Finally one last difference concerns model estimation. As far as our de-
pendent variable (y) is a proportion (the share of ministers assigned to each
faction) using the ordinary least squares regression (as done by Mershon) may
not produce accurate estimates. This happens because the values of y are
bounded between 0 (the faction does not hold any minister) and 1 (the whole
share of party ministers is assigned to one faction only). In such situations
the assumptions required by the OLS might not hold as we could have het-
eroskedasticity or the errors might be not normal distributed (see Wooldridge
2002). Moreover the predicted values might fall outside the unit interval.
Then we should adopt other models like the beta maximum likelihood estima-
tion (Paolino 2001) or the fractional logit (Papke and Wooldridge 1996, 2008).
Ono (2010) for instance analyzed portfolio allocation among LDP factions us-
ing a beta-binomial model. This model however does not allow the dependent
variable to assume values that are exactly equals to 0 or 1. In our case this
could be an issue because approximately 40% of our factions retain a share
of payoffs that is either 0 or 1, as shown in figure 5.1 (Papke and Wooldridge
1996: 620).
Consequently we will analyze our data by means of a fractional logit.
Moreover, as long as we have repeated observations nested within each party
congress, we clustered them accordingly, providing standard errors on congress.
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Figure 5.1: Distribution of the Share of Minister per Faction
Our dependent variable is SHARE OF MINISTERS, the percentage of minis-
ters belonging to faction i over the total number of portfolios assigned to party
j within government k. The independent variables are the following.
SHARE OF SEATS: the percentage of seats retained in party body (i.e.,
the National Council or the Central Committee); sometimes we compensate
for unavailable data using the percentage of votes gained in party congress.
MEDIAN FACTION: a dummy variable that identifies the median faction
(value 1) within each party congress. PARTY LEADER FACTION: a dummy
variable that identifies the faction to whom the party leader belongs to (value
1); in one case (PSI 1946 congress) we did not assign value 1 to any faction
because the party appointed an independent leader with the task to appease
the subgroups. LEADER AUTONOMY: measures the party leader’s degree
of autonomy; it equals 1 when the party leader is elected during the party
congress directly by party delegates or party members while it takes value 0
when the leader is appointed by a small committee. DISPROPORTIONAL
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RULE: accounts for the party congress electoral rule; it takes value 0 when the
rule is a pure PR; value 1 when the voting rule is a PR with majority prize and
a low threshold (5%); value 2 when the congress is held under a majoritarian
system or under a PR with majority prize and high threshold of representation
(20%). PARTY AGE: years elapsed from party birth until each government
took the office. DISTANCE: corresponds to the squared distance between fac-
tion i and the median faction within the party congress. PARLIAMENTARY
SUPPORT: the share of seats retained by the ruling coalition.
To investigate the effect of each variable on portfolio allocation we included
also some interaction terms. We focused in particular on the interactions
between SHARE OF SEATS and the other variables (LEADER AUTONOMY,
DISPROPORTIONAL RULE, PARTY AGE, DISTANCE) to attest whether,
under particular conditions, the impact of faction size changes. In this way we
can better assess if the Gamson’s Law actually shapes intra-party bargaining.
Finally we provide also the interaction term between LEADER AUTONOMY
and PARTY LEADER FACTION to verify whether the effect of each variable
is conditional upon the other.
5.4 Analysis and Results
Table 5.2 provides the results of the analysis. We presented several nested
models in order to account for all the hypotheses raised above. Model 1 is
our baseline model; we include only one independent variable, SHARE OF
SEATS. We want to test H 5.1: if a Gamson’s Law exists we will observe
a significant coefficient for this variable; additionally the conditional marginal
effect of SHARE OF SEATS (when this variable is fixed at the mean) should be
equal to one, attesting that there is, overall, a perfect proportionality between
faction’s size and the percentage of ministers assigned to it.
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In model 2 we investigate H 6.2a and H 6.2b; we add the two variables
related to the bargaining theories of portfolio allocation: MEDIAN FACTION
and PARTY LEADER FACTION, which represents a kind of formateur fac-
tion. We include them simultaneously even if they are strongly correlated.3
However the post estimation diagnostic does not underline any strong problem
with collinearity. Moreover testing the two variables in separate models leads
to equal results.
In model 3 we take into consideration the impact of formal rules through
the variables LEADER AUTONOMY and DISPROPORTIONAL RULE. We
introduce also two interaction terms between these variables and SHARE OF
SEATS to check whether the pattern of proportionality changes according to
variations in intra-party rules. Model 3 compares H 5.3a and H 5.4 controlling
if one of these two sets of rules retains a wider impact.
In model 4 we test H 5.5, related to intra-party informal rules, through
an interaction term to assess whether the impact of SHARE OF SEATS is
more or less proportional as PARTY AGE increases hereby fostering internal
cooperative norms.
Model 5 evaluates the effect of factions’ policy preferences on intra-party
bargaining (H 5.6). The interaction between the variable DISTANCE and
SHARE OF SEATS tracks changes in the pattern of proportionality accord-
ing to deviations in faction’s preferences (we can compare differences between
factions that are marginal or pivotal with respect to the bulk of party mem-
bers). We can also detect adjustments in the bargaining power of these fac-
tions according to variations in their size: do strong internal minorities exert
a blackmail power despite their extreme policy preferences?
Finally in model 6 we replicate model 5 adding the interaction between
3Apart from few exceptions, we observe that party leaders tend to be selected choosing
inside the median faction. This allow to minimize potential agency losses that could be
higher when leaders’s preferences are extreme (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991).
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LEADER AUTONOMY and PARTY LEADER FACTION (as suggested in H
5.3b) to provide a whole depiction of the intra-party balance of power between
party leader and minority factions, while in model 7 we test the interaction
between PARTY LEADER FACTION and PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT
(H 5.7).
To start with we comment the general results while later we will provide
additional remarks on each model. First of all, SHARE OF SEATS is always
significant confirming that size does matter. Larger factions are able to extract
a greater amount of office payoffs. However (except in model 6) the coefficient
of PARTY LEADER FACTION is always significant and positive as well,
even controlling for SHARE OF SEATS. This indicates that, at least in part,
bargaining theories apply to intra-party politics as long as the party leader
is able to exploit her strategic role to assign to her faction a share of payoffs
larger than the actual faction size. When looking at the other variables (and
at their interaction terms) we note that only few are significant. Moving from
model 1 to 5 we remove after each step those variables that retain no effect on
SHARE OF MINISTERS (i.e., MEDIAN FACTION, DISPROPORTIONAL
RULE, PARTY AGE). We find statistically significant effects only for three
other variables, LEADER AUTONOMY and DISTANCE, as well as for their
interaction with SHARE OF SEATS, and for PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT
in interaction with PARTY LEADER FACTION.
To provide a more substantive interpretation of the present analysis we
turn now to comment each model. In the baseline model SHARE OF SEATS
is significant; when the faction size is set at its mean (29% of seats) the condi-
tional marginal effect on the dependent variable is equal to 1.14. This seems
to point out that, overall, portfolio allocation is proportional to faction size
and figure 5.2 seems to confirm this idea.
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Table 5.2: Portfolio Allocation among Party Factions. Fractional Logit of
SHARE OF MINISTERS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
SHARE OF SEATS 6.578*** 5.610*** 6.420*** 6.288*** 5.989*** 5.913*** 6.052***
(0.482) (0.619) (0.776) (1.044) (0.774) (1.074) (0.760)
MEDIAN FACTION 0.047
(0.187)
PARTY LEADER 0.587*** 0.561* 0.578* 0.608* 0.654 -0.921*
FACTION (0.209) (0.309) (0.303) (0.317) (0.606) (0.472)
LEADER AUTONOMY 0.663** 0.660* 0.671** 0.659** 0.793**
(0.308) (0.376) (0.312) (0.313) (0.333)
SHARE OF SEATS* -1.508* -1.477 -1.514* -1.382 -1.719**
LEADER AUTONOMY (0.792) (0.930) (0.798) (1.158) (0.824)
DISPROPORTIONAL 0.030
RULE (0.176)
SHARE OF SEATS* -0.280
DISPROPORTIONAL (0.407)
RULE
PARTY AGE -0.000
(0.013)
SHARE OF SEATS* -0.004
PARTY AGE (0.034)
DISTANCE -0.558** -0.565** -0.502*
(0.278) (0.284) (0.263)
SHARE OF SEATS* 2.129** 2.168** 2.303***
DISTANCE (0.879) (1.016) (0.786)
PARTY LEADER -0.090
FACTION*LEADER (0.607)
AUTONOMY
PARLIAMENTARY -1.387***
SUPPORT (0.452)
PARTY LEADER 2.959***
FACTION* (1.039)
PARLIAMENTARY
SUPPORT
CONSTANT -3.149*** -3.047*** -3.326*** -3.280*** -3.223*** -3.213*** -2.575***
(0.184) (0.170) (0.281) (0.379) (0.280) (0.279) (0.218)
Observations 331 331 331 331 331 331 331
Log pseudo-likelihood -94.82 -93.96 -93.29 -93.38 -93.24 -93.23 -93.41
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure 5.2: Faction Share of Ministers as its Seats Share Changes
Note: The light gray area indicates the linear fit with a 95% Confidence Interval
Model 2 however finds more confirmation for the bargaining theories. PARTY
LEADER FACTION is significant even after controlling for the share of seats.
No matter its size, the faction the leader belongs to is always able to gain an
higher number of portfolios when compared to the others. The conditional
marginal effect (when all the variables are fixed at their mean) highlights a
10% increase in its share of ministers. Correspondingly the degree of propor-
tionality is higher among party leader factions (mainstream); overall they are
overpaid as the marginal impact of SHARE OF SEATS is 1.19 while this effect
falls below the value of 1 for factions not linked to the leader (0.89). Figure
5.3 illustrates that among minority factions (whose share of seats stands un-
derneath 50%) party leader followers (black dots) are able to extract a greater
amount of office payoffs, no matter their size.4 Finally the model tells us that
being the median faction does not impact on the share of ministers gained,
4We provide the best linear fit only related to minority subgroups to compare the two
types of factions (mainstream and non-mainstream). While the party leader might belong
to a minority group, there are no majority factions that are not linked to it.
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unless the median coincides with the party mainstream. This is in agreement
with the idea of a setter game where only the party leader can take advantage
of her role to decide what factions to reward and what to punish.
Figure 5.3: Faction Share of Ministers as its Seats Share Changes. Difference
between Mainstream (Black) and Non-Mainstream Factions (Gray)
Note: The two areas indicate the linear fit with a 95% Confidence Interval for mainstream
(black frame) and non-mainstream factions (gray frame)
Model 3 compares the impact of two sets of intra-party rules. The effect
of the internal electoral system is not significant. Majoritarian party rules
do not foster ‘winner-take-all’ dynamics: the minorities are still involved in
portfolio allotment. The electoral system plays a role only by transforming
votes (won by factions during the congress) into seats (inside party body), but
the magnitude of this effect does not enlarge beyond the mechanical level of
disproportionality. Conversely the direct election of party leader, by fostering
her autonomy, increases the ability to allocate payoffs according to her wishes,
thereby reducing the level of proportionality in portfolio allotment. We find
confirmation for Mershon’s claim (2001a: 573): ‘Once direct elections for the
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DC secretary general were instituted [. . . ] the norm of proportionality exerted
a rather weak influence on the distribution of ministerial posts among DC
factions. In this sense, the institutional reform with the strongest impact on
inter-factional portfolio allocation was not the shift to PR but the decision
to hold direct elections for the secretary general.’. Indeed the marginal im-
pact of SHARE OF SEATS drops from 1.03 to 0.89 when leaders are more
autonomous. However the party leader faction does not automatically gain
from this shift. The marginal effect of PARTY LEADER FACTION increases
barely by 1% when leaders are directly elected. The question then is who does
benefit from such discretionality in portfolio allocation.
Models 5, 6 and 7 try to provide an answer. By including the variable
DISTANCE and its interaction with SHARE OF SEATS we investigate how
policy preferences affect the inter-factional bargaining. They are both sig-
nificant, controlling for PARTY LEADER FACTION. According to H 5.6 the
interaction between the size of a minority faction and its distance from the bulk
of party members should catch the blackmail power of internal minorities.
Figure 5.4 reports the marginal impact of SHARE OF SEATS as DIS-
TANCE increases, along with a 90% confidence interval, for minority factions
not linked to the party leader. We highlight how this effect varies according
to the size of the minority group, drawing as an example three different lines.
The dotted one sketches the degree of proportionality for a small subgroup
(that retains 10% of party body seats); the dashed line shows the effect for
a medium sized minority (30%) and the solid one illustrates the impact on a
very strong non-mainstream faction (i.e., a group that retains 50% of seats
but did not prevail during the election for party leader). We observe that the
smaller faction is strongly underpaid: a 10% increase in size is rewarded by
only an additional 4% of the share of ministers. On the contrary the medium
sized group receives a proportional return in office payoffs for any increase in
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its strength. Moreover, as the distance between this subgroup and the median
faction increases the degree of proportionality increases as well up to the point
that this group will be overpaid when its ideal point is far away from the core of
party preferences. Something similar happens to the largest minority faction:
this powerful group is strongly overpaid; its reward is more than proportional
and growths when faction’s policy position diverges from that of the median
faction.5
Figure 5.4: Marginal Effect of Share of Seats on Share of Ministers as Distance
Increases
Note: Impact among non-mainstream factions. The graph reports the marginal effect, with
a 95% Confidence Interval, for three differently sized minorities (that retain respectively
10%, 30% and 50% of seats in party body)
Here we focused on minority factions to whom the party leader does not
belong. We assume that a growing distance between the ideal point of each
minority group and the median faction raises the cost of party membership
for the minority (Snyder and Ting 2002). Ceteris paribus its total amount of
5We observe the same effect for factions that hold an intermediate percentage of seats,
between 30% and 50%.
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payoffs will be lower and the faction will face increasing incentives to break
away (this reasoning is sustained by the empirical evidence that will be shown
in chapter 7). Minority factions can try to increase their amount of payoffs
threatening to split from the party (Boucek 2003a; Hirschman 1970). This
blackmail strategy however could be successful only if the threat is credible
and harmful. The party leader in turn will address minority factions requests
only in such situations. The present analysis seems to confirm this pattern. To
keep party unity, the leader caters to minority factions with a share of seats
greater than their actual size. However this happens only when the size of the
minority groups is already medium or large, while smaller factions do not carry
any real blackmail power and therefore their stakes remain completely ignored.
When the likelihood of their breakaway increases, powerful minorities receive
a growing amount of cabinet posts as an incentive to stay within the party.
In sum, through portfolio allocation the party leader compensates to those
minority factions whose threat of exit is credible and harmful for the party.
In order to provide them with a reason to stay within the party, their lower
amount of policy payoffs is balanced by means of a more than proportional
share of office payoffs (Warwick 1998).
Model 5, likewise models 3 and 4, reports an advantage for the party leader
faction and a decrease in proportionality (that means a more discretionary
distribution of payoffs) when the leader is directly elected. However in model
6, after including the interaction between PARTY LEADER FACTION and
LEADER AUTONOMY, these variables are no longer significant. Overall
the PARTY LEADER FACTION does not seem to gain from its status and
the deviations from a gamsonian pattern seem to be caused mainly by the
blackmail power of the minorities. Notwithstanding, the marginal effect of
being the PARTY LEADER FACTION is significant (and positive) only when
the leader relies on a greater autonomy thanks to its direct election, as shown
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in table 5.3.6
Table 5.3: Marginal Effect of Being the Party Leader Faction Conditional on
Leader Autonomy
Marginal Effect on SHARE OF MINISTERS when:
LEADER AUTONOMY = 0 0.110
(0.101)
LEADER AUTONOMY = 1 0.107***
(0.030)
Based on model 6 from Table 5.2
All other variables set at their means
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
As a final point, we look at the interaction included in model 7, which
involves PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT and PARTY LEADER FACTION,
to assess under what conditions the mainstream faction turns out to be over-
paid. Figure 5.5 illustrates the advantage exploited by the party leader faction,
conditional on the balance of power between government and opposition. We
distinguish between autonomous (black) and bounded leaders (gray). Overall
the mainstream is able to take advantage of its link with the party leader only
when the cabinet retains a safe majority. The wider the margin of the rul-
ing coalition, the lower the degree of competitiveness and, as a consequence,
the higher the benefit extracted by the mainstream faction in terms of office
payoffs.7 We did not find significant differences when comparing contrasting
leaderships, even though under autonomous leaders there is more variation
in the size of mainstream’s surplus so that the PARTY LEADER FACTION
6It could be argued that these results are inflated by the presence of parties with a
low number of cabinet posts. Here the minister(s) would be more likely assigned to the
mainstream faction at the expense of minority. However, when excluding from the sample
parties that retain only few ministers (for instance, one or two) the results of the analyses
hold and the advantage of the mainstream faction seems even strengthened.
7This result holds when considering the size of all the parties that sustain the cabinet
(even only through external support) instead of the percentage of seats retained by parties
in office.
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could hope to receive a slight larger bonus.8
Figure 5.5: Marginal Impact of being the Party Leader Faction on the Share
of Ministers as the Margin of Parliamentary Support Retained by Govern-
ment Parties Growths. Differences between Autonomous (Black) or Bounded
Leaders (Gray)
Note: The graph reports the marginal effect when LEADER AUTONOMY = 0 (gray line)
and when LEADER AUTONOMY = 1 (black line), along with the 95% Confidence
Interval (light-gray and black areas, respectively)
5.5 Intra-party Portfolio Allocation: Findings
Empirical evidence drawn from Italian factions does not allow to reject
the idea of proportionality in intra-party portfolio allocation. Overall, faction
size matters and the distribution of office payoffs is often in line with what
suggested by the Gamson’s hypothesis. However despite what shown in figure
8When testing the interaction between SHARE OF VOTES and PARLIAMENTARY
SUPPORT we observe that the degree of proportionality is constant across different level
of PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT when the leader is bounded by factional constraints and
has to stick to the inter-factional deal. On the contrary, under autonomous leaders the
proportional effect of SHARE OF SEATS on SHARE OF MINISTERS decreases when the
size of PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT retained by the cabinet growths.
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5.2 there are important deviations from a perfect one to one correspondence
between size and payoffs.
In this chapter we tried to go further explaining such deviations. First of all
we observed a significant advantage exploited by the party leader faction. Even
controlling for faction’s size this effect still holds; acting as the proposer in a
setter game, the party leader is able to reward her followers with an amount
of payoffs greater than their strength in party body. This evidence is in line
with the bargaining theories that predict larger payoffs for the formateur in
spite of proportional allocation.
We deepened this analysis looking at the effects played by formal and infor-
mal rules. Transforming party congress votes in party body seats, the electoral
system plays a role but its impact is confined only to that extent. Factions
that receive a share of seats lower than their congress votes or do not pass the
threshold will gain lower office payoffs accordingly. Conversely if they win rep-
resentation in party body they will be rewarded on the basis of their strength
within that arena: there are no ‘winner-take-all’ dynamics beyond this point.
Contrary to empirical evidence from Japanese LDP factions we do not find
any increase in proportionality across time. Perhaps cooperative norms that
emerge within older parties could be counterbalanced by an increase in loyalty:
cooperation should lead to a more proportional allocation while the increased
loyalty, which raises the cost of the exit option (ε), could force minority factions
to stay within and to accept an unfair distribution of payoffs, as suggested from
our theory (see chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion on loyalty). Due to
this countervailing mechanism, the overall effect on portfolio allocation is not
significant.
The direct election of party leader seems to play a more direct effect, de-
creasing the degree of proportionality in portfolio allocation. To provide the
public good (party unity and party strength), she identifies and provides se-
154
5.5. INTRA-PARTY PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION: FINDINGS
lective incentives that ensure the mobilization of all factions. When the leader
is more autonomous she can exploit her role to reward her followers or to keep
party unity by heeding the requests posed by internal minorities.
However our findings suggest that this second effect is prevailing. Besides
rewarding her supporters, the party leader addresses the requests of minority
(whose leverage is wide) in order to solve all the credible threats to party
unity. In this sense portfolio allocation becomes a strategy to ward off potential
harmful threats and to balance the total amount of returns for those factions
whose policy payoffs are lower, thus contributing to keep the party together.
This aspect is even more relevant inside competitive parliamentary arenas,
where the margin of ruling parties is lower and any single split might alter the
balance of power between government and opposition. On the contrary, when
the cabinet retains a wide parliamentary support party leaders will be able
to exert a larger degree of discretionality in portfolio allocation, being able to
enhance their own stakes and the payoffs of the mainstream faction.
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Chapter 6
Bounded Oligarchy: Factional
Bargaining over Party
Position-taking
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we addressed factional bargaining over office pay-
offs. Here we will investigate intra-party dynamics related to party position-
taking, to assess how factions bargain over policy payoffs. The process of party
position-taking can be analysed as the distribution of policy payoffs within the
party.1 The party position corresponds to the amount of payoffs to be shared
and each faction will try to affect this process minimizing the distance between
the party platform and its ideal point. In this chapter we will retrieve many
aspects that have been analyzed before (concerning the dynamics of factional
negotiations) assuming that factions bargain over party position. We will in-
vestigate whether a kind of Gamson’s law applies to the allocation of policy
1Warwick proposed a similar idea arguing that the ideal point of a coalition government
is like a policy payoff that has to be shared by the members of the coalition (Warwick 2001).
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payoffs or whether some actors, like the median faction, can extract larger
revenues. We will try to assess whether factions have an impact on party po-
sition (Aldrich 1983; Aldrich and McGinnis 1989; McGann 2002; Strøm 1990;
Ware 1992) or if, alternatively, parties try to get rid of factional preferences in
order to assume vote-maximizing positions (Downs 1957). By modelling party
placement as the result of inter-factional competition, we will highlight how
and under what circumstances factions shape the party, bounding the leader
in the choice of the platform. Furthermore, we will assess how party orga-
nization affects this outcome analysing whether different internal rules alter
the equilibrium between factions and leaders. In this way we will provide new
insights about the linkage between party leaders, members, and activists.
6.2 Who Sets the Party Position: Literature
and Hypotheses
The literature on party position-taking is vast, and it focuses mainly on
two aspects. One is to analyse the interactive moving of actors involved in
party competition to find the existence of equilibrium. Downs’ (1957) spatial
theory shows that in a two-party system such equilibrium consists in a cen-
tripetal convergence of actors toward the median voter. This result, however,
relies upon lots of assumptions about the motivations and individual features
of political actors. Starting from this conclusion, scholars have tried to relax
those assumptions. New models account for some aspects of ‘real world poli-
tics’, providing more realistic results that better fit empirical evidence. Among
these models we focus on those concerning multiparty systems, given that our
hypotheses will be tested looking at the Italian case. For instance, the ‘unified
theory of party competition’ (Adams et al. 2005) provides some arguments to
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support the idea of centrifugal equilibrium. According to this model parties
are pushed away from the centre, in the direction of those voters who feel
identified with them. Although parties maintain a link with their partisans’
preferences, this model predicts that parties maximize votes, adopting a slight
moderate position with respect to their followers.2
Another branch of the literature looks at the process of position-taking
not as the product of exogenous strategic interactions between parties in the
system, but as the endogenous result of an inward competition within the
party (Budge et al. 2010; Levy 2004). Starting from the idea that parties are
somehow bounded by intra-party structure, scholars investigate the effect of
organization and internal rules, on one side, and divergent intra-party prefer-
ences on the other. Both elements affect party position and its changes across
time.
The present work is more centred on this second branch of studies, but
will provide hypotheses and results that take both into account. In particular,
we will raise and test hypotheses dealing with factional preferences, intra-
party organization, and the pressure for a (partial) convergence due to party
competition.
Parties are clearly not unitary actors (e.g., Laver 1999; Laver and Benoit
2003; Laver and Schofield 1990; Strøm 1994). They are composed by members
that retain similar but non-identical preferences. Those members that share
the most similar policy view gather together organizing factions. Despite the
existence of some common traits shared by all the members (Aldrich 1995;
Krehbiel 1993; Snyder and Ting 2002), in fact the policy positions of internal
factions are not exactly the same (Bernauer and Bra¨uninger 2009; Giannetti
and Laver 2009). Each faction will try to enhance its preferred policy position
2Other models predict similar results (e.g., McGann 2002). See Budge et al. (2010) for
a review.
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in order to affect the party platform. Our dataset will help to map these
divergent preferences to analyse their impact on the process of position-taking.
It has been argued that the party’s ideal point depends on how internal or-
ganizational structure aggregates the preferences of members. Among divided
parties the internal equilibrium is the result of a factional strife (Giannetti
and Mule´ 2006: 462; Levy 2004). Factions bargain to influence party strategy
according to their power (Laver and Shepsle 1990b: 504). Depending on the
party decision-making process, this strife might follow different paths leading
to different potential outcomes (new party platforms). The decision-making
process in turn is affected by intra-party rules and organization, and by the
model of party that we take into account.
We might hypothesize that parties are (wholly or partially) bounded by
their factions, or alternatively, they are absolutely free to set their platform.
In the first case party position should lie somewhere inside the Pareto set of
factions’ positions. According to Levy (2004: 251): ‘parties can offer to voters
any policy in the Pareto set of their members. Parties cannot commit to offer
any policy outside the Pareto set but the party members can find mechanisms
(such as bargaining) that allow them to choose policies within the Pareto set’
(then this agreement will be enforceable). A stable agreement could be reached
only inside it.3 If this is the case any point inside this range should be related
with the actual party position.
However, the actual location of party along the continuum depends on
the bargaining power of each faction. This varies according to factions’ size,
measured as the share of votes gained during the congress (or the share of seats
inside party body). As Budge et al. (2010: 793) point out: ‘The stronger one
faction is relative to the others the more it overcomes resistance and carries
3Moreover, both voters and rival parties believe that only positions inside the Pareto set
can be stable.
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its preferred policy further’.
Among the points inside the Pareto set, two carry a theoretically substan-
tial meaning that depends on the structure of intra-party dynamics. For the
sake of preserving unity, inter-factional competition may build a consensual
environment where all faction’s preferences are somehow taken into account
(Budge et al. 2010; Giannetti and Laver 2009). At the level of legislative
party group Heller and Mershon (2009b) hypothesized that the party ideal
point should be close to the average ideal point of legislative members. Ex-
tending this idea to party body, we observe that ‘Indeed the mechanisms in
which Western European parties reach internal compromise do mimic some
form of a weighted average of the ideal policies of their factions’ (Levy 2004:
251). Hence, we would expect that party platform is set with a strong de-
gree of proportionality. This idea refers to a kind of Gamson (1961) rule in
the distribution of internal policy payoffs (i.e., party position).4 As far as
each faction is able to affect party position according to its strength in party
body (due to the results of party congress/convention) we would expect that
a factional agreement could be reached considering the weighted mean of the
factions’ ideal points. Then such equilibrium will be the best predictor of party
position and will bound the leader in the choice of platform and strategy.
Hypothesis 6.1a: The factions’ preferences affect party position so that
a ‘Gamsonian agreement’ position is strongly related to the party’s ideal
point
It has been argued that when the electoral system provides incentives for
4As discussed in the previous chapter, the Gamson (1961) hypothesis is essentially a
proportionality rule stating that office payoffs are allocated to each member proportionally
to its contribution to the coalition. Warwick (2001) extended this reasoning to policy payoffs
showing that ‘coalition policy corresponds with the weighted mean position of the parties
in government, with the parties’ seat share constituting the weights’ (Warwick 2001: 1215).
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inter-factional competition, the common interests in partisan unity are insuffi-
cient to prevent internal dissension so that factions divide during the electoral
campaign (Morgenstern 2001). To the contrary we claim that, to keep their
unity, parties cater to all factions according to the latter’s share of votes in
the congress body. We stress the importance of party unity, which is a key
source for party strength, particularly in the electoral arena. We hypothesize
that the cost of a breakup (ω) lifts as general elections approach, increasing
the importance of preserving party unity to avoid an electoral debacle, insofar
as disunity means defeat (Schattschneider 1942). A fission in fact yields nega-
tive effects on party performance (see paragraph 8.5 and footnotes 21 and 24,
chapter 7). Accordingly, many scholars have stated that party manifestos take
into consideration the concerns of both mainstream and minority factions pre-
cisely to boost party unity (and credibility) before elections (e.g., Levy 2004).
If this is the case, the impact of factional agreement on party position should
increase as the legislative term comes to an end.
Hypothesis 6.1b: As time passes and the new general elections approach,
the effect of the ‘Gamsonian agreement’ on party position should be
greater
Alternatively, inter-factional conflict may assume the traits of a winner-
take-all competition, with the median faction (mainstream) free to set its ideal
point as the overall party position.5 Although occasionally the median faction
could suddenly change party platform for strategic or contingent reasons, we
expect that on average the party will be located inside the Pareto set, closer
to the mainstream’s ideal point.
This is true for several reasons: the median faction still has a commitment
5It is worth remembering that the median is not a ‘dictator’ because its peculiar position
depends on the preferences of all other factions (Black 1958).
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with party members, due to the result of the party congress; strong deviations
of its position from the ideological position of the bulk of party members could
result in a loss of internal consensus (for the mainstream) and in a change of the
dominant faction in the following party congress; minority factions could feel
dissatisfied if the party is ruled only according to the will of the mainstream,
and hence could exploit their bargaining power by threatening to defect and
to leave the party (Boucek 2003a).6
Finally, as far as we deal with a unidimensional policy space, the median
voter theorem applies and the median faction’s position emerges as the party
position. This path actually bears a resemblance to the previous one. The
median faction is not a ‘dictator’; it competes during the party congress for
members’ votes. Hence, its position emerges as a kind of consensual equi-
librium of all members’ preference. Therefore, compared with the previous
hypothesis, we just want to check whether party position is pushed away from
that point in the direction of the median faction.
Hypothesis 6.2: Party position is biased towards the ideal point of the
median faction
We will measure the influence of the median faction above and beyond
its contribution to the Gamsonian agreement through a variable that records
the deviation of the median faction from the weighted mean.7 If our second
hypothesis is true we would expect a positive significant value of the coefficient
of such variable.
A third possible pattern assumes that parties are bounded only in a limited
6Their bargaining power will be higher if the threat is credible and could harm the party
(resulting in a loss of votes, seats, or strategic position).
7This makes it possible to overcome any possible problem of correlation between the
median and the Gamsonian agreement. Indeed these two positions are highly correlated
(.99). See Warwick (2001: 1223) for an analogous argument.
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way by factions. The increasing personalization of politics in modern democ-
racies (Poguntke and Webb 2005) boosts the party leaders’ power in spite of
the strength of factions. Whether the party leader, due to her charisma or
her ‘dominant position’ within the party, is able to set the new platform we
would expect a deviation from the factional agreement in the direction of her
interests. However, party leaders are democratically elected; hence, the rank-
and-file retain an influence over party position (Heller and Mershon 2009b).
The leader’s first purpose is to remain in charge; in addition, as the agent
delegated by party members, she will have more discretion in setting party
position, and she will exploit this feature provided she can keep the members’
approval.
When dealing with party leadership, however, we have to take into account
different intra-party rules and organizational patterns that affect internal dy-
namics, providing the leader with greater or lower power. This in turn affects
the leadership’s ability to deviate from the inter-factional agreement in the
direction of its preferred party position. According to the cartel party model
(Katz and Mair 1995), leaders want more autonomy from activists’ factions in
order to be free to pursue the building of a cross-party cartel (Katz 2001; Mair
1997). Their purpose is to lower members’ stakes, pushing the party to a mod-
erate position and thereby increasing both party votes and the likelihood of
being involved in government coalitions (Mair 1994; Marsh 1993). One strategy
to enhance the leader’s autonomy is to empower the ordinary party members
(or supporters), thus increasing the nominal level of intra-party democracy
(the rationale has been also discussed in paragraph 2.3).
Recent trends attest to an increase in the inclusiveness of party leader se-
lection mechanisms, and these trends are particularly evident among Italian
parties. Historically based on a small committee (National Council or Central
Committee), the selection procedure was extended to the whole audience of
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delegates at party congress, and, recently, the selectorate has tended to include
all party members (and sometimes even unregistered supporters) through di-
rect election of the leader (by means of closed or open ‘primaries’).8
Italian mass parties started to enlarge the selectorate at the end of the
1970s.9 In 1976 the election of the DC leader was demanded of congress
delegates instead of members of the National Council; the PSI set the same
rule in 1981, strengthening Craxi’s personalized leadership.10
Although some authors claimed that intra-party democracy increases mem-
bers’ influence over the party leadership (Pennings and Hazan 2001, Scarrow
1999, 2005) here we raise an alternative argument. Noticeably, the expanded
inclusiveness of the leader’s selectorate does not necessarily increase the rank-
and-file’s control over the leadership but paradoxically can be a leader’s strat-
egy to defang the base (Katz 2001; Mair 1994, 1997; Marsh 1993; Michels 1911;
Ostrogorksi 1902; Poguntke and Webb 2005; Rahat et al. 2008).11
Inclusiveness produced less tight contests and a decrease in competitiveness
8Open primaries have been adopted so far only by the PD to select the party leader.
Recently other parties, like Left Ecology and Freedom (SEL) or the PDL, seem willing to
adopt the same device to appoint the leader.
9See Fabbrini (1994) and Calise (2005) on the link between the personalized power of
Italian leaders and their direct election by party delegates. Moreover, Mershon (2001) shows
the impact of such rule on portfolio allocation among DC factions: after direct election
ministerial payoffs were no longer shared proportionally by all party subgroups. Refer to
chapter 5 of the present dissertation for an analogous argument.
10While inside the PSI Craxi was strengthen by such rule, factions within the DC still
maintained some influence. Notwithstanding this, in 1976 the direct election was crucial
to select Zaccagnini as party leader. Zaccagnini was somehow autonomous from factional
membership and factional ties; he tried to end intra-party fragmentation but he failed to
reach this purpose. Later on De Mita was elected leader in 1982 through direct election.
Likewise Zaccagnini, once appointed De Mita tried to cut out factional disputes. Contrary
to Craxi however he did not succeed in getting rid of subgroups. Nonetheless his direct
election granted him a certain degree of autonomy up to the point that he was the first DC
leader able to cumulate his party leadership with the role of prime minister, in 1988. See
Curini and Martelli (2009, pp. 142-144) for a comparison between Craxi’s and De Mita’s
attempts to unify their parties.
11Inclusiveness and democratization do not necessarily go hand in hand (Lundell 2004;
Rahat and Hazan 2001). Even a supporter of intra-party democracy like Scarrow (2005:
6) recognizes that inclusiveness ‘may also centralize the decision process by minimizing the
power of organizational subunits within the party [. . . ] In fact, in some cases national
leaders may advocate intra-party democratization because they see it as a way of weakening
regional party leaders’.
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(Kenig 2009b), complicating the task of removing an unwanted leader.12 In
addition, a directly elected party leader retains a higher legitimacy (Michels
1911); thus, she can cut out middle-level activists, getting rid of party fac-
tions’ ties. As long as the leader autonomy increases, the party should be less
bounded by factions and will converge toward the centre of the policy space.
Hypothesis 6.3: When intra-party rules increase the inclusiveness of the
leader’s selectorate the ‘Gamsonian agreement’ should be less (if at all)
useful to predict party position, which instead will be attracted by the
centre of policy space
Finally, if parties behave as catch-all actors (Kirchheimer 1966) we should
observe a decline in factional constraints on party platform. Parties will appeal
to a broader public, seeking the support of groups that lie outside the tradi-
tional party organization. If this holds we would expect parties to converge
towards the centre, to gain more votes and more resources, independently of
intra-party preferences and of the effect of party rules.
Hypothesis 6.4: Party position is independent from factions’ position
and, overall, will be attracted by the centre of policy space no matter
the shape of intra-party rules
H 6.1 (a and b), H 6.3, and H 6.4 represent three different models of
party: mass, cartel, and catch-all. In some sense they express a fulfilment or a
response to the others (see Katz 2001). We will compare them to assess under
what condition each one prevails. In our analysis H 6.1a and H 6.4 are the
two true alternative hypotheses: we want to assess whether, overall, factions
12With regard to candidate selection, inclusiveness also produces lower levels of represen-
tation (Rahat et al. 2008).
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bound the leader or if instead the party is free to move. H 6.3 lies somewhere
in the middle: we will test whether the rise of the cartel party (conditional on
changes in party rules) actually impacts on H 6.1a building a new party that
bears a resemblance to H 6.4, but only with strict conditions.13
6.3 Data and Methodology
To test the hypotheses raised before we want to compare the factions’
preferences, as shown in chapter 3, with a measure of parties’ positions. This
confrontation is made possible thanks to a recently built dataset, the Italian
Legislative Speeches dataset (ILS), which provides information about the party
positions of Italian parties from 1946 to 2010 (Curini 2011; Curini and Martelli
2009, 2010).14
Those data are based on a codification of all the investiture debates of the
Italian governments.15 Compared with Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP)
data, ILS retains some advantages. First of all, CMP does not distinguish
between positions of parties that run together in the election as an electoral
cartel but split afterwards; second, it does not assess the positions of new
parties that form during the legislative term (i.e., due to party fission); finally,
13Contrary to the mass and the catch-all models, the cartel party ‘whether understood as
a synthesis/thesis in a dialectic process or as the next stage in a cyclical process [. . . ] does
not represent a steady state’ (Katz 2001: 282).
14The dataset is available at: http://www.socpol.unimi.it/docenti/curini
15For each debate, the authors selected and codified the speech released by the party leader
(or by a relevant MP) plus the Prime Minister’s programmatic speech. The method adopted
to codify speeches is similar to that employed by the well-known Comparative Manifesto
Project in order to analyze the contents of party electoral programs (see Budge et al. 2001
for a detailed description). In each legislative speech the authors identified the number of
quasi-sentences and assigned each of them to a number of pre-established categories that
form the classification scheme. To take account of the Italian political context the original
56 categories of the CMP dataset have been increased to 68. The dataset contains the
percentage of the total text of legislative speech that deals with these categories. The
dataset was constantly updated until December 2010 and includes information about a few
additional debates over crucial votes of confidence (i.e., the debate related to Prodi I vote of
no-confidence and two debates on confidence votes faced in September and December 2010
by Berlusconi IV cabinet).
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CMP provides only one value per legislature while ILS, given the high level
of Italian governments’ instability, tracks parties’ positions almost year by
year, increasing the number of cases included in our analysis. In fact, we
can compare factions’ positions with the first known value of party position
expressed after the congress (that for the same reasons discussed before is
temporally connected to the congress). Furthermore, thanks to ILS, we can
compare the factional equilibrium reached during congress at time t with all
the values of policy positions held by the party until the new congress at time
t+1. This allows us to model changes in intra-party dynamics and bargaining
over time: for instance, we can model the effect of party fissions (happened not
immediately after the congress) over party position, and we can assess whether
bargaining dynamics vary as time passes.16
Using ILS we estimated party positions following the ‘vanilla method’
(Gabel and Huber 2000). We ran a factor analysis on the percentage of quasi-
sentences, and we extracted the first component; the standardized values of
party positions have been located on the latent dimension that emerged from
the analysis.17 Vanilla estimates are strongly correlated with the traditional
RILE scale measured on ILS and with the results of the vanilla method applied
to CMP data.18
In the next section we will compare these two datasets. Despite differ-
16When one or more factions leave the party during the period between one congress
and the next, we rearranged the result of factional agreement measuring the new balance
of power among the remaining subgroups. We excluded those cases where, due to party
fissions, there is only one faction left; however, had we included these data the main results
would not have changed.
17Given that we divided motions in two time periods before running Wordfish, we did the
same when dealing with factor analysis. We divided ILS in two subsamples and ran two
separate analyses. The results of these two factor analyses are highly correlated (0.87), with
parties’ positions as they emerge from the analysis run on the whole dataset.
18The correlation between vanilla method estimates and the RILE scale measured on ILS
is strong and significant (r = 0.85). Overall estimates of parties’ positions, determined by
applying the vanilla method to ILS and CMP, are positively correlated (0.57); among data
included in our analysis this coefficient increases to 0.61. Although we use ILS to test our
hypothesis we assess their reliability using CMP data; this does not alter our main results.
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ences, these data share some traits. Both are related to Italy from 1946 to
2010 (though they have been divided in two time periods, before and after
1989, in order to estimate positions). Both are built through content analysis.
Wordfish algorithm and factor analysis produce normalized estimates of po-
sitions extracted along a seemingly common latent dimension.19 The parties’
and factions’ positions are aligned along the left-right scale, and these data
cover the entire length of the continuum.20
They come, however, from two completely different sources: factions’ posi-
tions are extracted from debates that took place in party body, while the data
about parties are related to speeches delivered in the legislative arena. This
can be an advantage because the two measures are independent and exogenous
with respect to each other. One possible problem, however, is related to the
idea that the legislative party branch might retain a different position com-
pared with the party body. Anyway, given the strong control usually exerted
by Italian party bodies over their elected representatives, we can reasonably
retain that the position of the legislative party group will correspond to the
actual party position.
Having information on party positions within each cabinet as well as fac-
tional preferences within each party congress we can merge these data together
to build two datasets. In the first one we assess the impact of factions pref-
erences comparing them with the first known estimate of the party position,
19It could be argued that intra-party politics involves more than one dimension. We know,
however, that parties function as logrollers reducing complex issues into a low-dimensional
space (Levy 2004; Poole and Rosenthal 1997). If parties reduce the complexity on a single
dimensional space they need to compromise on that. In addition, both processes used to
estimate positions (Wordfish and factor analysis) follow a similar logic that reduces many
issues onto a single latent dimension.
20More precisely, according to factor analysis in the first period the two most extreme
parties are the PSIUP and the MSI. In factions’ dataset we have documents about PSIUP
factions’ and about MSI, and they are on the extremes as well. Similarly, in the second
period the two most radical parties are PRC and MSI-AN; indeed the dataset on factions
contains information about subgroups belonging to these two parties and they are located
on the wings. Hence, the whole left-right dimension is covered by data. However, the range
of the scales is different; then we divided all the values for the length of each continuum.
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measured after that the party congress has been held; here the number of cases
amounts to 65. In the second dataset we enlarge the number of cases com-
paring factions’ ideal points with all the estimates of party position measured
between the end of the party congress until the following one; the number of
observations enlarges up to 172.
6.4 Analysis and Results
We can turn now to the analysis testing the five hypotheses presented in
section two. Table 6.1 gives some details about their operationalization, along
with an explanation of how to assess their effect.
Our dependent variable is PARTY POSITION (PP) estimated through
vanilla method applied to ILS. Right-wing parties retain positive values while
PP is negative for parties located on the extreme left of the scale. Here we de-
scribe the independent variables. GAMSONIAN AGREEMENT POSITION
(GAP) is the mean of the factions’ positions weighted by their share of seats in
party body, measured within each party congress; positive values indicate that
the factions’ average is on the right and vice versa. The greater this values is,
the greater PP should be (the more GAP is on the right the more we expect
PP to be there). YEARS BEFORE ELECTIONS (YBE) is the number of
years remaining before the next general elections. We analyse its interaction
with GAP: as YBE shrinks, the marginal effect of GAP on PP should increase
(and vice versa). DISTANCE MEDIAN – GAP, measured as the distance
between the median faction and the factional agreement position, records the
influence of the median faction above and beyond its contribution to GAP.
The ability to attract PP towards its ideal point is caught by a positive signif-
icant value of this variable. LEADER AUTONOMY is a dummy variable that
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Table 6.1: Party Position-Taking: Hypotheses and Operationalization
Hypothesis and
Context
Variable Operationalization Expected Effect
Dependent Vari-
able
PARTY POSI-
TION (PP)
Vanilla estimate of party posi-
tion based on ILS
n.a.
5.1a: Mass party
ruled by consensual
dynamics
GAMSONIAN
AGREEMENT
POSITION (GAP)
Mean of factions’ positions
weighted by their share of seats
in party body
(+) GAP affects PP (e.g., the
more GAP stands on the right
the more the party should be
there)
5.1b: Mass party
ruled by consensual
dynamics: propor-
tionality increases
as new elections
approach
GAP*YEARS
BEFORE ELEC-
TIONS (YBE)
Interaction between the GAP
and the number of years re-
maining before the next gen-
eral elections
(−) GAP marginal effect on
PP increases when the YBE
shrinks, and vice versa
5.2: Mass party
ruled by winner-
take-all dynamics
DISTANCE ME-
DIAN – GAP
Distance between the median
faction’s position and GAP
(+) A positive coefficient high-
lights a deviation from GAP
towards the median faction
5.3: Cartel party GAP*LEADER
AUTONOMY
Interaction between GAP and
a dummy variable that as-
sumes value 1 when the party
leader is elected directly by del-
egates (or through primaries)
and 0 when she is elected by
a small committee
(−/0) Among parties whose
leader is elected by a wide se-
lectorate the marginal effect of
GAP should be lower (or not
significant at all)
PARLIAMENTARY
CENTRE OF
GRAVITY
Mean of parties’ positions
weighted by their share of seats
in Parliament (proxy for the
centre of policy space)
(+) Among parties whose
leader is elected by a wide
selectorate the policy centre
should affect PP
5.4: Catch-all
party
GAP Mean of factions’ positions
weighted by their share of seats
in party body
(0) GAP effect on PP should
never be significant
PARLIAMENTARY
CENTRE OF
GRAVITY
Mean of parties’ positions
weighted by their share of seats
in Parliament (proxy for the
centre of policy space)
(+) The centre of policy space
should always affect PP
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accounts for the personalization of politics and for the party leader’s strength;
it assumes the value 1 when the leader is directly elected (by delegates during
party congress or by party members or supporters through ‘primary election’),
and the value 0 when the party leader is nominated by a less inclusive selec-
torate (i.e., a small committee like the party’s National Council or Central
Committee).21 We analyse the interaction between GAP and this variable,
and we expect that GAP’s effect on PP should be lower or not statistically
different from zero when leader autonomy is greater. Finally, PARLIAMEN-
TARY CENTRE OF GRAVITY is the mean of the parties’ positions weighted
by their share of seats in Parliament, used as a proxy for the centre of political
space. The higher this value, the greater the value of PP (if the political centre
attracts the parties we will find a positive significant value of this variable).
Figure 6.1 provides a first visual analysis of our main hypotheses. For each
party congress we show the GAP value along with all the PP values measured
before the next congress. We distinguished between parties whose leader is
autonomous (grey) or not (black). Accordingly, we plotted two dashed lines
with the fitted value of the regression for the two contexts.
This first enquiry tells us that factions do matter: there is a positive rela-
tionship between GAP and PP, attesting that the parties’ ideal point is not
independent from the factions’ preferences. However, we observe differences
between parties whose leaders are stronger or weaker. The black line is steeper
while the grey is smoother, indicating that when leaders retain direct legiti-
macy they gain autonomy and are able to get rid of the factions’ influence.
Now we investigate more in depth the contribution provided by our co-
21We do not distinguish between leaders elected by delegates or through closed/open
primaries because the latter context concerns only one congress among those included in the
dataset (PD 2009, with the adoption of open primaries). In addition, even when leaders are
elected by delegates, party members often know which leader is attached to each factional
motion they vote for, so that this procedure resembles that of closed primaries.
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Figure 6.1: Party Position and Weighted Mean of Factions
Note: The dashed lines express the fitted value for autonomous (grey) or bounded (black)
party leaders
variates to the dependent variable by testing several models. In model 1,
our baseline model, we regress PARTY POSITION (taking the first known
value after the congress) on the factional agreements (GAP). In model 2 we
add, as control variables, the DISTANCE MEDIAN - GAP and the PARLIA-
MENTARY CENTRE OF GRAVITY. In model 3 we include two interactions:
between GAP and LEADER AUTONOMY and between GAP and YBE. In
the fourth model we replicate the third model on the larger dataset.
We test these models by means of an OLS regression. Given that our ob-
servations are nested within parties they might not be independent. To assure
unbiased results of our analysis we cluster observations by party, providing
standard errors on cluster.22 Table 6.2 reports the results.
The GAP coefficient is always significant: factions exert an effect on their
22In model 4 we have repeated observations within each congress. Therefore, we change
the cluster variable providing standard errors by congress. Clustered standard errors are
heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (Rogers 1993).
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Table 6.2: OLS Regression of PARTY POSITION
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GAMSONIAN AGREEMENT POSITION 0.392*** 0.410*** 0.678*** 0.544***
(0.106) (0.128) (0.134) (0.0916)
DISTANCE MEDIAN – GAP -0.191 -0.131 -0.257
(0.310) (0.293) (0.176)
PARLIAMENTARY CENTRE -0.223 0.002 0.306*
OF GRAVITY (0.324) (0.346) (0.155)
LEADER AUTONOMY -0.020 -0.014
(0.036) (0.031)
GAP*LEADER AUTONOMY -0.291** -0.282**
(0.132) (0.109)
YEARS BEFORE ELECTIONS 0.019*** 0.005
(0.005) (0.004)
GAP*YBE -0.072** -0.054***
(0.025) (0.020)
CONSTANT 0.025 0.023 -0.008 0.022
(0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017)
Observations 65 65 65 172
R2 .499 .511 .636 .536
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
parties’ placement, and this is confirmed after including some control variables.
To the contrary, DISTANCE MEDIAN – GAP is never significant; we did not
register any disproportionate effect of the median faction. Within each party
the median, like any other faction, affects the platform only to the extent
of its strength in party body. The political centre seems to have no effect.
PARLIAMENTARY CENTRE OF GRAVITY is not significant in model 2
and 3, while it appears to have an impact on party position only in model 4.23
Both interactions are significant and retain the expected sign. According
to our hypothesis and to the theoretical framework described in chapter 2,
LEADER AUTONOMY decreases the effect of GAP on PP, and this effect is
quite strong. For instance, according to model 4, the impact of GAP ceased to
be significant among parties that elect their leader through a wide selectorate.24
23Adding to model 4 an interaction between this variable and LEADER AUTONOMY
we found that this effect is significant only when the latter variable retains value 1.
24The marginal effect of GAP on PP is equal to .406 (.061) and statistically significant at
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Finally, when general elections come closer, increasing the cost of a breakup,
inter-factional bargaining becomes more consensual and indeed the impact of
GAP on PP increases. However, we can better discuss the effect of these
interactions by looking at figures 6.2 and 6.3 (based on model 4). They draw
the marginal effect of GAP on PP as the new general elections approach.
Figure 6.2: Marginal Impact of GAP on PARTY POSITION as YBE Changes
when Leaders are Autonomous
Note: The light gray area represents the 95% Confidence Interval of the estimate
When leaders are selected by party committees (figure 6.2) they are more
bounded by the will of factions; factional preferences increasingly shape party
position as new elections approach. To the contrary, when intra-party rules
grant more autonomy to the leader (figure 6.3) the effect of GAP on PP is no
longer significant, unless looming elections increase the need for party unity
(high ω), pushing the leader to partially heed factions’ requests in order to
achieve a compromise (in line with the expectations discussed in chapter 2).
the 99% level when LEADER AUTONOMY equals 0, while this effect is no longer significant
when it equals 1: .124 (.093). Clustered standard errors in brackets.
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Figure 6.3: Marginal Impact of GAP on PARTY POSITION as YBE Changes
when Leaders are Bounded
Note: The light gray area represents the 95% Confidence Interval of the estimate
We turn now to interpret these results in the light of our hypotheses. We
can reject H 6.4: as long as GAP is always significant we reject the idea that
party positions are independent from factional preferences. Similarly, we can
discard H 6.2; from the present analysis does not emerge any disproportionate
advantage retained by the median faction above and beyond its share of votes.
H 6.1a finds partial confirmation; the hypothesis that parties are shaped by a
consensual agreement seems true, but this feature interacts with intra-party
rules and with the party system. In line with H 6.1b we observe that as
new elections come closer, parties tend to set their platform with an increasing
degree of proportionality.25 Finally, we find some evidence for H 6.3, confirming
the ‘cartel party’ theory.
25This holds true no matter the changes in the electoral rule. We do not find differences
between open list PR, used until 1992, and the systems adopted afterwards (which included a
closed list PR, at least in part). Even when factions compete for preference votes (like during
the First Republic) the appeal of party unity as a resource for inter-party competition holds
and parties seek to foster internal cohesion when setting their positions before the campaign.
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Overall, factions do exert constraints on their parties. However, when in-
ternal organization promotes the leader’s autonomy the party is no longer
bounded by activists and the leader retains more discretion in setting the
platform. Comparing these results with the literature on party competition,
we found that in a multiparty system with parties tied by activists there is
no convergence towards the centre, in accordance with recent theories. The
political centre exerts an attraction only when party leaders are free enough
from factional blackmail to be able to set party position on their own. This
aspect, in turn, is in line with the cartel party theory and stresses the ability of
autonomous leadership to partially adopt moderate stakes, moving the party
towards more convenient positions. This further explains why, in current pol-
itics, strong leaders are able to increase party votes, building their electoral
(and political) fortunes.
6.5 Leader, Factions, and Party Position-taking:
Findings
The present chapter investigated the process of position-taking within the
party. We tried to assess whether the party is run as an oligarchy whose leader
is completely in control of party’s choices, as suggested by Michels (1911).
Our results indicate that, overall, we should reject the idea of parties totally
free to move in the policy space in order to maximise their votes. On the con-
trary we find that party positions are tied to factions’ stakes so that the party
seems to work as a bounded oligarchy where the leader’s wills are somehow
limited by factional preferences. The impact of factional constraints is greater
when the need for party unity is higher likewise when new general elections
approach. In those contexts the electoral payoff of party unity enhances the
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need to pursue a compromise among all party subgroups.
This path however is partially different when intra-party rules increase
leaders’ autonomy. The direct election of party leader by a wide selectorate,
like the entire corpus of party members or delegates at party congress, boosts
her autonomy in spite of factions’ desires.26 In line with the cartel party theory
the leader can exploit such autonomy to set a more moderate position that
enables the party to build cartels increasing its chances to get office payoffs.27
Despite some authors (Pennings and Hazan 2001; Scarrow 1999, 2005; Scar-
row and Gezgor 2010) claim that more intra-party democracy enhances rank-
and-file ability to influence the party decision-making, this chapter provides
evidence for a converse argument. Our results revive Michels’ idea that an in-
creasing direct democracy lead the party towards a kind of ‘Bonapartism’. The
leaders are able to exploit their strategic and privileged position to preserve
and perpetuate themselves up to the point that they are often able to co-opt
their heirs (Michels 1911). Their overwhelming supremacy over party mem-
bers produces high levels of leadership stability. Indeed party leaders remain
in charge for decades and a change in the dominant faction is an even more
rare event. In such a context the leader might appeal to party members in
order to get rid of factions and activists, overcoming any resistance promoted
by the internal opposition (Michels 1991).
Thus direct democracy might produce the counterintuitive output of mak-
ing the party slip towards a ‘Bonapartist’ oligarchy (recall for instance the
debate opened within the DC around this point, as described in paragraph
2.3). In this sense, the direct election of party leaders (e.g., through ‘pri-
26For a similar view see McGann (2002).
27In this latter situation we registered indeed a partial convergence towards the centre,
even thought factional preferences still matter when new elections are behind the corner.
Although carried out in a non-strategic setting, this result seems to confirm the most recent
developments of Downsian theories (e.g., Adams et al. 2005) that predict a centrifugal
equilibrium with (only) partial convergence.
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maries’) might simply be a mean to defang the activists. To sum up, instead
of promoting members’ control of party elites and the emergence of a widely
shared platform, intra-party democracy seems to support leaders’ autonomy,
leading the party to behave as a real oligarchy and revitalizing Michels’ claims
once again.
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Chapter 7
The Politics of Fission:
Determinants of Faction
Breakaway
7.1 Introduction
Many scholars analyze politics under the assumption that parties are
unitary actors, while we just saw that this is not true. Additionally many
works rely on the idea that parties are exogenous elements in the political
system, and treat them as given. On the contrary we consider parties as the
output of inter-factional bargaining (Giannetti and Laver 2009); far from being
fixed and stable entities they are often upset by fusions and fissions (Laver and
Benoit 2001, 2003). These changes are affected by the attributes of the party
system and in turn they impact on it changing the number of parties, the level
of polarization or parliamentary and electoral equilibriums. Although fissions
are a kind of rare event they happen more often than one might think; splits
affect different parties and political systems but are endemic in some countries,
like Italy. In such context fissions are an always existing threat (see later) and
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an opportunity to reshape payoffs.1 ‘If political parties are endogenous, then
members of party factions may be seen to belong for as long as it is rational
to do so’ (Laver and Kato 2001: 510); day by day, factions are in a dilemma
between to stay or to leave the party, breaking away.
In this chapter we will analyze incentives and constraints that affect this
choice altering the likelihood of their breakaway. We analyze this outcome as
the result of a rational choice made considering policy, office, and electoral
payoffs altogether. We retrieve elements analyzed in previous chapters like
the impact of portfolio allocation (office payoffs, chapter 5) or party platform
(policy payoffs, chapter 6). We will also investigate the constraints posed by
intra-party rules or by the party system. This analysis will shed light on how
parties try to keep their unity and on why factions decide to leave.
7.2 Factions and Fissions
So far, the literature on party splits has focused more on an individual
level of analysis, inquiring about the reasons why a single legislator might want
to leave her party and switch to another one (Heller and Mershon 2008). This
approach presents some limitations. First of all, in considering parliamentary
switching, we implicitly exclude parties that retain no seats in Parliament,
while fissions often concern small parties that are out of Parliament (Mair
1990). Moreover, as Giannetti and Laver (2009) stated, ‘In the real political
world [. . . ] it is often difficult to discuss the making and breaking of parties
without referring to factions or groupings of some shape and form’. In addition,
1Party fissions however are important sources of party system change in many other
countries. Apart from the cases discussed in chapter 1, concerning fissions in Germany and
UK, we record analyses related to several political systems like France (Evans 2003), Japan
(Cox and Rosenbluth 1995; Kato 1998, Reed and Scheiner 2003), Spain (Gillespie et al.
1995), Korea (Park 2010) as well as new Eastern European democracies (e.g., Kreuzer and
Pettai 2003).
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the literature often measures policy positions using roll call votes while it has
been argued that content analyses on ‘texts drafted by [. . . ] intra-party groups
seem to be the best choice to identify their respective preferences, in particular
if the research question deals with changes of the positions of political actors
over time’ (Benoit et al. 2009: 443; Benoit and Laver 2006). By adopting
party factions as units of analysis we allow to overcome these lacks.
In this chapter we observe fissions at the factional level, analyzing all those
situations where a group of members and activists behave as a unique actor.
We already know, for instance, that factions coordinate their members’ ac-
tivities. This is true for voting behaviour (e.g., Giannetti and Laver 2009)
but also for breakaways. Party fissions require indeed a coordinated behaviour
(Kreuzer and Pettai 2009), therefore we model them following a classic coor-
dination game.
Party members belonging to the same faction might retain different opin-
ions about the strategy to pursue in order to maximise their payoffs (within or
without the party). For instance, in a faction composed by only two members
one of them might believe that the best method to affect the party is to voice
from within, while the other could claim that there is no way to gain satis-
factory payoffs staying inside and would rather exit. However they could gain
positive payoffs only through coordinated moves. If only one of them leaves
the party this effect would be close to zero: there would not be any loss in
party votes (except for the splinter member itself) and the leaving member will
hardly ever be able to pull the party closer to her position. Conversely if only
one member remains within, the faction dissolves (we would require at least
two members to call it a faction) and its bargaining power shrinks virtually to
zero (or at most will be cut by half).
Figure 7.1 provides the details of the game. Given that member A prefers
to leave while member B would rather stay there are two Nash equilibriums.
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They will exploit positive payoffs only if both decide to stay within or to break
away: factional members need to coordinate.
Figure 7.1: Fission as a Coordination Game. Exit (Go) or Voice (Stay) Payoffs
for Two Factional Members.
Player A
Player B
Stay Go
Stay 1, 2 0, 0
Go 0, 0 2, 1
Let us extend this example to the more realistic situation where the faction
is composed by many members. Two concepts help us to identify the final
equilibrium: focal point and strategic move.
Activists will decide to leave whenever they recognize this strategy as the
focal point of the game. Imagine that the party takes a position which is recog-
nized by faction members to lay beyond the level of tolerability. For instance,
the party could propose a bill or release a favourable declaration on an issue
that is strongly opposed by the faction, or take a strategic decision thwarted
by the subgroup (i.e., allying or merging with another party or joining a coali-
tion government), or alternatively it could impose sanctions on some factions’
activists such that all the other members, even those not directly punished,
feel that this act is unacceptable and decide to break away altogether.
Another example of focal point emerges when during a factional assembly
the majority of its members decide to pick up the exit option. In these contexts
all the faction adherents should recognize the choice to leave as the focal point
of the game: the faction coordinates its members, pushing them away from
the party as far as they acknowledge that this coordinated strategy maximizes
their individual payoffs (see table 7.1).
On the other hand a strategic move can wield the same effect. If the
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faction’s leader resigns from the party most of her followers will do the same.
Noticeably this strategic move could not be done by any activist but only by
a prominent member who retains a key role within the party or the faction.
There is no need to have temporal contiguity between the leader’s and its
followers’ choice. To the contrary in this case the leader might decide to
leave alone precisely to signal to the supporters that they can reach another
equilibrium choosing to leave as well.
Something similar happened with the API breakaway from the PD. Rutelli,
a well-known top politician, was the first to resign from the PD.2 Within a few
days other MPs (identified as being part of a common subgroup) followed the
leader. A similar dynamic occurred during the split of the faction Socialisti
ed Europei from the DS. The factional leader, Gavino Angius, announced the
decision to break away on its own while after few days many activists belonging
to this subgroup made the same choice.
Conversely we provide up-to-date examples concerning the idea of focal
point as a mean to reach the equilibrium. When the PDL party body approved
measures against three members of a minority faction, MPs belonging to this
subgroup (properly coordinated by the faction’s head, Fini) commonly agreed
on leaving the party to create a new parliamentary group (that eventually
became a party). On the other hand after the Greens 2009 congress, when the
new party leadership decided to stop the alliance with other left-wing parties,
members of the defeated faction favourable to such alliance met together and
during an assembly decided to break away.
In the remaining of the chapter we will focus on splits in party body,
defining a breakaway as the choice to leave the party made by a faction who
contested the congress presenting its own motion. For the reasons discussed
2Rutelli is the former leader of the centre-left coalition and the party leader within the
DL. He became later the leader of the splinter group API.
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above we count as fissions all those cases where the whole faction, or the
majority of its members, or the leader on her own leave the party. Then we
will investigate the elements that increase the likelihood of a breakaway to find
what features preserve or harm party unity.
7.3 Party Unity and Party Fission: Literature
and Hypothesis
Parties are voluntary associations composed by like-minded individuals
(Aldrich 1995) that join together to solve collective action dilemmas and coor-
dination problems (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991).
Parties lead their members to discover the advantages of cooperation. In fact
party members and party factions may exploit greater payoffs both in the par-
liamentary arena (through log-rolling and coordinated voting behavior) and in
the electoral market, where enforced cohesion strengthens the value of party la-
bel (e.g., Snyder and Ting 2002) and the likelihood of MP’s reelection, but also
during the negotiations over coalition governments (Ba¨ck and Vernby 2003).
Notwithstanding the incentives to stay together, parties are often internally
divided and sometimes such division leads to party breakup. Within the party
those members who retain the most similar views gather together (for reasons
comparable to that of party formation) and build party factions (Bernauer and
Bra¨uninger 2009). Accordingly we analyze the party as a coalition of factions
(Leiserson 1968; Panebianco 1988) that compete against each other to take
control over the party and to maximize their share of payoffs, while at the
same time they need to cooperate in order to produce the public good, party
unity, which the leader is in charge to preserve (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991).
In this sense intra-party politics is a matter of conflict and cooperation under
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the shadow of a party fission.
From the theory described in chapter 2 we contend that three basic ele-
ments affect the faction’s decision about whether to stay or to leave the party:
payoffs, intra-party rules and attributes of the political system. Factions eval-
uate first of all their amount of payoffs. Inside the party they compete to
allocate (scarce) resources like cabinet spoils (office payoffs), party line (pol-
icy payoffs), and candidacies (electoral payoffs). Although evidence from Italy
suggests that rewards are distributed according to the strength of each faction,
we observed also some important deviations from a pattern of perfect propor-
tionality.3 Moreover the factional strife happened during the congress creates
winners and losers, so that some subgroups could be dissatisfied by the new
equilibrium.
Minority factions that lose in the congress struggle face three alternatives:
toe the party line (‘loyalty’), express dissent from within trying to alter the
balance of power (‘voice’), or leave the party (‘exit’). 4 The choice to stay or
to leave depends, first of all, on their share of benefits. Factions compare the
rewards available within the party and the payoffs that they will be likely to
obtain by splitting away. In this sense fair and consensual intra-party dynamics
should promote party unity: when the leader grants to factions a quota of
returns proportional to their strength the probability to improve such utility
in another way will be lower, and potential defectors will have to cope with
fewer temptations. Conversely when payoffs are unsatisfactory (for instance,
the party position lies too far from the faction’s ideal point or the subgroup is
3Chapters 5 and 6 of the present dissertation provide empirical evidence about the linkage
between factions’ size and their share of payoffs but they also highlight some degrees of
variation.
4Our theoretical framework takes the cue from the ‘exit voice and loyalty’ game, devel-
oped by Hirschman (1970) to analyze the behavior of a party member facing the choice
between to stay or to leave the party (as well as several other topics). This framework
has been retrieved by Kato (1998) and Gehlbach (2006) with specific applications to party
fission.
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undervalued in terms of cabinet spoils or candidacies) the likelihood of a party
breakup rises.
Besides the benefits however, factions have to weigh also the costs of their
choice. The decision to break away in fact is subject to constraints provided
by intra-party rules (democracy and leader’s autonomy) and by the party sys-
tem (electoral rules and competitiveness), which may increase (or decrease)
the exit cost and, consequently the utility and likelihood of a split. Under
undemocratic party rules, dissatisfied factions do not have any chance to im-
prove their condition by voicing from within. The voice option in fact could
be denied, due to party rules, or the cost could outweigh the benefit. When
‘voice’ is not a credible alternative, the only option opens to dissenters is the
‘exit’ (Hirschman 1970). Electoral rules too impinge on this process. When
the electoral system provides high barriers to entry (due to disproportionality,
district magnitude, thresholds of representation and so on) the breakaways are
no longer rewarding and party breakup should become less likely.
Nevertheless, party fission does not only involve splinter groups. On the
other side in fact party leaders want to preserve party unity. As discussed in
chapter 2, leaders are in charge of sharing benefits among party factions. They
can choose either to follow a logic of fairness, or to reward their supporters, or
alternatively to allocate payoffs in order to preserve party unity heeding the
claims of powerful potential splinter groups. Here the rule adopted to select
the party leader matters as well: directly elected leaders may exploit their
autonomy to favor their followers by promoting unfair intra-party dynamics
that increase the risk of party fission.
As shown in chapters 5 and 6, the leaders’ degree of autonomy impinges on
their choice concerning the distribution of rewards. In addition, this rule could
interact with party system attributes: competitive electoral conditions raise
the need for party unity, decreasing the discretionality of autonomous leaders,
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and the likelihood of a breakaway. Overall, for the sake of preserving unity,
leaders will cater to the minority factions in order to decrease the likelihood
of their breakaway as long as they perceive that a fission will damage the
whole party. When, on the contrary, they feel that a split will not hurt the
party because the splinter group is too small or the fission may produce more
clarity about the party label, they will ignore the issues raised by minorities,
leaving them dissatisfied and inclined toward a breakaway (Heller and Mershon
2009b).5
Factions leave when they are dissatisfied, and they are dissatisfied when
party leaders pay no attention to their preferences. Hence we try to shed
light on party fission focusing on factional preferences (to find the causes of
dissatisfaction) while controlling for the constraints imposed by the rules.
To start with, we focus on elements that alter the structure of incentives
(Sartori 1976) available to potential splinter groups. Factions care about policy
payoffs. Shared policy preferences tend to structure both party membership
(Aldrich 1995; Snyder and Ting 2002) and factional affiliation (Bernauer and
Bra¨uninger 2009; Giannetti and Laver 2009). As far as policy shapes the mak-
ing of a party, so must it also shape its breaking. According to Boucek (2009:
473) in fact ‘divergent factional preferences [. . . ] create splitting pressure’.6
We know that members (and factions) incur a cost from party membership
(Snyder and Ting 2002). Factions whose ideal point is close to that of the
bulk of party members will face lower costs and will extract an higher amount
5In turn, these factions will leave only if they can improve their condition after the split.
6Some authors tried to test such idea by looking at party switching (Desposato 2006b;
Heller and Mershon 2008; McElroy 2009; McElroy and Benoit 2009). Overall their findings
seem to confirm this point even though some results were ambiguous. Desposato (2006b)
proved that policy preferences indeed affect switches in Brazil. Heller and Mershon (2008)
analyzed switches in the Italian Low Chamber finding a significant effect of policy motiva-
tions in three out of four legislatures but not in the pooled sample. Even inside the European
Parliament individual MPs seem motivated by policy concern (McElroy and Benoit 2009)
even though the impact of policy preferences is not always statistically significant throughout
different models (McElroy 2009).
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of policy payoffs.
Conversely the cost of membership is higher among factions whose ideal
point lies far away. Accordingly they would be more prone to break apart
to avoid suffering this huge cost (while, conversely, the price of ε would be
lower). After the split in fact they will set a more suitable party platform that
provides them with larger benefits in terms of policy payoffs (larger pi and,
overall, wider ratio between the trade-off, pi, and the exit cost, ε). Assuming
that party position corresponds with the weighted mean of all factions (Levy
2004), we raise the following claim.7
Hypothesis 7.1: The greater the distance between faction i and the
weighted mean of all factions, the higher the policy reward attached
to faction’s breakaway and, consequently, the higher the likelihood of
party split
On the other hand, factions are also interested in office payoffs and (fac-
tional) career rewards. Hence, they may decide to toe the party line even if
their preferences are divergent (Boucek 2003a): in fact the ratio between pi and
ε decreases when factions can exploit the benefits yielded by office payoffs. We
will test the impact of office through three hypotheses. To start with, we argue
that political power is in fact a glue for party unity, if this is the case factions
should be less willing to leave.
7Warwick (2001) showed the existence of a one-to-one correspondence between cabinet
position and the weighted mean of government coalition members. Following this idea,
discussed in chapter 6, we consider the party as a coalition of actors (factions) who bargain
over the party platform according to their strength in the party convention (Levy 2004).
For this reason, we take the weighted mean of their ideal points to measure party position.
However, using the position of the median faction (Debus and Bra¨uninger 2009) as a proxy
for party position does not alter the results.
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Hypothesis 7.2a: The likelihood of a breakaway is lower among parties
in office
Nonetheless, politicians sometimes leave ruling parties (Reed and Scheiner
2003). In this regard, scholars have argued that breakups can be prevented
only when minority factions hold a share of spoils greater than zero (Caillaud
and Tirole 2002).
Hypothesis 7.2b: The likelihood of a breakaway is lower when the faction
is in office
Along the same vein we suggested that factions compare their share of
payoffs within the party and their potential gain under the alternative option
(the breakaway). Accordingly, overpaid factions, whose share of office payoffs
is greater than their size in party body, should be less willing to break apart
(low pi). This is consistent with what discussed in chapter 5, where we argued
that, to avoid the exit of powerful minority factions, the party leader might
cater to them with a share of portfolios greater than their size (Boucek 2003a;
Hirschman 1970).8 If this is the case being overpaid reduces the probability of
its own breakaway. Conversely underpaid factions that can reasonably expect
to gain larger payoffs by splitting away (large pi) will be even more dissatisfied
and inclined to split (Giannetti and Laver 2001; Laver and Kato 2001; Wada
and Schofield 1996).
8Minority factions could be overpaid when their threat is credible and harmful and the
party leader has a care in preserving unity in spite of cohesion.
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Hypothesis 7.2c: The greater the difference between faction’s share of
office payoffs and size, the lower the chances to extract larger amounts
of office rewards after the split and, consequently, the lower the likeli-
hood of its breakaway
Although we claimed that factions care about office, policy, and votes, some
scholars have argued that, overall, factions are interested mainly in patronage
(Bettcher 2005; Persico et. al 2011; Sartori 1976; Zuckerman 1975, 1979).
Nonetheless, they recognize that some factions might care about policy.
Sartori (1976), for instance, distinguished between factions of interests
(office-seeking) and factions of principles (ideologically oriented). Similarly,
Roemer (2001) argued that there are three types of factions within each party:
opportunists (concerned solely with votes and office), militants (policy-seeking),
and reformers (a mix of the two).
As Mershon (1996) pointed out, in the Italian context the main reward for
cabinet participation is linked to office payoffs. Thus, office-seeking subgroups
(factions of interests) will try to get involved, and more likely will be involved,
in governments. Following this idea, we can test whether the impact of policy
motivations on party splits changes among factions in office.
Hypothesis 7.3: Among factions of interests (those that more likely will
try to get access to the spoils), the impact of policy motivations on the
likelihood of a faction breakaway should be lower
Besides policy and office, factions also care about electoral payoffs and
their members make forecasts about the chances of reelection. We argue that
candidacies are part of the total amount of payoffs that party factions have to
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divide. Then, candidate selection procedure (i.e., the way MPs are selected)
impinges on party unity too.
When evaluating costs and benefits of a split, potential splinter groups
take into account their chance to gain seats staying within the party. Under
closed list PR and centralized candidate selection procedures the party leader
retains control over candidacies (Cox et al. 1999; Carey 2007), therefore she
is able to deny room for dissenting factions. Having defied the leadership by
exerting the voice option, minority factions might fear to be excluded from
party list in retaliation. Accordingly, the limited room available to dissenters
raises the cost of voice ν, which encourage to revert to exit. On the contrary,
through preference voting, open list PR lowers ν and provides factions with
open access to parliamentary seats (Katz 1986a; see also chapter 4 of the
present dissertation) thereby institutionalizing factionalism (Boucek 2010) and
decreasing the likelihood of splits.9
With respect to the Italian case we can test this hypothesis by performing
a comparison between an electoral system based on open list PR, enacted until
1993, and those adopted afterwards whose selection mechanisms were strongly
centralized (Carey and Shugart 1995).10
Hypothesis 7.4: Closed list PR and centralized candidate selection in-
crease the likelihood of a breakaway
Along the same line factions anticipate the number of parliamentary seats
they will be able to win in future elections. Notably, disproportional electoral
rules freeze the party system acting as barriers for the entrance of new parties.
In this regard, the electoral system raises the exit costs (ε) for dissidents as a
9Accordingly, when candidate selection is devoted to primary elections we should expect
similar effects (Hortala-Vallve and Mueller 2011).
10Refer to chapter 4 for a detailed description of changes occurred to the Italian electoral
system.
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function of its disproportionality.11 In addition, it alters the expected electoral
payoffs of potential splinter groups with negative effects on their ability to
extract additional amounts of policy and office payoffs in the long-run (lowering
pi). These effects should be greater under single-member plurality systems
(Boucek 2010), but can hold even under proportional representation.
Hypothesis 7.5: The higher the disproportionality of the electoral sys-
tem, the lower the likelihood of a breakaway
Intra-party rules impact on the trade-off between costs and net benefits of
a breakaway providing incentives or constraints. Loyalty, taken as an informal
internal rule, act as a barrier to exit. The partisan tie to party symbols like
logo and label (Kertzer 1996), and the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (Andeweg
and Thomassen 2010; Crowe 1983, 1986; Kam 2009) internalized during a
long standing militancy might dissuade members from choosing the exit option
(Gehlbach 2006; Hirschman 1970; Kato 1998). This effect should be higher
among older parties where the importance and the utility of party loyalty is
well established thereby increasing the cost of breaking away (ε).12 It is not
by chance that within older parties fissions are often bathed in tears, while
among younger ones they are bathed in blood.13
11The splinter group will face high start-up costs to create a new party and enter the
system as a relevant actor.
12Political parties are solutions to collective action problems (Aldrich 1995; Cox and
McCubbins 1993; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). Although party membership might prove
to be costly in the near term, members should be aware of the advantages of cooperation in
the long-run once they have experienced them. Intra-party interactions in fact are repeated
games where cooperative norms emerge, enhancing party unity over time (Boucek 2003).
Therefore even if short-term payoffs might leave factions dissatisfied and inclined to break
apart, they can recognize the utility of loyalty and decide to toe the party line in order to
gain a greater share of payoffs in the future. However, by controlling for the share of office
payoffs we will be able to assess the net impact of loyalty untied to convenience (see later).
13A long standing militancy makes members feel like brothers. In this sense we can
compare the teary eyes of the members that broke away from the PCI in 1991 (after a long
lasting common party militancy) with the riots that happened during congresses held by
younger parties (e.g., the NPSI 2005 congress or the Greens 2009 assembly).
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Hypothesis 7.6: Among older parties the loyalty effect decreases the
likelihood of a breakaway
Sometimes party elites enforce strong transformations in the party struc-
ture, changing its symbols (name and logo) or merging the party with others.
Such changes are peculiar events and reflect transformations that may not be
expected to affect the party position:14 as Heller and Mershon (2009b: 190)
noted, in 1991 many party members left the PCI when it was dissolved to cre-
ate the PDS ‘even though the main position of that party lay relatively close
to their own ideals.’15 When a party changes its label or its logo the loyalty
effect (and the value of ε) should theoretically shrinks to zero; similarly when it
merges with others all the informal rules established within the former party
break down. For these reasons party loyalty may be no longer sufficient to
exert barriers to exit.16
Hypothesis 7.7: When a party changes its symbols or merge with oth-
ers, the loyalty effect shrinks to zero, fostering the likelihood of faction
breakaways
The impact of intra-party formal rules could be tested as well. In demo-
cratic parties minority groups can express their dissent from within. In less
democratic parties such opportunity usually is not available and factions face
the choice between accept the leadership proposal or exit from the party (see
for instance the results of chapter 4). This is typical in parties organized
14Even so, we control for the impact of policy motives through the variable suggested in
H 7.1.
15This aspect finds confirmation in our dataset.
16We track four changes in party logo and label occurred during a congress: the fusion of
the PSIUP into the PCI in 1972, the adjustment of PSI logo in 1978, the evolution of the
PCI into PDS in 1991, and the dissolution of the DS to form the PD in 2007.
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according to the principles of ‘democratic centralism’ (e.g., Marxist parties).
Under democratic centralism, party members are theoretically free to discuss
and support different views about party strategy and ideology, but dissent
must be expressed only inside the party. Once the party body has set the line,
its choice must be enacted even by dissenting members. The public expression
of dissent hurts the monolithic structure of these parties weakening them in
the eyes of their voters. In such contexts the party leader pays a wide price for
ν and would rather prefer to whip the minority (to enhance internal cohesion)
instead of bargaining for a compromise. In fact undemocratic parties tend
to rely on strong discipline, which increases the propensity for splits (Heller
and Mershon 2008; Laver and Schofield 1990) and raises the cost ν for dis-
senters too, with negative effects on party unity (ν increases the probability
of splits).17 Voice (when tolerated) cannot contribute to reach a compromise
and therefore it is not an alternative to exit (Kato 1998): after that minority
factions have publicly expressed their dissent it is almost impossible for them
to step back and the only realistic choice is to leave the party (Hirschman
1970).18
17This is true unless the cost of exit (due to party loyalty) is very high. This pattern is not
unusual for instance among communist parties where, despite undemocratic internal rules,
the strong loyalty to the party as a machine to implement the Marxist ideals contributed to
preserve its unity.
18Note that, apart from favoring the breakaway of dissenters, leaders may also directly
send them off the party. Expulsions are a peculiar trait of undemocratic parties. A few
members were ejected from the Italian Communist Party in 1951; after the expulsion they
created the Movement of Italian Workers (that later merged with others to form the USI,
Independent Socialist Union). In 1969 the PCI sent off the left-wing faction textitil Mani-
festo, charged of factionalism; this episode remains the most well-known case of expulsion
in recent years. We observe expulsions also within other parties, like the PDCI; in 2009
a minority group was ejected due to the violation of democratic centralism and factional
ban; its members then created a small extreme left party called Communists – Popular
Left. It is less straightforward the categorization of other splits like the fission of PSI in
1981 (when dissenters grouped into the Socialists’ League were sent off after that they had
publicly criticized the leadership of Craxi and the lack of internal democracy) or the split of
textitFiniani, forced to leave the PDL in 2010 (remember that the PDL structure is located
halfway between a full democratic party and one organized through democratic centralism,
as discussed in chapter 4). According to our theory however, breakaways and expulsions are
two products of the same underlying process and the distinction between these two concepts
is blurred, in fact ‘since politicians can be assumed to exercise some degree of foresight, it
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Hypothesis 7.8: The likelihood of a breakaway increases in parties ruled
through ‘democratic centralism’ where the cost of voice thwarts the reach
of a compromise
To conclude, following the suggestion of table 2.3, we want to check the
effect of leadership autonomy. Overall, compared to their constrained coun-
terparts, autonomous leaders should foster the likelihood of splits.
Hypothesis 7.9: The likelihood of a breakaway increases when leaders
are autonomous
However this should happen only in dominant party systems, whereas under
growing competitive conditions autonomous leaders will be focused on keep-
ing unity by exploiting their greater autonomy to cater to potential splinter
groups. Competitive electoral markets affect the leader’s reply to minority’s
requests. In fact they foster the need for party unity raising the cost of breakup
(ω), which is instead lower when the competition is less tight (Boucek 2010).
Along this line, we claim that the effect of leader autonomy is conditional on
competitiveness.
Hypothesis 7.10a: Leader autonomy increases the likelihood of a break-
away when party system competitiveness shrinks
On the other side however, party system competitiveness also provides
opportunities or constraints that favor or inhibit party fission. Competitive
conditions might alter the balance of power between rival parties. Potential
is reasonable to view expulsions as in essence stemming from voluntary choice’ (Heller and
Mershon 2009a: 10).
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splinter groups then feel the incentive to defect insofar as, after the split,
they can reasonably expect to exploit a share of payoffs larger than their size,
due to their growing bargaining power (Giannetti and Laver 2001; Laver and
Kato 2001). Conversely, low competitive systems reduce pi decreasing their
leverage. Nevertheless, we contend that competitiveness interacts with leader
autonomy, as hypothesized also in H 7.10a. In fact as party system dominance
enlarges (low ω), autonomous leaders will trade unity for cohesion. Beside they
will exploit the lack of competition to reward their followers, forgetting about
internal minorities: splinter groups will be underpaid (high pi) and willing to
break away. To the contrary, constrained leaders tend to stick to the coalition
deal, no matter the extent of party competition. Accordingly a decrease in
competitiveness yields as a unique effect a reduction in minority leverage when
parties are ruled by bounded leaders.
Hypothesis 7.10b: When party leaders are autonomous, a decline in
party system competitiveness raises the likelihood of a breakaway
Figure 7.2 summarizes the hypotheses presented above. We report the
sources of breakaway, the variables adopted to test them and the expected
effect of each variable on the outcome.
7.4 Data and Methodology
In this chapter we evaluate the elements that affect a rare event like party
fission. An article by Mair (1990) counted 34 major party fissions occurred be-
tween 1945 and 1987 in 14 Western European countries, with a mean close to
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Figure 7.2: Determinants of Faction Breakaway. Hypotheses and Operational-
ization
one per year across Europe.19 Within his sample, only three fissions (roughly
9%) occurred inside Italian parties. However, he reported only the major fis-
sions, excluding those cases that coincided with fusions. He also excluded cases
where parties were not separately catalogued within the electoral data and did
not consider small parties or parties that retained no seats in Parliament.20
In contrast, we include even such cases because all of them contribute to
alter the system, by changing the equilibrium between parties in Parliament
or their electoral performances.21 In this new dataset, we consider up to 29
19Due to the methodological reasons adopted by Mair however the actual number of party
fissions across Europe is probably larger than this. A more detailed discussion on this point
will be provided below with respect to the Italian case.
20Mair, for instance, did not consider some important fissions, such as the breakaways of
two PSI right-wing factions that left the party in 1947 and created the PSDI, as well as the
split of a moderate faction within the MSI in 1976.
21We record some examples. The split of PSI in 1947 contributed to the dissolution of
the ruling coalition, composed by PCI, PSI and DC, and to the emergence of the DC as a
core party (Curini and Martelli 2009). The breakaways of Democrazia Nazionale and Destra
Popolare from the MSI in 1977 were crucial to sustain the Andreotti III Cabinet, likewise the
split of Cossuttiani from PRC in 1998, which created PDCI, was of help to keep the centre-
left coalition in office until 2001 (jointly with the support of UDEUR, Union of Democrats
for Europe, formed after the breakaway of a centrist party). The breakaway of two small
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faction breakaways in Italy over a period of 64 years, an approximate mean of
one fission every two years.22 This clearly highlights how often party fissions
happened: viewed in such context, faction breakaways are not a rare event.
They are, instead, an ever-present opportunity to reshape payoffs (Giannetti
and Laver 2001; Laver and Kato 2001) and an everyday threat exerted by
minority factions on the party mainstream.
Table 7.1 lists some details about the fissions included in the dataset pro-
viding the year of the split, the party affected by the fission, the name of the
splinter group and the outcome of the breakaway that clarifies whether the
faction decided to create its own party or joined an existing one.23 Just shy of
half left to join, soon or later, another party while the others built their own
one.
Most of these cases are related to fissions within left or centre-left parties
like PSI, PSDI or PRC. However there are also some splits related to centre-
right parties like AN, MSI, UDC. Overall it is hard to find a party that has
never been affected by a breakaway. A part from those mentioned, during
factions from the PRC in 2006 and 2007 contributed to the fiasco of the electoral alliance
The Left – The Rainbow (SA) in the 2008 general elections. These splinter groups, Critical
Left (SC) and the Communist Workers Party (PCL), won respectively 0.46% and 0.57%
of votes, thwarting SA chances to pass the 4% threshold. In fact SA gained only 3.08% of
votes and, for the first time since a century, parties belonging to the socialist and communist
political families failed to elect MPs. This, in turn, wields effects on policy-making, party
system polarization and fractionalization, as well as on government bargaining and coalition
building.
22The breakaways amount to the 11% of the number of factions considered.
23One of the cases listed in table 7.1 is not an actual breakaway. It concerns the ex-
pulsion of left-wing faction Sinistra per l’Alternativa from the PSI in 1981. This sanc-
tion was enacted by the PSI leadership after the publication of a letter, wrote by mem-
bers of the splinter faction, who complained against party leadership because of the lack
of internal democracy. They decided to openly manifest their dissent by means of pub-
lic voice, claiming that there was no room for the expression of dissent inside the party
body. The letter is available in “La Repubblica”, October 4th, 1981, or on the web:
http://www.bassanini.eu/public/Appello 1981.pdf. Following what discussed in footnote
18 (this chapter), we argue that splinter members know whether their action will lead to the
expulsion or not (Heller and Mershon 2009a). Accordingly, we treat this case as a breakaway
although excluding it from the analysis does not alter the results.
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Table 7.1: List of Fissions Included in the Dataset
Year Party Splinter Faction Outcome
1946 PDA Democrazia Repubblicana Creates CD (later joins PRI)
1947 PSI Iniziativa Socialista Creates PSLI (later becomes PSDI)
1947 PSI Concentrazione Socialista Creates PSLI (later becomes PSDI)
1948 PSI Autonomisti Creates US (later joins PSLI)
1948 PSLI Sinistra Later joins PSU
1949 PSI Per il Socialismo Creates PSU (later merges with PSLI)
1957 PSDI Unita` Socialista Creates MUIS (later joins PSI)
1957 PSDI Autonomisti Creates MUIS (later joins PSI)
1964 PSI Sinistra Creates PSIUP
1969 PSI Rinnovamento Socialista Creates PSU (later renamed PSDI)
1972 PSIUP Confluenza PSI Joins PSI
1972 PSIUP Continuita` e Rinnovamento Creates Nuovo PSIUP
1977 MSI Destra Popolare Joins DN
1981 PSI Sinistra per l’Alternativa Creates LDS (later joins PCI)
1989 PSDI Prospettiva Socialista Democratica Creates UDS (later joins PSI)
1991 PCI Per la Rifondazione Comunista Creates PRC
1998 PRC Cossuttiani Creates PDCI
1998 PRC Pontieri Creates PDCI
2003 NPSI Socialismo e Liberta` Joins SDI
2005 NPSI Unita` e Rinnovamento Creates SU-PSI (later creates PS)
2006 AN D-Destra Creates La Destra
2006 PRC Sinistra Critica Creates SC
2007 PRC Progetto Comunista Creates PCL
2007 DS Correntone Creates SD (later creates SEL)
2007 DS Democratici e Socialisti Creates SD (later joins PS)
2008 UDC Popolari Liberali Joins PDL
2008 PDCI Unire la Sinistra Merges with other parties to create SEL
2009 PRC Rifondazione per la Sinistra Merges with other parties to create SEL
2009 FV Associazione Ecologisti Merges with other parties to create SEL
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the First Republic all the major parties experienced a split: the PLI (with
the breakaway of the Radical Party in 1955), the PRI (its right-wing faction
left in 1963 when the PRI supported the first centre-left coalition government)
and even the DC, though only when the regime was collapsing: in 1991 and in
1993 two small left-wing faction (La Rete and Cristiano Sociali) broke away. In
addition before the 1953 general elections all the DC allies (PLI, PRI, PSDI)
faced the split of dissenters who disagreed with the new electoral law that
introduced a majority prize for the coalition of parties that won more than
50% of votes (indeed those splits succeeded in the purpose of preventing the
attribution of the majority prize to the DC coalition).24 Similarly during the
Second Republic other parties, besides those listed above, were damaged by
fissions. For instance the heirs of DC divided and merged several times. The
more relevant splits were those of the Christian Democratic Centre (CCD) from
the PPI in 1994, the breakaway of the Christian Democrats for the Republic
(CDR) from the CCD in 1998, or the several splinter groups that left the
UDC.25 In addition, as discussed before, API break apart from the PD in
2009 and the PDL too faced the breakaway of FLI in 2010 (which in turn
was damaged by the split of its moderate members in 2011).26 Unfortunately
most of those fissions did not happen during the congress hence, due to the
24The DC coalition, which included PSDI, PLI, PRI and two regional parties (SVP, South
Tyrolean People’s Party and PSDA, Sardinian Action Party), was able to obtain 49.8% of
votes, that means 0.2% below the threshold required to gain the majority prize. Three
parties composed by factions that broke away from the coalition were responsible for such
failure. More in detail: the already cited USI (joined by former PSDI members) gained
0.83% of votes; Popular Unity (UP), composed by factions that split from PSDI and PRI,
won 0.63%; National Democratic Alliance (ADN), created by former PLI members, obtained
0.45% of votes.
25For instance the MPA born as a fission of the UDC in 2005 (and in turn suffered the
split of We the South, NS, in 2010), likewise the Populars of Italy Tomorrow (PID) that
split from UDC in 2010.
26This moderate faction, FareItalia, switched off from FLI with its own parliamentary
representation. The PDL faced two additional splits, one in October 2010, when members
tied to the southern party leader Gianfranco Micciche´ broke away and created Force of the
South, and another one in November 2011 when few members of the Cristoforo Colombo
Foundation switched off and created their own group (Liberals for Italy) triggering Berlus-
coni’s resignation (see paragraph 8.3).
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methodological reasons discussed in chapter 3, we were not able to include
these cases in the dataset.
With respect to table 7.1, figure 7.3 sketches the frequency of fissions across
time. There are two peaks, one immediately after the beginning of the First
Italian Republic and the second one after the transition to the Second Repub-
lic. We observe some splits after the fall of Berlin’s Wall, when the Italian
transition began. However the number of fissions markedly increased during
2006 and 2008 general elections when the electoral rule was changed again,
promoting a renewal of the Italian party system. This graph tells that when
the party system is particularly fluid, parties tend to divide and merge so that
we can easily observe splits. However there are some fissions even between
the 1960s and the 1980s when the Italian party system was considered to be
highly stable. Hence, apart from the fluidity of the party system, other reasons
help that explain why a faction leaves its party, as we will discuss in the next
paragraph.
Figure 7.3: Number of Fissions over Time
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We will test the hypotheses presented before through a logit regression.
The dependent variable is FISSION, which has a binary outcome and takes the
value 1 when faction i leaves the party during the period between one congress
and the following; it takes the value 0 otherwise. We count as a breakaway
each case where a faction, its leader, or the majority of its members leave the
party (after having presented a motion during the party congress).
However not all the fissions included in the dataset occurred during the
congress. Sometimes what the changes occurred between one congress and the
following could have an impact on party unity as well. This is particularly
true for the share of office payoffs. As we argued, to preserve unity the party
leader might cater to minority factions with a share of portfolio larger than
their actual size. Such compensation usually happens ex-post meaning that
during the congress one faction could still be underpaid and, to receive its
rewards, it has to wait until the next government is formed. Despite its lower
share of payoffs the promise of being overpaid in the next government might
prevent the faction from exiting.
To assess this causal relationship we multiply our cases (254 factions) by the
number of governments that alternated between one congress and the next one.
The total number of cases is 769. In this way we sketch variations in intra-
party environment almost year by year to establish what set of intra-party
attributes had actually caused the split. With respect to the share of payoffs
we can test whether being overpaid or underpaid in portfolio allocation during
the lapse of time subsequent to the congress has an impact on the likelihood
of a fission.
Within this dataset the number of breakaways amounts to 29. Although
fissions are not so rare as one could think, we observe a breakaway only in the
3.8% of cases. To cope with the low variance in the dependent variable we
could have used a rare events logistic regression (Tomz et al. 2003), which cor-
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rects the estimates for the bias that occurs when the observed events are rare.
However, using a ‘relogit’ model does not alter the substantive results. Fig-
ure 7.2 summarized the independent variables adopted to test our hypotheses.
Here we provide a more detailed description.
DISTANCE (H 7.1), measured as the squared Euclidean distance between
faction i policy position and the weighted mean of all factions, takes into ac-
count the role of policy payoffs. For faction i in party j, office payoff effects are
tested through three variables. PARTY IN OFFICE (H 7.2a) and FACTION
IN OFFICE (H 7.2b), two dummy variables that each take the value 1 when
party j or faction i, respectively, retain cabinet posts; OVERPAID (H 7.2c),
a continuous variable that expresses the difference between faction i share of
ministers and its share of seats within the party body: positive values suggest
that the faction is overpaid, having a percentage of portfolios greater than
its size, while it is underpaid when OVERPAID is negative. We assigned the
value 0 when the party is not in office. Additionally we test whether policy and
office payoffs interact through the interaction term DISTANCE*FACTION IN
OFFICE (H 7.3).
Two variables measure the impact of electoral motives and rules: CLOSED
LIST (H 7.4), a dummy variable equal to 1 when the electoral system is a
closed list PR or a plurality with centralized candidate selection and equal to
0 under open list PR; DISPROPORTIONALITY (H 7.5), measured through
the Gallagher index.27
The net effect of loyalty has been assessed through PARTY AGE (H 7.6)
that measures the years elapsed from party birth, and controlled through the
dummy variable SYMBOL CHANGE (H 7.7), which takes the value 1 when
the party changes its symbols (label or logo), during the congress, even in
27We used data provided by Gallagher and Mitchell (2008: appendix B) according to the
index outlined by Gallagher (1991).
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consequence of a merger.
Turning to intra-party rules, DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM (H 7.8), a
dummy variable equal to 1 when the party structure is organized according
to the principles of ‘democratic centralism’, accounts for the level of internal
democracy, while LEADER AUTONOMY (H 7.10a), a dichotomic variable
equal to 1 when the leader is directly elected (by party members or delegates)
and 0 when the leader is indirectly elected (by a small committee), measures
the leader’s degree of autonomy.
MARGIN OF VOTES (H 7.9a), is a measure of political system competi-
tiveness. This variable records the difference between the share of votes won
by the two main competitors (i.e., the parties that ranked respectively first
and second in general elections).28 The higher the gap, the lower the degree of
party system dominance.29 Finally we include the interaction term LEADER
AUTONOMY*MARGIN OF VOTES (H 7.9b and 6.10b) to assess the condi-
tional effect of these two latter variables.
28We measured the gap between DC (first-ranked) and PSI (second-ranked) in 1946, DC
and Popular Democratic Front (FDP) in 1948, DC and PCI from 1953 until 1987, DC and
PDS in 1992, PDS and FI in 1996, FI and DS in 2001, ULIVO (PD) and FI in 2006, PDL and
PD in 2008. A somehow similar operationalization could be found in Curini and Martelli
(2010). Refer to Laver and Benoit (2001) for a theoretically grounded discussion about the
relevance of a comparison between the largest two parties as a measure for party system
competitiveness/dominance, even in multi-party systems.
29A narrow margin implies greater uncertainty about the outcome, whereas we would
observe wider gaps in dominant party systems. The Italian party system was considered
as dominated by the DC throughout the whole First Republic (1946-1992). Some authors
claimed that the DC was a ‘core party’, i.e., a party whose ideal point cannot be defeated in
a majority vote (Laver and Schofield 1990, Schofield 1993, 1995; Schofield and Sened 2006).
Notably the existence of such party is strongly associated with party system dominance and
implies a lower degree of competitiveness within the political system (Bogaards and Boucek
2010). However the DC degree of dominance varied across years. In fact, contrary to what
reported in Schofield (1995), recent works proved that the DC was not always a core party
(Curini 2011; Curini and Martelli 2009). We compared the variable MARGIN OF VOTES
with DOMINANT PARTY SYSTEM, a dummy that witnesses the existence of a core party
in the political system, and we found a positive and significant correlation between the two.
The polyserial correlation is .60. Note also that a condition to become a core party is to get
the highest share of votes. Then the margin of the first party can be considered as a good
proxy for party system dominance.
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7.5 Analysis and Results
Table 7.2 presents the results of the analysis. The data are encoded by
government. To avoid any possible bias due to independence, observations
have been clustered by government, within each congress, and standard errors
have been estimated on clusters.30
Five models have been provided.31 The first four test the role of office
payoffs separately while the fifth assesses the conditional effect of leadership
autonomy. Model 1 checks how the likelihood of a breakaway varies when party
j is or is not in office. Model 2 assesses the differences when faction i retains
at least one minister. Model 3 replicates model 2, adding an interaction term
between office and policy payoffs. Model 4 investigates whether being overpaid
or underpaid in term of office payoffs has an effect on the decision to break
away.
Finally model 5 replicates model 4 adding the interaction term between
the mode of leader’s election and party system competitiveness, to validate
our hypotheses about their conditional effect.32
Across the models, almost all the variables are significant and retain the
expected sign. DISTANCE increases the likelihood of fission. Factions do care
about party policy position, and they are more likely to leave the party as
30Clustered standard errors are heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (Rogers,
1993). Controlling for temporal dependence through temporal dummies or random effects
does not alter the results.
31Given that we are dealing with a rare event, to assess the goodness of fit we report the
percentage of correctly predicted outcomes and sensitivity (percentage of correctly predicted
positive outcomes) measured according to a .05 cut-off point, which is close to the outcome
rate (.04). The goodness of fit is similar across the models.
32In this latter model we omit the variable CLOSED LIST as far as the post-estimation
diagnostic highlights some problems due to collinearity. This dummy variable also distin-
guishes between the First and the Second Republic; however such distinction overlaps with
the different levels of political system competitiveness, in that Italy was more close to a
dominant party system during the First Republic. The polyserial correlation between the
two variables is in fact significant (-.51). Notwithstanding this, keeping the variable inside
does not alter the substantive results of the analysis.
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Table 7.2: Logit Regression of Faction Breakaway (FISSION)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DISTANCE 1.536** 1.432** 1.359* 1.553** 1.340*
(0.739) (0.724) (0.815) (0.738) (0.718)
PARTY IN OFFICE 0.570
(0.481)
FACTION IN OFFICE -0.887* -0.937
(0.529) (0.582)
DISTANCE*FACTION IN OFFICE 0.456
(1.027)
OVERPAID -5.881** -5.962**
(2.640) (2.559)
CLOSED LIST 2.126*** 2.134** 2.136** 2.205**
(0.814) (0.960) (0.960) (0.863)
DISPROPORTIONALITY -0.325* -0.387* -0.386* -0.371* -0.379***
(0.179) (0.226) (0.227) (0.190) (0.146)
PARTY AGE -0.090*** -0.083*** -0.083*** -0.089*** -0.127***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023)
SYMBOL CHANGE 2.744*** 2.660*** 2.659*** 2.833*** 2.538***
(0.644) (0.542) (0.542) (0.591) (0.537)
DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM 1.939*** 1.622*** 1.622*** 1.838*** 2.204***
(0.397) (0.356) (0.356) (0.386) (0.405)
LEADER AUTONOMY -0.059 0.041 0.038 -0.035 -1.915
(0.770) (0.816) (0.814) (0.803) (1.450)
MARGIN OF VOTES -0.166**
(0.0710)
LEADER AUTONOMY* 0.370**
MARGIN OF VOTES (0.174)
CONSTANT -1.665** -1.117 -1.111 -1.397** 1.494
(0.752) (0.821) (0.818) (0.747) (1.284)
Observations 769 769 769 769 769
Log Pseudo-likelihood -94.575 -94.175 -94.163 -92.591 -92.280
Correctly Predicted 82.18 82.57 82.57 82.31 82.83
Sensitivity 72.41 65.52 65.52 72.41 68.97
Area under the Roc Curve (AUC) .842 .852 .852 .850 .857
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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the distance from the bulk of the party factions increases. On the other hand,
office payoffs positively affect party unity although belonging to a ruling party
is not a sufficient condition to preserve unity. In fact, PARTY IN OFFICE
does not affect the likelihood of splits, and its effect is not statistically different
from zero.33 On the contrary, FACTION IN OFFICE decreases the likelihood
of breakaway. Party unity is enhanced only when factions receive a quota of
payoffs are greater than zero (Caillaud and Tirole 2002) i.e., when they directly
targeted with ministerial posts.
The interaction term DISTANCE*FACTION IN OFFICE is not significant:
the impact of policy payoffs on FISSIONS is similar between factions in and
out of office.34 Moreover, given that in the Italian context the main reward for
cabinet participation is linked to office payoffs (Mershon 1996), we tested the
impact of policy motivation within a narrower subsample that includes parties
in office only the coefficient of DISTANCE is still significant and maintains
its sign and magnitude.35 This result provides a further confirmation for the
idea that even potential ‘office seeking’ groups are also concerned with policy
motivations. OVERPAID is significant and negative as we expected: factions
whose share of office payoffs is greater than their size leave with a lower prob-
ability meaning that assigning more ministers to one subgroup might prevent
33We must recall, from chapter 4, that the cost of voice, ν, should be greater among ruling
parties inasmuch as their life is more under public scrutiny compared to the opposition.
Accordingly, and bearing in mind the portray of table 2.2, we can further hypothesize that
among ruling party the likelihood of fission should be greater (due to ν), although only when
the cost of ω decreases. We tested this idea adding to model 1 an interaction term between
PARTY IN OFFICE and PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT, i.e., the share of seats retained
by the ruling coalition (which is a good proxy for the value of party breakup with respect
to members of the ruling coalition that have much to lose in the parliamentary arena). We
found indeed a significant coefficient of the interaction, proving that the likelihood of fissions
increases among ruling parties though only when PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT is wide
enough (equal or above the 60%). Below that threshold, the increased price of ν is balanced
by the high cost of ω. Note also that this result provides an argument for the idea of parties
as minimum winning coalitions (Leiserson 1968).
34In model 3 the marginal effect of DISTANCE on FISSION is .032 (.016) when the faction
is in office and .048 (.028) when it is not. Clustered standard error in brackets.
35Among the subsample covering parties in office DISTANCE has a significant positive
effect on FISSION: 2.029 (.995). Clustered standard error in brackets.
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it from breaking apart while, conversely, underpaid factions are more likely to
split.36
Besides policy and office, electoral motives matter as well (Reed and Scheiner
2003). CLOSED LIST is always significant and negative: when the selection of
candidatures is centralized the likelihood of split increases, whereas preference
voting contributes to preserve unity inside factionalized parties. The variable
DISPROPORTIONALITY, in turn, has a significant impact.37 It raises the
exit costs and decreases the expected electoral payoffs of splinter groups, low-
ering the likelihood of a fission. Dissenters would rather stay within the party
if the electoral system does not guarantee their reelection outside of it.
Apart from that, formal and informal intra-party rules are sources of break-
aways too. Loyalty restrains minorities from breaking away. Having controlled
for OVERPAID, which also captures the impact of patterns of cooperation that
might emerge over time, the coefficient of PARTY AGE is always significant
and in line with our hypothesis.38 This result expresses the positive effect of
loyalty on unity due to the‘logic of appropriateness’ developed during party
militancy, net of the ‘logic of consequentiality’ (March and Olsen 1989). This
effect is confirmed by SYMBOL CHANGE.39 Having controlled for policy DIS-
TANCE, this latter variable tracks the net effect of changes in party symbols
that are untied to deviations in party platform. Its positive coefficient attests
36Overpaying one factions implies underpaying another one. It is up to the leader to
decide which group to reward and at the expense of who. Overall, to preserve unity the
leader should try to underpay those whose threat of breakaway is non-credible (as suggested
in chapter 5).
37Note that although DISPROPORTIONALITY and CLOSED LIST are strongly corre-
lated (.86) the post-estimation diagnostic does not record any trouble with collinearity.
38PARTY AGE could be associated also with members’ chances of reelection related to
the electoral value of party label, under the idea that among older parties the label is well
established and conveys electoral benefits (see Synder and Ting 2002). Nevertheless, we
already controlled for this aspect through DISPROPORTIONALITY and CLOSED LIST,
which evaluate the role of electoral motives comparing the expected electoral payoffs that
factions would be able to gain inside or outside the party.
39Conversely, when excluding this variable the impact of PARTY AGE on FISSION does
not change.
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that an adjustment in party logo or label decreases the loyalty of factions rising
the probability of a split.
DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM strongly increases the occurrence of a
split. Among undemocratic parties that do not tolerate dissent, the cost of
voice is quite large. This is true both for the leadership (voice infringes the
monolithic party structure damaging its cohesion) and for the minority (leaders
will revert to discipline to impose cohesion after the majority has set the line,
hence the dissenters will face the choice between compliance or breakaway).
The coefficient of LEADER AUTONOMY is never statistically different
from zero: contrary to H 7.9, autonomous leader does not boost the risk of a
split, on the whole. MARGIN OF VOTES is negative and significant however,
having included in model 5 the interaction between LEADER AUTONOMY
and MARGIN OF VOTES, we want to observe the impact of each variable,
conditional on the other (as suggested in H 7.10a and H 7.10b).
In table 7.4 we report the conditional marginal effect of MARGIN OF
VOTES. In line with H 7.10b, a wide margin (low competitive systems) in-
creases the likelihood of splits among parties are ruled by autonomous leaders,
which take advantage of the lack of competitiveness to maximize their fol-
lowers’ rewards leading to more splits. Conversely, the minor incentives for
breaking apart exert a negative impact on FISSION when in sub-competitive
party systems when leaders are constrained. In such context, splinter groups
have nothing to gain, provided that within the party they already receive a
fair share of payoffs distributed by non-autonomous leaders that have to stick
to the inter-factional agreement.
Accordingly, from figure 7.3 we observe that greater LEADER AUTON-
OMY increases the likelihood of a breakaway when party system competitive-
ness declines (i.e., when MARGIN OF VOTES enlarges), in line with H 7.10a.
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Table 7.3: Marginal Effect of Party System Competitiveness Conditional on
Leader Autonomy
Marginal Effect on FISSION when:
LEADER AUTONOMY = 0 −0.005**
(0.002)
LEADER AUTONOMY = 1 0.019*
(0.010)
Based on model V from Table 7.2
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
When the distance between the two main competitors is 7.5% or below this
effect is not significant: when party system competitiveness is strong any single
vote matters, boosting the need to preserve unity. Therefore we do not ob-
serve differences between parties ruled by autonomous or constrained leaders
because for both of them the main purpose will be to keep the party together.
Conversely, when the margin of the first party growths the competitiveness de-
creases; then the cost of party breakup shrinks and consequently autonomous
leader will not pay too much attention to the requests of internal minorities,
leaving them unsatisfied and inclined to break apart. In fact, for values of
MARGIN OF VOTES between 7.5% and 17.5%, LEADER AUTONOMY in-
creases the likelihood of splits.
Finally, when the margin is very wide and the system tends to one-party
dominance this effect remains positive but no longer significant. This could be
due to some reasons. When a single party dominates the political system the
cost of a breakup is lower but the incentives for a breakaway are lower as well
and, more important, the cost of voice shrinks too (along with the ability of
internal minorities to affect policy-making or to hurt the party from within).
Dominant parties may want to adopt inclusive strategies, tolerating broader
levels of division and dissent in order to preserve their dominance (Laver and
Benoit 2003; Boucek 2010). However this latter idea might deserve deeper
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investigation.40
Figure 7.4: Marginal Effect of LEADER AUTONOMY on FISSION as MAR-
GIN OF VOTES Increases
Note: The light gray area represents the 90% Confidence Interval of the estimate
40We tested the impact of party system competitiveness through other variables finding
somehow similar results. When using the ENP, Effective Number of Parties (Laasko and
Taagepera 1979), as a proxy for competitiveness we found a positive significant effect of
LEADER AUTONOMY for medium level of ENP, in line with our hypothesis. The effect is
not significant when ENP is very low (single party dominance) or too high (due to uncertainty
about the outcome, see Coppedge 1998); refer to Schleiter and Voznaya (2011) for a similar
discussion about ENP as s proxy for competitiveness. Using PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT
we find a significant positive effect of LEADER AUTONOMY only among parties in office
and we obtain a similar outcome modifying MARGIN OF VOTES to measure the gap
between electoral coalitions (when in place). One possible explanation is that among ruling
parties, whose life is more under public scrutiny compared to the opposition, the cost of
internal voice (ν) is larger and may outweigh the cost of a breakup (ω) when the ruling
coalition retains a safe margin (see also footnote 33, this chapter). Under such conditions, for
the sake of improving government effectiveness (Katz 1986b), autonomous leaders will trade
unity for cohesion, increasing the propensity for splits (see table 2.2). Autonomous leader
could better overpay their supporter when they are in office due to the larger availability of
office and policy payoffs to be shared. Vice versa, autonomous leader in opposition parties
have little to distribute so that unfair dynamics do not hurt minority factions too much.
These two latter results, although non identical to the suggestion proposed in H 7.10a, still
provide a confirmation for that general idea. However, the specific differences in intra-
party dynamics between ruling and opposition parties, along with factional politics inside
dominant parties (Bogaards and Boucek 2010; Boucek 2012), are topics that deserve further
investigation, although this deepen enquiry lies beyond the scope of the present dissertation
(see paragraph 9.3 below).
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To conclude, we show more substantively the effects of the variables con-
sidered in model 4. Table 7.4 provides the difference in probability to illustrate
the deviation in the predicted probability of FISSION due to a change in each
parameter (the values of all the other variables are set at their mean). We
increase continuous variables by one standard deviation from the mean (which
is the default) while dummy variables vary from 0 to 1.
Table 7.4: FISSION. Difference in Probability
Parameter Default Increase Diff. in Probability
DISTANCE 0.103 +0.194 0.004**
(0.003)
OVERPAID 0.004 +0.118 −0.006**
(0.003)
CLOSED LIST 0 +1 0.087**
(0.064)
DISPROPORTIONALITY 3.33 +1.80 −0.007*
(0.004)
PARTY AGE 25.59 +13.88 −0.009***
(0.004)
SYMBOL CHANGE 0 +1 0.165***
(0.036)
DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM 0 +1 0.072***
(0.044)
LEADER AUTONOMY 0 +1 0.004
(0.016)
All other variables set at their mean
Predicted Pr. of FISSION is 0.014 (0.007)
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
7.6 The Determinants of Factional Breakaways:
Findings
The results of the present analysis shed some light on the reasons why a
party breaks up, altering the structure of the party system. We analyzed three
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key elements that affect faction’s decision to break away finding results that
are in line with our main hypotheses. We proved that the amount of payoffs
available within or without the party is crucial to explain faction breakaways.
However intra-party rules, the electoral system and other attributes of the
political system like the level of competitiveness affect the structure of payoffs
and, directly and indirectly the likelihood of party breakup. Moreover party
leader’s attitude to compromise with internal minorities is another important
factor that explains party unity and party fission.
First of all, we observe that factions care about office, policy, and elec-
toral payoffs, and that all these three aspects influence their decision to stay
or leave the party. Policy motives seem to drive the breaking (and making)
of parties; subgroups that share common preferences are more likely to join
together (Aldrich 1995) and, accordingly, they are more likely to split when
intra-party heterogeneity increases. The bigger the distance between the fac-
tion and the party mainstream, the greater the likelihood of a breakaway.41
Although some scholars have claimed that factions are interested mainly in
patronage, our results show that, on the contrary, factions are driven by pol-
icy motivations, too. Even among subgroups that are in office (which should
be labelled ‘factions of interests’) policy payoffs impinges on the likelihood of
a breakaway, regardless of the risk of losing the office.
Positive office payoffs, in turn, provide incentives to stay within the party.
In addition being overpaid decreases the likelihood of a breakaway; conversely
41Note that another logic, apart from that underlined in H 7.1, may yield the same output.
Marginal located minority factions pay a huge cost from membership. This price however is
paid also by the party leadership when internal polarization (attached to heterogeneous party
membership) increases. When divergent preferences coexist, the blurriness of label growths
(Snyder and Ting 2002) and the party could suffer problems of credible commitment towards
voters and allies. This effect will be greater, the larger the distance between each faction
and the bulk of party members. The leader then will be unwilling to heed the requests of
minority factions whose position is strongly marginal and she would rather pursue internal
cohesion in spite of unity. A split, in fact, may increase the clearness of party label wielding
positive effects on the whole party.
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factions whose share of spoils is lower than their strength in party body are
more likely to leave, trying to gain greater payoffs from outside the party.
This result confirms that portfolio allocation could be a strategy to keep party
unity, preventing the threat of a breakaway (in agreement with the findings
discussed in chapter 5): the party leader might grant a larger share of payoffs
to factions whose breakaway could damage the party.
Electoral payoffs matter as well. Factions evaluate the chances of reelection
within or without the party. Notwithstanding their unsatisfactory quota of
payoffs, dissenters might prefer to stay within the party if the electoral system
does not guarantee their persistence. Accordingly, disproportional rules act as
barriers to exit disempowering the strength of splinter groups in future elections
and even thwarting their chances to get represented after the breakaway.
Conversely closed list PR and centralized procedures for candidate selec-
tion enable party leaders to select candidates and MPs. Hence the leader can
punish dissenters leaving minority factions outside the party list or reducing
the percentage of candidates assigned to them. In turn, undemocratic party
rules that forbid internal dissent exert a similar effect, pushing leaders to whip
minority in order to enhance cohesion. Deprived of the voice option (see chap-
ter 4) dissenters will be more inclined to exit. In this sense preference voting,
by decreasing the cost of voice, could be a source of party unity in systems
characterized by divided parties (along with democratic intra-party rules). In
fact it provides factions with open access to parliamentary seats thereby in-
stitutionalizing factionalism and sustaining unity. In this sense open list PR
is a valid alternative to the adoption of primary elections (Hortala-Vallve and
Mueller 2011).
Party loyalty act as a constraint to exit. The partisan tie to symbols and the
logic of appropriateness developed during the militancy restrain members from
breaking away. In this sense, discipline might help to preserve unity when it
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has been endogenously internalized in the rational calculus made by dissenting
factions. On the contrary, when discipline is imposed as an exogenous element,
like inside divided undemocratic parties, the result will be an increase in the
likelihood of splits. Discipline cannot be effective when the ‘exit’ remains an
option (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). In turn this may help to explain why
undemocratic parties are sometimes long lasting without suffering from this
lack of democracy: the strong discipline could be balanced by huge levels of
loyalty, which raise the exit costs defusing the credibility of such option.42
The loyalty effect however ceases to wield effects when the party transforms
its structure changing its symbols or merging with other parties so that the
logic of appropriateness is no longer able to avoid splits. This aspect impinges
on elites’ attempts to alter the political system in order to reduce party frag-
mentation. When party merger is only a ‘cold fusion’ process, that comes from
an instrumental and strategic calculus untied to any policy basis, the internal
wings will be more likely to break apart, thwarting the elites’ effort to simplify
the political supply. The lack of loyalty toward the new party in fact does not
help to restrain averse members from splitting away.
This path bears a resemblance with changes in the Italian political system
occurred since 2008. Political elites pushed for a reduction of fragmentation
and two new parties (PD and PDL) arose from the merger between already
existing groups (DS and DL created PD, while AN and FI formed the PDL).
However the two fusions were followed by several waves of fissions within each
42We registered only episodic moments of conflict within the PCI despite it was ruled
through democratic centralism since its birth. This trade-off between discipline and loyalty
could be of use also to explain the factional strife that erupted within the LN in January
2012: the LN party mainstream imposed a whip on the internal minority forbidding its
leader, Maroni, from taking part in public debates. Despite this strong sanction (closely
linked to the idea of democratic centralism, large ν) the head of Maroniani faction was
willing to remain within the LN. In fact, he confirmed his loyalty and claimed that he would
never had left the party after 25 years of militancy (wide ε). Nevertheless, after that a broad
number of local party branches (large ω) expressed their support for Maroni, deciding to
defy the whip, the party mainstream stepped back, withdrawing the ban in order to avoid
the risk of a damaging breakaway.
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party. Within the PD, the Democratic Left (SD) exited from the party in
2007 and API broke away later on in 2009. In 2007, few months before the
birth of PDL, the right-wing faction within AN (one of the founding parties)
split creating a new party, La Destra (The Right), with the purpose to hinder
this merger. Subsequently in 2010 another breakaway involved the PDL, when
its minority factions broke apart building the FLI, and two additional splits
occurred until 2011. After an initial decrease in the effective number of parties
and parliamentary groups (fostered by the formation of PD and PDL) the
breakups countervailed this process so that fragmentation started to growth
once again.43
Whether regarded in terms of breakaways or expulsions, party fissions in-
volve two sides: the splinter group and the party leader who is in charge of
preserving unity. We argue that factions leave the party when they are dis-
satisfied, and they are dissatisfied when the party leader do not cater to them
with a fair share of benefits. In turn the leader will not cater to internal minori-
ties when she is focused on keeping cohesion (homogeneity) in spite of unity.44
This happens when a party fission will not harm the party, that means, when
party unity is not an issue at stake, like for instance under low competitive
43The ENP, measured according to the number of seats, has grown from 3.08 in May 2008
to 3.40 in December 2010 and 3.99 in December 2011 (Ceron 2011).
44The search for more cohesion along with the firm rejection of any internal dissent are
indeed two elements that contribute to explain the fission of PDL in 2010 and the breakaway
of FLI. Remember, from chapter 3, that PDL openly declared its firm refusal of any public
expression of dissent (likewise in parties ruled through democratic centralism). In addition
the policy declarations released by Lower House Speaker Fini (head of the minority faction)
and by other members of FareFuturo and Generazione Italia (Finiani subgroups) were
considered by PDL leadership as laying too far away from the PDL policy platform and
ideology. In addition the wide margin of seats retained by the centre-right ruling coalition
at the beginning of the XVI Legislature, along with the strong voters’ support kept by
PDL and LN according to the poll surveys and to the results of local elections, contributed
to lower the degree of competitiveness. This allowed PDL leadership to trade unity for
cohesion. In search for a tight cohesiveness they decided to push Finiani faction outside the
party, in order to secure a community of intent that could enhance government effectiveness.
In fact the expression of dissent within the PDL was starting to damage party’s image and
government’s efficacy and could have eventually eroded voters’ support. However it seems
that PDL leadership has underestimated the damaging effect of a split, at least in the
long-run.
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conditions where the cost of a breakup shrinks.45
From our theory then we derive that party fission is an interplay between
splinter factions and the leader (tied to the party mainstream), where leader’s
attitude toward party unity and the shape of payoffs allocation dynamics ex-
ert a crucial role in interaction with leader autonomy and with the condi-
tion of the electoral market measured in terms of party system competitive-
ness/dominance.46
45The lack of competitiveness might also contribute to explain the fractionalization of
one-dominant party system as well as the end of party system dominance (Boucek 2010). In
this sense, the adoption of fair intra-party dynamics of payoffs allocation in dominant parties
allow to preserve them from disruptive factionalism, hereby perpetuating party dominance
(consider for instance the Italian DC or the Japanese LDP). However, according to what
discussed above (see footnote 40), this topic stands on its own and deserves further and
deeper investigation.
46Some works provided preliminary insights on how leader’s attitude to internal dissent
affects party unity and cohesion (Boucek 2010; Ceron 2011).
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Chapter 8
Factions, Fissions, and Their
Effects on the Party System
8.1 Introduction
So far we highlighted that parties are not unitary actors but are instead
divided in many subgroups. We detected their internal subgroups estimating
factional preferences and investigating what rules shape intra-party politics;
we scrutinized how factions bargain to preserve party unity and why some-
times the party breaks up. Our results depicted the sources of factionalism
and proved their impact on intra-party equilibriums. However if intra-party
divergences do not yield effects on party politics and the party system, study-
ing factions and fission would be less relevant, if not worthless at all. Some
of our findings confirm that the party system affects intra-party politics, for
instance through portfolio allocation or providing incentives and constraints
to the growth of factions and the likelihood of splits. In this chapter we will go
one step forward to assess whether factionalism and party fissions have an im-
pact on real world politics and on the party system as a whole. We will provide
a measure of intra-party polarization and we will analyze the impact of divi-
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sion on several aspects of politics, focusing on policy, office, and votes. First
of all we analyze whether intra-party divergences reflect in different rates of
cohesion during parliamentary votes. Then we assess whether greater internal
polarization affects the likelihood of being involved in a coalition government.
Finally we control if intra-party division alters the electoral performance of a
party.
8.2 A Measure of Intra-party Division
To evaluate the impact of factionalism we need a measure of the degree
of polarization within the party. However taking into account only the range
of preferences existing inside parties would be insufficient. We should better
take into account both the preferences and the strength of each faction.
An example helps to explain why. Suppose we have two parties, A and B. A
is composed by a strong majority faction that retains 99% of members’ support
and by a minority faction whose strength is limited (only 1% of seats in party
body); the ideal point of the minority lies far far away from the mainstream.
On the contrary B is composed by two factions of equal strength whose policy
views diverge to a lower extent compared to party A. We can easily argue that
party A would be perceived as less divided even if the distance between its two
factions is greater than in party B. In party A in fact the overwhelming strength
of the mainstream faction with respect to the minority contributes to clarify
the party line, assuring that its policy position would be easily identified. On
the contrary, despite factions in party B are closer, their equal strength makes
it harder to identify where the party is actually located and who sets its line
and strategy. Hence the uncertainty around the actual preferences of party B
could be greater.
This higher uncertainty might produce some effects. For instance, it may
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decrease the likelihood that the party will be involved in a coalition, as we
argue later. Additionally its party label appears less clear, the voters then will
face difficulties in understanding its actual position on several policy issues
and whenever the party expresses a common position the voters would not
believe to such commitment because of the broad division existing inside it.
Finally, the risible strength of the minority faction in party A would decrease
the likelihood that its parliamentary group will split on key votes: if dissenters
decide to rebel they face the risk of a punishment without being sure that their
defection will really alter the outcome of the vote. In party B to the contrary
factions are large enough to believe they are able to alter the result. Moreover,
despite their preferences are not much divergent, it could be difficult to find a
compromise when the options are just “yes” or “no” (and “abstain”), therefore
the party could more easily split.
To provide a measure of polarization that takes into account the bargaining-
complexity within the party we retrieve the ‘ideological standard deviation’, an
indicator used by Warwick (1994) to assess the polarization of a party system,
and we adapt it to fit the intra-party environment, given that we consider the
party as a ‘factional system’. Therefore we take into account faction’s size
and policy position to assess the degree of INTRA-PARTY DIVISION (IPD)
within each party congress, through the following formula:
IPD =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
si(fi −GAP )2 (8.1)
where si is faction i’s share of seats in party body, fi is its policy posi-
tion, and GAP is the GAMSONIAN AGREEMENT POSITION (the weighted
mean of factions’ positions measured as described in chapter 6); the summa-
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tions are over the number of factions within each congress (n).1 Figure 8.1
illustrates the distribution of INTRA-PARTY DIVISION within the 83 con-
gresses included in the database. IPD assumes, on average, the value of 0.17.
IPD is positively correlated (r = .84) with the range of INTERNAL POLAR-
IZATION, shown in chapter 4, and with two measures of internal fragmentation
described in the same chapter: NOF (r = .31) and ENF (r = .21).
As shown in figure 8.2, the mean value of IPD is quite similar for all parties:
with few exceptions it ranges from 0.1 to 0.2; NPSI and PCI retain slightly
lower values while within the Greens IPD is on average greater than 0.2 (like-
wise in the unique observation concerning PDA and PDCI). The broader inter-
nal division within the Greens comes as no surprise given that this single issue
party included subgroups whose ideology differs widely (apart from a common
and strong interests in environmental policy). Overall however the variation of
IPD across time (within the same party) seems to be larger than the difference
across parties. At different points in time parties like DC or PLI experienced
very different levels of intra-party division while these levels are more similar
within parties like DS or PSDI.
8.3 Policy: Does Factionalism Affect Policy-
Making?
To start with we want to test whether intra-party division shapes policy.
In chapter 6 we have already shown that party position is affected by the
wills of all factions, hence divergent preferences lead to differences in terms of
policies. Here we try to go further to determine their impact on parliamentary
1Note that this formula leads to the same results of the Polarization Index provided by
Dalton (2008) to calculate party system polarization.
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Figure 8.1: Distribution of Intra-party Division within Party Congresses
Figure 8.2: Intra-party Division per Party
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policy-making. We claim that, apart from altering party ideology and position
on several issues, the effect of intra-party differences should be observable,
resulting in lower degrees of cohesion in parliamentary votes. This in turn
could affect the outcome of a vote, changing the content of legislation that will
be enacted.
Analysing the roll call votes on divisive foreign policy issues, Giannetti and
Laver (2009: 166) found ‘a clear relationship between the factional structure
[. . . ] and indicators of party cohesion’ within the Italian Democrats of the
Left. Their work sustained the idea of a linkage between factional preferences
and voting behaviour.2
Noticeably a party whose factions retain exactly the same preferences
should consistently vote in a very cohesive manner. Conversely in a party
that is internally polarized, factions could more easily split on parliamentary
votes. However this is just a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a split
vote as long as voting behaviour does not depend only on preferences but could
be induced through party discipline (Kam 2009; Krehbiel 2000; Laver 1999). A
split is more likely to occur when the number of rebels is large enough so that
the outcome of the vote could be affected. Otherwise the rebels would face
the consequence of their betrayal being punished by the party leader without
gaining the benefit coming from a policy change.3 Accordingly we claim that:
2Though Giannetti and Laver’s work is only a case study, we contend that this framework
applies to many other contexts. A classical example related to the Italian history concerns
the election of Giovanni Gronchi as Head of State in 1955; he was appointed by an heteroge-
neous majority composed by left-wing and right-wing parties with the decisive contribution
provided by both DC left-wing and right-wing factions that voted against the wishes of DC
leadership. Beside this example, the Italian politics is studded by cabinets defeated (Boucek
2010; Giannetti 2010; Mershon 1994) and laws rejected due to the defections of MPs be-
longing to a party faction (note, moreover, that until 1988 the secret ballot provided a safe
shield for dissenters).
3Hardly ever a single MP is able to affect the output of a parliamentary vote on her own.
This is not unrealistic but it is certainly a rare occurrence. When a single member decides
to defy the party line, she faces the risk of punishment (by the party leader) without being
sure about the effect of her vote on the final policy output. To the contrary whenever all
the members of a faction that shared common policy views on a bill proposal decide to rebel
they increased the likelihood of being able to affect legislation. The higher their number the
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Hypothesis 8.1: The greater the extent of intra-party division, the lower
the cohesion in parliamentary voting
To test this idea we use the main indicator of MPs voting behavior that
is roll-call votes and we compare party cohesion in parliamentary votes with
IPD, the measure of intra-party division displayed above, which accounts not
only for the level of divergence but also for the internal bargaining-complexity.
We know that roll-call votes are not a perfect measure of parliamentary
behavior. Not all votes are roll-calls, thus they do not provide a complete
picture of voting behavior. The decision to call a roll-call vote may also be
strategic and biased according to the issues or the group that call it; this
is true for the European Parliament (Carrubba et al. 2006; McElroy 2009:
214-215) but also in many other contexts (Giannetti and Benoit 2009: 233).
Party groups might call roll-call votes for many different reasons and this
strategic behavior could bias the MPs’ voting behavior in such votes compared
to others, ‘however, regardless of the strategic reasons for calling roll-call votes,
it is reasonable to assume that roll-call votes are used for the more important
decisions’ (Hix et al. 2005: 215).
Roll-call votes casted in the Italian parliament are accessible only since
1988, after the removal of the secret ballot. Data on roll-call, covering the
years from 1988 until 2008, have been collected and made available thanks to
Curini and Zucchini (2010). To assess the extent of intra-party cohesion several
greater the potential effect of their defection. Moreover as the percentage of rebels increases
the leader will be less able to revert to discipline in order to impose her line without damaging
the party: when the entire parliamentary group, but the leader, decides to dissent from the
party line it would be theoretically impossible to impose discipline to constrain the MPs
and, in case, the party leader will be dismissed. Something similar happened indeed in
1976, when the moderate faction within the MSI supported the formation of Andreotti III
Cabinet against the will of the party mainstream, and in 1998 when PRC mainstream group
split in two separate factions and a majority of MPs voted against a motion of no confidence
on Prodi I Cabinet, presented by their own party. In both cases the parliamentary groups
dissolved after the split.
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different measures have been calculated. The first one is the well-known Rice
(1924, 1928) index:
Ricej =
1
m
m∑
i=1
|Y esij −Noij |
Y esij +Noij
si(fi −GAP )2 (8.2)
Noticeably the Rice index of voting likeness considers only “Yes” and “No”.
However the voting behavior encompasses other two alternatives i.e., “Ab-
stain” or “Home” where the latter stands for ‘stay home’, i.e., be absent. The
rules in the Italian Lower House take all the four options into consideration.
In particular, those who abstain are counted for the quorum but not for the
calculus of the majority of votes required to pass the bill.4 The absences too
allow often to express a policy position, when some MPs boycott the vote try-
ing to avoid the achievement of the quorum or when a parliamentary group
publicly expresses its firm refusal on a highly divisive bill (Curini and Zucchini
2010).
In this sense abstention and absence are almost never trivial nor neutral.
On the contrary they are often a strategic voting behavior intended to signal
a third position beyond approval or rejection. Indeed these additional options
played often a crucial role during parliamentary votes, even in key votes like
cabinet’s investiture. There is evidence suggesting that party factions adopted
such strategies during key votes, to halt unwanted bills or pieces of legislation
and to defeat governments hereby fostering a cabinet reshuﬄe that alters the
distribution of ministers among party factions (Giannetti 2010).
Being sources of a (potential) tactical voting, abstention and absence re-
quire coordination and discipline between MPs belonging to the same group
4For instance if a plurality of MPs is in favor of the bill abstentions, by allowing to reach
the quorum required to validate the vote, contribute to pass the bill. The opposite holds
when a plurality of MPs oppose the project.
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(or subgroup). Therefore the logic behind these two options is not much dif-
ferent from the group’s decision to vote in favor or against a bill.5 Moreover,
these alternative voting options allow factions to express their dissent without
the need to cast a vote that is completely in contrast with the party line, while
signaling however that their position lies in between. This linkage between
factional disagreement and unconventional voting options conveys a further
reason to consider them in our analysis of party unity.
To measure parties’ voting cohesion considering all these alternatives we
revert to other indexes. The first one is the Agreement Index (AI), applied
by Hix et al. (2005) in a work on the cohesion of groups in the European
Parliament. The index considers separately the three different voting options,
“Yes”, “No”, and “Abstain”, creating a count of each choice for each vote.
AIj =
1
m
m∑
i=1
maxYij , Nij , Aij − 12 (Yij +Nij +Aij −maxYij , Nij , Aij)
Yij +Nij +Aij
(8.3)
where Yij, Nij and Aij denote respectively the choice to vote “Yes”, “No”,
or “Abstain”. Perfect cohesion is indicated by AI equals to one, meaning that
all MPs of a party cast the same vote (or do not cast a vote all together).
Conversely when AI is zero the MPs are equally divided between the three op-
tions, reporting an absolute lack of cohesion. Other authors (Landi and Pelizzo
2006) proposed a modified version of AI adding a fourth category to identify
the absents, who chose to stay home (though excluding MPs absent due to par-
liamentary duty). The Modified Agreement Index (MAI) is measured through
the following formula:
5Carey (2009) too suggests considering non-voting in addition to cross-voting to analyze
party unity.
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MAIj =
1
m
m∑
i=1
maxYij , Nij , Aij , Hij − 13 (Yij +Nij +Aij +Hij −maxYij , Nij , Aij , Hij)
Yij +Nij +Aij +Hij
(8.4)
where Hij indicates the choice to stay “Home”. Alternatively, Curini and
Zucchini (2010) argued that, in line with the rules of the Italian Lower House,
abstentions could be likened to favorable votes. Within their dataset almost
all the bills submitted to a roll call vote were approved; in those situations
indeed the abstentions contributed to match the quorum, validating the vote.
In this sense they actually carried a positive effect. Accordingly we provide
another alternative measure of AI focused on the actual effect played by the
voting behavior. This version, called Actual Agreement Index (AAI), takes
into account the absence as a third choice beyond “Yes” and “No” (like in the
previous case). However, contrary to MAI, we sum up “Yes” and abstentions
due to their common effect on policy-making. We measured the AAI as follows:
AAIj =
1
m
m∑
i=1
max(Yij +Aij), Nij , Hij − 12 [(Yij +Aij) +Nij +Hij −max(Yij +Aij), Nij , Hij ]
(Yij +Aij) +Nij +Hij
(8.5)
The difference between the Rice index and the several types of Agreement
indexes are greater when parties tend to abstain, or to stay home, as a block
(Hix et al. 2005).6 However when looking at the correlation between the four
measures we observe that the main difference seems to concern the impact of
strategic absences, as it emerges from table 8.1.
Among those displayed above, only two correlations appear statistically
6For instance, if one party splits between 10 “Yes”, 10 “No” and 100 “Abstain”, it would
be completely divided (0.000) according to the Rice index, while the AI would show that
the party is relatively cohesive in its choice (0.750); see Hix et al. (2005: 216).
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Table 8.1: Correlation between Alternative Measures of Party Cohesion in Roll
Call votes
Variables Rice AI MAI AAI
Rice 1.000
AI 0.642 1.000
MAI 0.099 0.222 1.000
AAI 0.003 0.171 0.955 1.000
significant (both at the 99% level): one is between the Rice index and the
Agreement Index and the other involves MAI and AAI. This clearly highlights
two patterns marked by the choice to consider the absence as a third option
beyond “Yes” and “No”. In fact MAI and AAI are firmly correlated with each
other while they diverge from AI and Rice, which do not count the absentees.
We will analyze the impact of IPD on party cohesion referring to these
four dependent variables. We adopted the Rice index (RICE) and the three
different versions of the Hix Agreement Index: AI, MAI and AAI. Data on roll
calls are available only for a limited number of cases (n = 30) and not for the
whole sample of congresses (that is 83). Due to the huge relevance of party
switching within the Italian Parliament (Giannetti and Laver 2001; Heller and
Mershon 2005, 2008) the indexes have been measured considering only MPs
belonging to each parliamentary group at the end of the legislature.
We modified INTRA-PARTY DIVISION accordingly, excluding from the
count factions that broke away by the end of the term. When after the fission
there is only one faction left we assigned to IPD the value of 0 to indicate the
absence of divisions because the sources of polarization i.e., the other splinter
factions, were no longer inside the party. When only one group remains inside
we would not expect to observe divergent preferences and voting behavior.7
We additionally include two control variables. The first one, GROUP SIZE,
is the number of MPs belonging to each group. Several authors (Carey 2002;
Dion 1997; Sieberer 2006) suggest to control for this aspect as far as roll-call
7However considering those situations as missing cases does not alter the results.
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indexes of cohesion are artificially inflated for small parties (Desposato 2005).
The second variable is RULING PARTY, a dummy variable that takes value 1
when the party belongs to the coalition that supports the government (even if
just through an external support); this variable allows to control the differences
in cohesion between ruling and opposition parties as long as some authors
claimed that parties in office tend to be more unified (Becher and Sieberer
2008; Carey 2002, 2007; Diermeier and Feddersen 1998; Katz 1986b; Saalfeld
1995) while others support the reverse hypothesis (Rahat 2007; Sieberer 2006).
Figure 8.3 and 8.4 show that the values of our dependent variables are bounded
between 0 (lack of cohesion) and 1 (perfect cohesion).
Figure 8.3: Kernel Density of Rice Index and Agreement Index (AI)
As discussed in chapter 5, in those cases the OLS assumptions might no
longer hold and we could find heteroskedasticity or not normally distributed
errors (Wooldridge 2002). We need to estimate our parameters through an-
other model like the beta-binomial model (Paolino 2001) or the fractional logit
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Figure 8.4: Kernel Density of Actual (AAI) and Modified (MAI) Agreement
Index
(Papke and Wooldridge 1996, 2008). Contrary to the fractional logit, the beta-
binomial model requires that the dependent variable does not assume values on
the extremes of the interval (0 or 1). RICE varies from .94 to .99 and AI sim-
ilarly assumes values between .92 and .99 (figure 8.3). On the other side MAI
ranges from .55 to .85 and the AAI between .53 and .83 (figure 8.4). Hence
we can analyze data through beta maximum likelihood estimation, although
using a fractional logit does not alter the results. We cluster observations on
party to deal with the issue of independence. The results of the analysis are
displayed in table 8.2.
The coefficient of IPD retains a significant effect only in two out of four
analyses. In line with our hypothesis it has a negative and significant impact,
though only when party cohesion is measured through MAI and AAI, the
two indexes that interpret strategic abstention as an additional voting option.
When roll calls are analyzed through Rice and AI, on the contrary, the effect
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Table 8.2: Beta Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Party Cohesion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RICE AI MAI AAI
INTRA-PARTY DIVISION 0.638 1.024 -0.704** -0.860***
(0.875) (1.063) (0.285) (0.296)
GROUP SIZE 0.003* 0.006*** 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
RULING PARTY 0.325 0.097 0.311** 0.245
(0.312) (0.177) (0.149) (0.168)
Constant 3.419*** 3.035*** 0.488*** 0.422***
(0.182) (0.241) (0.114) (0.095)
Observations 30 30 30 30
Log pseudo-likelihood 92.056 91.059 38.342 38.126
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
of IPD is no longer statistically different from zero.
In line with other recent contributions (Depauw and Martin 2009; Sieberer
2006) we found that GROUP SIZE is significant but only when looking at the
Rice index or at AI. This effect holds even when adopting the adjusted version
of Rice index proposed by Desposato (2005); hence this feature does not seem
linked to that kind of bias.8
Finally the effect of RULING PARTY is controversial. Members of the
ruling coalition report higher levels of cohesion in parliamentary votes (e.g.,
Carey 2007) although this effect is significant only when analyzing the Modified
Agreement Index. If this was the case there would be a resemblance with the
findings shown in chapter 4 when we registered a decrease in fractionalization
among parties in office. The cost of division could be higher among ruling
parties that face incentives to strengthen their cohesion in order to ameliorate
government effectiveness (Katz 1986b). However when looking at the other
indexes this result loses its significance so that the actual impact of party
government on MPs cohesion needs further investigation.
8See Sieberer (2006) for an analogous outcome.
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Despite the limited number of observations these preliminary results show
that, after controlling for party’s size and status, factions’ behavior seems
consistent with their preferences. However the methodological assessment of
absentees seems crucial to understand the impact of intra-party politics on
parliamentary votes.
The role of coordinated absences as a device to express an alternative po-
sition is rooted in the parliamentary split known under the name of “Aventino
Secession”. In 1924, to complain against the disappearance (and the murder)
of Giacomo Matteotti (an anti-fascist MP), the representatives belonging to
anti-fascist opposition parties withdrawn from the parliament to signal, with
their absence, the lack of legitimacy of the oncoming fascist dictatorship. After
the advent of the Republic, this parliamentary tactic has been adopted from
time to time to signal a firm refusal on several topics. Recently, in October
2011, the whole opposition reverted to such strategy as a mean to defeat the
Berlusconi IV Cabinet in a vote of confidence. However the lack of cohesion
within the main opposition party leaded to the failure of this device.9 A very
similar strategy was adopted one month later, during a crucial (though ordi-
nary) vote on the cabinet’s balance sheet. All the opposition parties (including
MPs switched off from the PDL few days before) agreed on a common tactic
to force the Prime Minister to resign. The opposition was cohesive in refusing
to cast a vote, so that the balance sheet was approved but only with 308 votes
out of 630 MPs. In consequence of this debacle, which highlighted the lack of
a majority, Berlusconi decided to resign.
Overall the absences exert strong effects on the policy-making. An enquiry
9MPs belonging to the Radical Party, who were members of the PD parliamentary group,
refused to adopt such tactic and participated in the vote, forcing all the other opposition
parties to give up with the ‘Aventino’. As a consequence of such behavior the Radicals
have been temporarily suspended from the PD group. Something similar already happened
a few weeks before when, conversely, the Radicals deserted the room during the vote of no
confidence on a cabinet minister.
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highlighted that in the XVI Legislature the absence of MPs belonging to the
opposition was crucial to sustain the majority in roughly the 35% of parlia-
mentary votes.10 Some of these votes were non-trivial. For instance many
PD representatives were absent during the vote on ‘tax amnesty’, in October
2009; among them Paola Binetti, the leader of a conservative catholic PD fac-
tion named Teodem. Due to their unjustified absence Binetti and other MPs
received a formal warning by party body.11
Indeed strategic absence could be a way used by minority factions to sig-
nal their divergent position from party mainstream on specific bills. Another
example helps to shed light on the linkage between absences and factionalism.
In July 2011, several catholic PD deputies expressed their view on the ‘living
will’ by staying home during the vote on that bill, in dissent from the party
line. Going back to H 8.1 it seems that, overall, broader levels of intra-party
divergence yield lower cohesion in parliamentary voting, in line with the result
discussed by Giannetti and Laver (2009).
8.4 Intra-party Politics and Government For-
mation
The second aspect we want to investigate is the impact of factionalism
on office. In chapter 5 we investigated this effect within the party, focusing on
portfolio allocation among factions. Here, going one step forward, we want to
test whether intra-party politics affects coalition formation.
Groennings (1970) was the first to investigate this topic. He stated that
parties weakened by factional disputes face disadvantages in coalition bargain-
10The enquiry is available on http://maggioranzasalva.openpolis.it.
11Binetti complained about this warning. A few months later she switched off the party,
together with other MPs belonging to her faction.
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ing. Similarly other authors emphasised the positive effect of party unity on
office payoffs (Baron 1998; Diermeier and Stevenson 1999). In the same vein,
Warwick (2000) said that parties have policy horizons that define the bounds
of compromise; narrow horizons, providing more constraints, decrease the like-
lihood of being involved in the process of coalition formation. Focusing on
intra-party organization Strøm (1990) claimed that decentralized intra-party
decision-making increases the role of party activists, which are notably more
policy-oriented (May 1973) and then, less willing to compromise, hereby de-
creasing policy flexibility. Hence decentralization complicates negotiations.
Accordingly some scholars claim that more democratic parties suffer during
bargaining over government formation (Ba¨ck 2009; Mu¨ller and Strøm 2000;
Pedersen 2010; Warwick 1996). Recently Pedersen (2010) proved that parties
with unconstrained negotiators tend to be more often involved in government
formation than parties with a strong organization. Ba¨ck (2009: 64) shown that
‘factionalization and intra-party democracy have negative effects on a party’s
chances of getting into government’.
Nonetheless other authors argued that factions can provide strategic advan-
tages in coalition bargaining, by increasing party flexibility (Laver and Shepsle
1996, 1999; Maor 1998; Meyer 2012). In addition Maor (1995, 1998) claimed
that inside centralized parties the conflict manifests itself in public voice or
exit from the party, and these public disputes, more than internal conflict,
damage the bargaining power of parties.
Following this literature we focus on how intra-party division and party
organization affect the likelihood of being involved in a coalition government,
raising two main hypotheses. First of all, a party divided into many factions
that retain diverging policy positions will face more troubles in reaching an
agreement with other parties to form a coalition. Intra-party divisions make
a party less attractive to its potential allies. The uncertainty about internal
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equilibrium yields doubts about party’s commitment to a coalition deal (Ba¨ck
and Vernby 2003). In fact any agreement reached between the party and
its allies could be reneged whenever intra-party equilibriums are altered by
factional competition. Even so factions might disagree around the choice of
coalition partners complicating the task of finding an arrangement.
Hypothesis 8.2: The greater the extent of intra-party division, the lower
the likelihood of being involved in coalition governments
Another aspect of intra-party politics that affects government formation
concerns party organization: meaning the level of internal democracy and
centralization. According to contrasting changes in the internal structure,
party leaders could be completely free to negotiate a deal or alternatively
constrained by members, activists and factions (Mu¨ller and Strøm 1999; Strøm
1994; Warwick 1996: 475). As discussed above unconstrained negotiators
should be more easily able to pivot between potential alternatives in order to
get involved in a government coalition.
Hypothesis 8.3: The greater the centralization of party decision-making,
the higher the likelihood of being involved in coalition governments
We can additionally hypothesise that these two attributes interact so that
the effect of intra-party division varies according to party organization. Then
we test this claim through an interaction term between intra-party heterogene-
ity and leader’s autonomy. Groennings (1970) claimed that when intra-party
disputes happen, centralized parties permit to bypass the conflict allowing the
party to remain in the coalition (Ba¨ck 2009). Conversely Maor (1995: 66) ar-
gued that organizational decentralization helps to manage internal struggles,
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enhancing party’s chances to enter the cabinet. We can assess which of these
claims is more reasonable testing the following dashing hypotheses.
Hypothesis 8.4a: The negative effect of intra-party division on the like-
lihood of being involved in coalition governments is lowered among cen-
tralized parties
Hypothesis 8.4b: The negative effect of intra-party division on the like-
lihood of being involved in coalition governments is lowered among de-
centralized parties
We will test these hypotheses focusing on the likelihood that a party will
be involved in a coalition government. The dependent variable is CABINET
MEMBERSHIP, a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the party is member
of the coalition government in the first cabinet appointed after the end of each
party congress. To test H 8.2 we use the variable INTRA-PARTY DIVISION
described above. We correct the value of this variable to account for fissions
occurred before the bargaining that leaded to the formation of the new cabinet.
Hypothesis 8.3 will be tested through LEADER AUTONOMY, a dummy vari-
able that accounts for the degree of decision-making centralization; it assumes
the value 1 when the leader is directly elected by party members or delegates,
and the value 0 when the party leader is nominated by a less inclusive selec-
torate. Direct election makes leader more autonomous and able to centralize
the decision-making process: the direct legitimacy grants her more power and
discretionality during coalition bargaining. Our last claim (H 8.4a versus H
8.4b) will be assessed through an interaction term that encompasses these two
variables: INTRA-PARTY DIVISION*LEADER AUTONOMY.
Moreover we add some control variables commonly used in the literature
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to check whether our hypotheses hold. Scholars distinguish between internal
and external bargaining resources. The former are related to the intra-party
attributes discussed so far; the latter concern elements like parties’ strength
in Parliament and their policy positions. Many authors recognize that party’s
size could impact on the likelihood of being involved in coalition governments
(e.g., Laver and Shepsle 1996); larger parties need a lower number of partners
to form a majority, hence they usually face minor difficulties during coalition
bargaining as long as they can negotiate with a lower number of potential
allies or with smaller groups. To control for this aspect we include the variable
PARTY SIZE that expresses the percentage of seats retained by party i.
Besides size, party policy views matter as well. Applying the Black (1958)
theorem to coalition bargaining we would expect that the median party (i.e.,
the party to whom the median legislator belongs) is able to exploit its strate-
gic position during negotiations (Ba¨ck 2009; Laver and Schofield 1990: 11).
In addition parties try to build connected coalitions that minimize their re-
ciprocal distance (e.g., Axelrod 1970); hence parties whose distance from the
government ideal point is lower should have more probability of taking part
in the bargaining (Pedersen 2010). Using data from ILS (Curini and Martelli
2009) and applying the ‘vanilla method’ (Gabel and Huber 2000) to estimate
parties’ and governments’ policy positions on a single dimension (as described
in chapter 6) we are able to account for the impact of policy views. We identify
the median party within each parliamentary debate by looking at parties’ size
and policy positions on the left-right scale. Then we create the variable ME-
DIAN PARTY, a dummy that takes value 1 when party i contains the median
legislator, and 0 otherwise.
In addition we build the variable POLICY DISTANCE that measures the
divergence between party i’s and government j’s ideal points. Given that ILS
data are measured after the bargaining, when the government has already
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been formed, it could be argued that the policy positions expressed during the
debate are the endogenous outcome of that negotiation process. To cope with
this matter we measure the Euclidean distance between government position at
time t (the first government empowered after the congress) and party position
at time t−1 (the position expressed during the confidence vote on the previous
government, the last one who took office before the end of the party congress).12
As a final point, recent contributions to the literature on coalition formation
concern the idea that incumbent coalitions are advantaged during bargaining.
Incumbent represents ‘the reversal point in the event the other parties fail to
agree on an alternative’ (Strøm et al. 1994). Furthermore transaction costs
‘increase when parties change coalition partners, which implies that parties
that had governed together will prefer to continue this cooperation’, exploit-
ing the established routines and the reciprocal (almost) complete information
(Ba¨ck 2009: 54). To sum up, incumbent cabinets will more likely form again
(Ba¨ck 2003; Ba¨ck and Dumont 2007; Pedersen 2010; Warwick 1996). The
dummy variable INCUMBENT helps to consider this feature; it takes value 1
if the party was member of the government at time t− 1, and 0 if not.13
We test our hypotheses by means of a logistic regression.14 The number
of cases should be equal to the number of congresses (83), however due to a
12However using the distance between party i and government j measured at time t does
not alter the main results.
13We should also take into account the role of pre-electoral coalitions that are a feature
of Italian politics during the Second Republic and seldom during the First one (a coalition
composed by DC, PLI, PRI, PSDI, and the regional parties SVP and PSDA, contested the
1953 general elections; see footnote 24, chapter 7). Including a dummy variable to identify
parties that are members of a winning pre-electoral coalition (or, conversely, members of
a losing coalition) does not alter the substantive results. Moreover such variable would
be omitted (and some observations would be dropped) because it predicts perfectly the
outcome.
14Including a lagged dependent variable in a logit regression requires assuming that the
parameters relating the independent variables to Y are the same regardless of whether lagged
Y is 0 or 1. This is what Beck et al. (2002) called ‘restricted transition model’. It also
makes sense to include a lagged dependent variable when the lag has an effect per se on Y .
Notwithstanding this, testing temporal dependence on the present dataset through random
effects or following discrete time duration models (Beck et al. 1998) does not alter the
results.
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few missing cases this value drops to 66. Observations have been clustered
by party; we provided standard errors on clusters to deal with the nested
structure of data, thereby avoiding any possible bias due to independence.
Table 8.3 displays the results of the analysis. We provide two different models
in order to test H 8.2 and H 8.3 separately (model 1), or in interaction (model
2) according to H 8.4 (a and b).
Table 8.3: Logistic Regression of CABINET MEMBERSHIP
(1) (2)
INTRA-PARTY DIVISION -5.469* -6.808**
(3.050) (3.385)
LEADER AUTONOMY -0.850 -1.857*
(0.581) (1.054)
INTRA-PARTY DIVISION* 6.987*
LEADER AUTONOMY (3.720)
PARTY SIZE 0.085** 0.075*
(0.041) (0.041)
MEDIAN PARTY -1.319 -1.198
(1.181) (1.166)
POLICY DISTANCE -0.164** -0.170**
(0.066) (0.066)
INCUMBENT 3.571*** 3.580***
(0.832) (0.855)
CONSTANT -1.146* -0.847
(0.630) (0.627)
Observations 66 66
Log Pseudo-likelihood -23.583 -23.165
Correctly Predicted 87.88 86.36
Area under the Roc Curve (AUC) .918 .920
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
In the first model IPD is significant: INTRA-PARTY DIVISION reduces
the likelihood of being in office, in line with H 8.2. However contrary to
our hypothesis 8.3 the impact of intra-party rules does not seem influential;
the coefficient of LEADER AUTONOMY is not significant meaning that au-
tonomous leaders do not necessarily take advantage of their autonomy during
coalition bargaining.
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Almost all the control variables are significant, as we expected. PARTY
SIZE increases the likelihood of being in office; similarly being member of the
former cabinet strongly increases the probability to participate in the new gov-
ernment. Conversely POLICY DISTANCE is negative and significant meaning
that such probability decreases as the distance between party policy position
(at time t− 1) edges away from government position (measured at time t). To
conclude with, MEDIAN PARTY does not show a significant coefficient after
controlling for size and policy views. The effects of these control variables
are confirmed by model 2. The coefficients keep their sign and their level of
significance.
We revert to table 8.4 and figure 8.5 to assess the impact of the internal bar-
gaining resources after including the interaction term between INTRA-PARTY
DIVISION and LEADER AUTONOMY. The interaction is positive and sig-
nificant. The marginal effect of INTRA-PARTY DIVISION is significant only
when leaders are not autonomous: the greater the level of division the lower
the likelihood of participating in the cabinet. On the contrary among par-
ties whose leader are more autonomous (due to direct legitimacy) intra-party
division ceases to play any effect.
This idea seems coherent with Groennings’ (1970) argument (summarized
in H 8.4a): factionalized parties are less likely to be in office the higher the
level of decentralization of intra-party decision-making. An autonomous party
leader is more able to handle growing internal disputes (as shown for example
in chapter 5) so that these are no longer harmful for party’s chances to get in
office. Conversely the marginal effect of LEADER AUTONOMY decreases the
likelihood of joining the government only when the level of intra-party division
approaches zero (figure 8.5).15 This effect is not significant when internal
15In our data IPD equals zero when, after a fission, only one faction remains inside the
party.
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division growths.
Table 8.4: Marginal effect of Intra-party Division Conditional on Leader Au-
tonomy
Marginal Effect on CABINET MEMBERSHIP when:
LEADER AUTONOMY = 0 −1.679**
(0.834)
LEADER AUTONOMY = 1 0.042
(0.010)
Based on model II from Table 8.3
All variables set at their mean
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Figure 8.5: Marginal Effect of LEADER AUTONOMY on CABINET MEM-
BERSHIP as IPD Increases
Note: The light gray area represents the 95% Confidence Interval of the estimate
Whether this concerns portfolio allocation or the programme of the coali-
tion government, strong leaders have the means to solve these quarrels keep-
ing the party together. By granting more than proportional shares of posts
to unsatisfied factions, the leaders can prevail upon minorities managing to
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subscribe the coalition deal. In addition, autonomous leaders ensure that the
whole party will be credibly committed to such deal. Furthermore, provided
that we are dealing with divided parties, the higher degree of independence
expressed by a solo head decreases the complexity of bargaining.
Along this line we can additionally hypothesize that, by reconciling diver-
gent preferences, autonomous leaders are also able to decrease the time-span
of such negotiation, as suggested by Mershon (1994). However we leave this
statement opens for future researches.
On the other hand, autonomous leaders can enhance the chances to get in
office even through their impact on intra-party decision making. In chapter
6 in fact we proved that autonomous leaders are free to set party position
according to their wills, in particular when the new general elections are far-
off. This means that when the coalition bargaining takes place in between
two elections, leaders are completely unbounded and can choose a platform
that enables them to build cartels and get in office.16 They also tend to adopt
moderate positions (see footnote 23, chapter 6) closer to those of governments,
thus decreasing the POLICY DISTANCE and enhancing the probability to
get access to the ruling coalition.
To conclude, in table 8.5 we provide a more substantive interpretation of
16Remember that, due to the high instability rate of Italian cabinets, often coalition
bargaining occurred far from the elections. This is true across the whole history of the First
Republic but also during the Second Republic where, despite the existence of pre-electoral
coalitions, several times the deal was reneged and renegotiated after the elections, leading
to appoint governments supported by partners different from those who ran the election
together (the so called ribaltone, majority reversal). For instance, after the 1994 elections,
Berlusconi I Cabinet was replaced by Dini, supported by former opposition parties with
the consent of LN (already in office during the previous government); between 1996 and
2001 Prodi I was dismissed and followed by three centre-left cabinets that included two
parties previously out of office (the left-wing PDCI and the moderate UDEUR). Similarly,
moving from Berlusconi II to Berlusconi III (between 2001 and 2006) two parties (NPSI and
PRI) upgraded their status obtaining one minister each. Finally, after the 2008 elections
Berlusconi IV Cabinet changed its majority (in 2010) and members belonging to the new
coalition partners were appointed as junior ministers; in 2011 the government resigned and
it has been replaced by the Monti Cabinet, supported also by some parties defeated during
the 2008 elections.
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the coefficients displayed in model 1 of table 8.3. We report the difference in
probability to illustrate the deviation in the predicted probability of CABINET
MEMBERSHIP due to a variation in each parameter (the values of all the
other variables are set at their mean). We increase continuous variables by
one standard deviation from the mean (which is the default) while we report
the effect of a change from 0 to 1 for dummies. More polarized parties face
a decrease in the probability of joining the government by 15%; being an
incumbent party increases such probability by roughly 70%. Policy matters:
when the party position lies far from the government ideal point the party is
12% less likely to be involved in the cabinet. Finally size matters as well: when
its share of seats passes from 12% to 38% the party’s chance to be in office
rises by 23%.
Table 8.5: CABINET MEMBERSHIP. Difference in Probability
Default Increase Diff. in Probability
INTRA-PARTY DIVISION
0.12 +0.17 −0.152*
(0.081)
LEADER AUTONOMY 0 +1 −0.193
(0.131)
PARTY SIZE 12.10 +26.54 0.232**
(0.086)
MEDIAN PARTY 0 +1 −0.258*
(0.224)
POLICY DISTANCE 1.56 +3.13 −0.122**
(0.049)
INCUMBENT 0 +1 0.684***
(0.113)
All other variables set at their mean
Predicted Pr. of CABINET MEMBERSHIP is 0.515 (0.095)
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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8.5 The Impact of Factions and Fissions on
the Electoral Performance
The last element we are concerned with is related to the electoral per-
formance of factionalism. So far we shown that intra-party division produces
effects on policy-making and government formation. Here we want to assess if
intra-party politics affects the electoral competition altering parties’ share of
votes. We will analyse two distinct effects: on one side the impact of inter-
nal division per se and, on the other hand, the whole effect of disunity that
encompass the occurrence of party fissions.
Literature on party factions analysed their impact on the electoral arena
raising two contrasting ideas. McAllister (1991: 218) retrieved this electoral
hypothesis claiming that ‘factions enable the party to present a broader policy
appeal to voters at elections while still retaining a common party label’.17
This idea refers to the concept of catch-all parties (Kirchheimer 1966), that
appeal to a wider electorate going beyond their traditional area of support.
Growing intra-party differences allow factions to represent a broader extent of
political opinions and this could be a way to maximise party’s votes (McAllister
1991). However he found little support for this hypothesis and claimed that
‘factions and tendencies do not help the party to present a broader appeal to
the electorate’ (McAllister 1991: 219).
Morgenstern (2001) go further supporting the idea that parties face a di-
minished likelihood of winning the election due to internal divisiveness. How-
ever he also recognize that some attributes of the electoral system might en-
courage an enlargement of the party ideological spectrum (through growing
factionalism) to attract more votes.
Similarly it could be argued that higher levels of internal division allow
17For a similar view: Shepsle 1972. But see Alesina and Cukierman 1990.
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the party to obtain nationwide benefits through votes of exchange (Katz 1985)
or because of local intra-party competition due to preference voting (Wildgen
1985). On the other side, we claimed that party unity underpins the electoral
value of party label thereby producing positive effects on its share of votes
(Boucek 2003a; Laver 1999; McGann 2002; Snyder and Ting 2002). It is not
by chance that, when establishing its platform, the party usually takes into
account the stakes of all factions in order to present itself as a unified front in
the eyes of the voters (Levy 2004), as shown in chapter 6: ‘Major parties [. . . ]
are complex structures held together by the fact that disunity means defeat’
(Schattschneider 1942).
We can assess which of these two claims holds true, testing whether intra-
party division hurts the party in the electoral arena or, to the contrary, fac-
tionalism allows to appeal to a broader set of voters improving party’s electoral
performance.
Hypothesis 8.5a: The greater the extent of intra-party division, the
lower the share of votes gained by the party
Hypothesis 8.5b: The greater the extent of intra-party heterogeneity, the
higher the share of votes won by the party
As far as internal polarization increases the likelihood of breakaways, we
want to explore the net effect of division controlling for the occurrence of party
fission.18 We carry out this analysis focusing on changes in party’s votes. Our
dependent variables are ABSOLUTE CHANGE, the difference between party’s
votes a time t (the first general election held after the congress) minus its votes
18Although in some cases a breakup might increase the clarity of the party label bearing
a positive effect on its share of votes, we retain that, overall, fissions damage the party’s
electoral strength entailing a loss of votes.
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at time t−1 (the last election held before it), and RELATIVE CHANGE that
records the change in party’s votes between time t and time t− 1, over party
size measured at time t− 1.19
The total number of observations is 49, which is lower than the number of
congresses (83) because of some missing data. When the party celebrates more
than one congress between two subsequent elections we measure the impact
of INTRA-PARTY DIVISION only within the last congress. Conversely when
between one congress and the next the party contested more than one election
we measure as dependent variables all its performances. When two (or more)
parties contest one election together as an electoral cartel we compare their
performance with the sum of votes gained by each of them in the previous
(or in the following) election. For instance, after the merger between PSI and
PSDI into PSU, in 1966, we compare PSU share of votes in 1968 with the sum
of votes gained by PSI and PSDI in 1963.
The independent variables are: INTRA-PARTY DIVISION (IPD); FIS-
SION, a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the party suffers a breakaway
between one election and the next one; SPLINTER GROUP SIZE, a variable
that measures the size of the splinter group, summing up the share of congress
votes won by factions that leave the party before the next elections (we as-
signed the value zero when there are no breakaways); TIME IN OFFICE, the
percentage of time the party spent in office during the Legislature until the
elections.20
19We are interested in the relative change too. For instance if a small party that retains
7% of votes shrinks by 2%, this loss could prevent it from passing a 5% threshold so that even
a small absolute loss will be harmful for the party. On the contrary although a large party
(40%) could be damaged by a 2% loss, it maintains a huge share of the electorate. Likewise,
when measuring the impact of fissions we retain that a small party could be damaged by
the breakaway of a faction representing roughly one third of its members (even though the
splinter group’s value in general elections equals 2%). On the contrary, in the same vein,
a big party should be less (if not at all) concerned by the split of a minority faction whose
contribution during general elections is estimated around 2% because this splinter group
represents only 5 party voters out of 100.
20The results do not change when counting the percentage of governments the party
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We test our hypotheses by means of an OLS. We clustered observations by
party, providing standard errors accordingly to deal with the issue of indepen-
dence. The results are shown in table 8.6.
Table 8.6: OLS Regression of Change in Party Votes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ABSOLUTE RELATIVE RELATIVE RELATIVE
CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE
INTRA-PARTY DIVISION -2.507 -0.379 -0.295 -0.300
(4.473) (0.313) (0.311) (0.326)
FISSION -2.882* -0.266**
(1.205) (0.079)
SPLINTER GROUP SIZE -0.835* -0.819*
(0.296) (0.279)
TIME IN OFFICE 0.062
(0.043)
CONSTANT 0.032 0.065 0.030 -0.004
(0.648) (0.061) (0.063) (0.070)
Observations 49 49 49 49
R2 0.212 0.175 0.116 0.126
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Although the coefficient of IPD is negative it does not appear to be signif-
icant. This result could mean that division entails contrasting effects none of
whom is prevailing. On the contrary FISSION is negative and significant in
both analyses. Parties hit by a breakaway suffer a relative decrease in their
votes by 27% meaning that on average one voter out of four abandons the
party after a fission. This effect is in part directly related to the breakaway,
as long as supporters of the splinter group will probably abandon the party
in the next elections. However there could be also an additional effect: the
fission signals to the public the existence of a strong and potentially damaging
divisiveness within the party. This might convey a decrease in voters’ trust
toward the party wielding additional losses of votes.
participated to (during the Legislature) or using a dummy variable to identify parties that
were involved in the last government appointed before the elections.
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The average size of splinter groups included in this analysis is equal to 21%
whereas the average loss due to FISSION (according to model 2) was 27%.
These two values are not statistically different, then we want to control this
aspect by means of another variable, SPLINTER GROUP SIZE, that records
whether the impact of a fission extends beyond the size of the splinter groups.
From model 3 we note the existence of an almost one to one correspondence
between the size of the splinter factions and the loss of votes suffered by the
party.21 The coefficient tells us that any 10% increase in the share of votes of
the splinter factions conveys a loss of 8.35% in party’s votes. This seems to be
the general trend, although there might be some deviations from this path.
Figure 8.6 plots the variation in party votes (RELATIVE CHANGE) along
with SPLINTER GROUP SIZE for those parties that suffered a fission between
the congress and the elections (we labelled observations using the party label
and the year of the congress where the fission happened). We also report the
linear fit between the expected values predicted from model 3 and SPLINTER
GROUP SIZE (with a 95% confidence interval).
These results do not highlight any significant direct effect of intra-party
division on the electoral performance of parties, even though they confirm that
fissions matter. Any breakaway can potentially alter the electoral fortunes of
a party in agreement with the idea (already discussed in chapters 5 and 7)
that fissions are an always existing threat that could harm the party entailing
a loss of votes. This is the reason why the mainstream should care about
splinter groups’ stakes. However as long as the (electoral) loss due to party
breakup seems proportional to the strength of the splinter group (within the
party body) party leaders might actually disregard the threat of small sized
21This holds when controlling for ruling parties, under the idea that a retrospective judg-
ment over the incumbent government might have an impact on vote.
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Figure 8.6: Comparison between Loss in Party’s Votes and Size of the Splinter
Group
Note: The light gray area represents the 95% Confidence Interval of the estimate
splinter groups (see chapter 5).
Note that this empirical correspondence between losses in party body and in
the electoral arena could be an argument in favour of the resemblance between
party activists and voters, contrary to what generally argued (e.g., May 1973).
Either the voters withdraw their consent because of their linkage with the
splinter groups (and if so, activists seem to be a good depiction of voters) or
the party loses support because of the lack of credibility after the split. The
former explanation seems more plausible given the data, although this topic
deserves further investigation.
To conclude, as far as intra-party polarization increases the likelihood of
a split (as shown in chapter 7), intra-party divisions might exert an indirect
effect on party’s electoral strength through their impact on party fission. Ac-
cordingly, we can argue that a lack of internal cohesion damages the value
of party label; to avoid such loss the leadership will be more willing to whip
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internal dissenters forcing them to break away (leaders can even send them off
the party). In this sense the effect of intra-party division on votes could be
considered much more straightforward.
8.6 Factions, Fissions, and the Party System:
Findings
This chapter proved that it is worthwhile to study intra-party politics.
Factional preferences and their reciprocal strength exert an effect on the party,
and through the party on the system as a whole. In addition they play a role
in many aspects of political life, like policy-making, government formation and
electoral competition, altering the outputs of everyday politics.
First of all intra-party politics affects policies. There is an indirect effect:
in chapter 6 we shown that factional preferences shape the intra-party equi-
librium by altering the party platform. Besides there is also a direct effect:
divided parties tend to be less cohesive during parliamentary votes (even if this
result needs further investigation). Despite discipline, there seems to be a link-
age between factional preferences and voting behaviour (Giannetti and Laver
2009). Hence in the legislative arena divergent factional preferences might af-
fect the outcome of policy-making and the extent of policy change (note in
fact that changing levels of party cohesion might help oversized coalitions to
avoid the risk of gridlocks, see Ko¨nig 2006).
Intra-party politics affects office too. From chapter 5 we know that fac-
tionalism has an effect on internal portfolio allocation and that the threat of a
party fission contributes to alter the share of payoffs providing an advantage
to potential splinter groups. On the other side a large branch of literature un-
derlined the role played by factions and fissions in government formation and
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termination (e.g., with respect to the Italian case: Giannetti 2010; Giannetti
and Laver 2001; Mershon 1994). The present chapter confirmed that growing
intra-party struggles exert a direct effect on government formation, jeopar-
dising party’s chances of getting in office. This in turn will affect the whole
party system altering its features and the potential outcomes (i.e., changing
the members of the ruling coalition, the alliances, and presumably the legisla-
tion enforced by the cabinet). However our results seem to indicate that party
organization attributes interact with factional preferences so that centralized
parties with autonomous leader are more able to handle intra-party conflicts
and protect party’s chances of participating in the government.
Finally intra-party politics affects even votes, in a sense. Factionalism
however seems to play only an indirect effect by increasing the likelihood of
fissions, which are proved to be damaging for party’s electoral fortunes.
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Conclusion
9.1 Preferences and Rules. What Matters Most?
Throughout the chapters we scrutinized several domains of intra-party
politics to investigate the shape of internal dynamics. Our research question
dealt with the impact of factional struggle on the party and the party system.
We were interested in understanding how factions compete against each other
and how they bargain to reach a compromise. We additionally investigated the
failures of factional bargaining that lead to party break-up. Despite this work
addressed disparate topics, ranging from position-taking to government for-
mation, we kept some attributes constant throughout the chapters in order to
investigate their effect across the whole dissertation. In particular we focused
thoroughly on factional preferences and intra-party rules, to assess which one
matters more. Here we report the main findings.
With respect to preferences, in chapter 3 we described the heterogeneity
of factions’ positions, then in chapter 8 we depicted a measure of intra-party
division (IPD). As far as rules are concerned we provided in chapter 4 some
descriptive statistics related to party statutes. Following the data presented in
table 4.2 here we create an index that expresses, per each party, the average
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level of internal representativeness (AIR), among the congresses included in
the dataset.
This index could be considered as a proxy for the level of intra-party democ-
racy. It has been measured as the weighted mean of representativeness granted
by party statutes within each congress (see table 4.2). The weights correspond
to the percentage of congresses held under a particular rule; more precisely we
assigned value 1 to rules that provide a high level of representativeness (H), 0.5
to rules that express a medium level (M) and 0 when the representativeness
is low (L). Therefore the maximum level of AIR is equal to 1 when the rules
guarantee the highest degree of representativeness to the minorities (within all
the congresses considered). In table 9.1 we report the mean value of AIR and
IPD (over party) to describe the relation existing between statutes’ rules and
intra-party heterogeneity.
Table 9.1: Details about Internal Rules and Preferences: Mean Value of AIR
and IPD within each Party
Party AIR IPD
AN .50 .11
DC .61 .20
DS .75 .11
FV .75 .26
MSI .80 .16
NPSI .75 .06
PCI .83 .09
PD .75 .15
PDA .75 .29
PDCI .50 .24
PLI .61 .23
PRC .88 .13
PRI .66 .12
PS .75 .16
PSDI .92 .20
PSI .90 .18
PSIUP 1.00 .12
UDC .75 .13
Unsurprisingly the maximum level of AIR is reached by socialist parties
like PSIUP, PSDI and PSI whose index ranges from .9 to 1.1 Those parties
1Within the Greens (FV) the AIR score is lower compared to our expectation, given that
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considered internal democracy as one of the distinguishing traits of their po-
litical action.2 This is particularly true for the PSDI that characterized itself
for a great tolerance of internal dissent; indeed after the split from PSI in
1947 this party enacted the highest level of internal democracy, in contrast
with PCI and PSI that were ruled through democratic centralism at the time
(Curini and Martelli 2009, pp. 60-61). Similarly after PCI dissolution in 1991
the splinter group that created PRC enacted an high level of democracy as
a strategy to differentiate from the PDS whose internal rules were more con-
straining (Giannetti and Mule´ 2006).
On the other side of the continuum the two least representative parties
within our sample are AN and PDCI: AN set apart from the democratic orga-
nization typical of its ancestor (MSI); the PDCI contrary to its ‘twin’ party,
the PRC (who was instead familiar with the deliberative democracy promoted
by the extra parliamentary left), supported a more orthodox left-wing position
and organized itself according to the ‘democratic centralism’.
In figure 9.1 we compare statutes’ rules and factional preferences. For each
congress, we plot the values of AIR and IPD along with the linear fit between
the two variables.
This graph highlights that these two features of intra-party politics are truly
their internal life has usually been extremely democratic. Indeed from 1990 to 1993 the
Greens did not elect any leader being ruled collectively by all members; since 1993 until
2000 they did not elect not a real leader but only a formal speaker; afterwards the speaker
chair was turned into a typical party leader figure, directly elected, precisely to cope with
the excessive decentralization of the party decision-making process. The two congresses
included in our dataset are subsequent to 2000, hence the poor level of AIR registered in our
data is due to the direct election of party leader and it is in line with the actual evolution
of dynamics within this party.
2The PSI constitutes a partial exception in that it was sincerely democratic only between
the 1960s (when the democratic centralism was completely removed) and the 1980s, when
the Craxi personalized leadership restrained the room available for dissenters up to the point
that one minority faction was sent off the party in 1981 (see footnotes 18 and 23, chapter
7). Noticeably (due to the methodological reasons explained in chapter 3) our data exclude
almost all PSI congresses held in a less democratic environment.
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Figure 9.1: Rules and Preferences as Two Independent Features
Note: Distribution of Intra-party Division (IPD) according to different levels of internal
representativeness (AIR). The black line indicates the linear fit between the two variables
independent with respect to each other. Indeed their correlation is nearly null
(-.05) and not statistically significant. In this sense we can turn to summa-
rize the results of our analyses to assess which of these two attributes is the
best predictor of party’s behaviour and what is the most powerful factor that
explains intra-party dynamics.
We will discuss the relevance of each element together with the impact
of their interaction, across the various domains investigated in the empirical
chapters. We distinguish between: intra-party formal rules (those reported
in table 4.1); intra-party informal rules (i.e., PARTY AGE as long as loyalty
is higher among older parties due to the logic of appropriateness, although
repeated interactions may foster the emergence of cooperative norms);3 fac-
tional preferences (we sum up INTERNAL POLARIZATION, IPD and other
related variables, like GAP and DISTANCE). We also pay specific attention
3See chapters 5 and 7 for a deeper discussion around this idea.
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to the effects of the interaction between preferences and rules. In addition we
account for other features, related to the party or the party system, which
are widespread across the dissertation: party strength (PARTY SIZE), party
status (whether or not in office, e.g., PARTY IN OFFICE), electoral system
(caught by OPEN LIST and DISPROPORTIONALITY) and party competi-
tion (PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT, YBE, PARLIAMENTARY CENTRE
OF GRAVITY and MARGIN OF VOTES), even in interaction with LEADER
AUTONOMY.
We sketch the effect of these variables across the 8 analyses carried out in
the 5 empirical chapters (4 through 8). These analyses inspect the following
domains of politics: CONTESTED CONGRESS (chapter 4); fractionaliza-
tion (NOF, chapter 4); portfolio allocation (SHARE OF MINISTERS, chapter
5); party position-taking (PARTY POSITION, chapter 6); party fission and
faction breakaway (FISSION chapter 7); party MPs cohesion in parliamen-
tary voting behaviour (RICE, AI, MAI and AAI, paragraph 8.3); government
formation (CABINET MEMBERSHIP paragraph 8.4); electoral performance
(ABSOLUTE CHANGE and RELATIVE CHANGE, paragraph 8.5).
In table 9.2 we show whether each attribute has an impact on a specific
field, no matter the direction and the magnitude of such effect. As an example,
we do not care whether INTERNAL POLARIZATION increases or decreases
fractionalization. We just want to record if the variable significantly impacts
on the party or the party system. We draw any statistically significant effect
(either positive or negative) through the sign “
√
” while attributes that are
not statistically significant are marked by a “×”.
When comparing preferences and rules (as in table 9.2) we observe that
the former seem to matter more while the effect of the latter is more con-
trasting. Indeed factional preferences affect almost all the domains of politics.
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Table 9.2: Impact of some Attributes on several Domains of Intra-party Politics
CHAPTER 4 4 5 6 7 8.3 8.4 8.5
Contest. NOF Portfolio Position Fission MPs Cabinet Party
Congr. Allocation Taking Cohesion Formation Votes
Formal
Intra-party
Rules
Disproportional
√
/× √ ×
Rule
Factions Ban × ×
Democratic
√ √
Centralism
Direct Election × × √ √ √/× √/×
Informal × √
Intra-party
Rules
Factional
√ √ √ √ √
/× √ √/×
Preferences
Preferences∗ √ √
Rules
Party Size
√ √
/× √
Ruling Party
√ √
/× √ √ ×
Electoral
√ √
System
Competition
√ √
/×
Competition∗ √/× √ √
Leader
Autonomy
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Divergent intra-party preferences increase the number of factions, constrain
the leader in the process of party position-taking and increase the likelihood
of fissions. In addition they are taken into account in the process of portfo-
lio allocation: powerful factions whose position lies far away from the bulk of
party members tend to be strategically overpaid by the party leader in terms
of office payoffs (to counterbalance their lower gain in policy payoffs). Beside
shaping the party, factional preferences contribute to alter the party system
too. Heterogeneous parties in fact have lower chances to get involved in coali-
tion governments. Those parties seem to be also more divided during roll call
votes, even though this effect is less clear and deserves further investigation.
On the contrary heterogeneous preferences do not show any direct effect on
party’s electoral performance, even though they could damage party’s share of
votes by increasing the likelihood of fissions.
Factional policy preferences are indeed relevant in explaining intra-party
politics. Although some scholars claimed that factions are interested mainly in
office payoffs (Bettcher 2005; Golden and Chang 2001; Sartori 1976; Zuckerman
1975, 1979) we shown that factions care about policy too. Furthermore among
ruling parties, where we should find ‘factions of interests’ concerned only with
patronage, we observed that policy motivations still matter: heterogeneous
preferences help to explain factionalism (chapter 4) and breakaways (chapter
7).
Rules seem to play a role as well. To start with, we ascertained the impact
of the electoral system on intra-party fractionalization: open list and decen-
tralized candidate selection increase the number of factions. They also affect
party unity: disproportional systems act as disincentives for breakaways while
preference voting enables to institutionalize factions decreasing the likelihood
of splits. On the other hand, the impact of intra-party rules (both formal
and informal ones) seems more indefinite. Only some of them do really affect
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politics and sometimes these effects are unclear.
To start with we test the impact of informal rules. Due to repeated in-
teractions in fact we would expect a greater degree of cooperation as time
passes. When testing this claim we find contrasting results. Looking at port-
folio allotment we did not find any increase in proportionality, contrary to
what suggested by the cooperative argument. Our suggestion is that the effect
of cooperative dynamics is counterbalanced by an increase in loyalty observed
within older parties. Accordingly, after controlling for consensual portfolio al-
location, we observe that the likelihood of fission is lower inside older parties.
This effect, net of the logic of consequentiality related to cooperative dynamics
or to the electoral value of party label, expresses the value attached to loy-
alty due to the logic of appropriateness developed during the militancy and
strengthened by the partisans tie to symbols and party structure.
We turn now to consider the impact of rules prescribed by party statutes.
First of all, disproportional internal electoral rules exert, within the party, the
restrictive effect suggested by the Duverger’s Laws about the party system. In
fact they allow to halt party fractionalization decreasing the number of factions
and the likelihood to observe contested congresses (even if this latter effect is
less certain). However we do not register any further impact. In fact dispro-
portional party environments do not alter the dynamics of portfolio allocation.
Their effect within this domain is limited to adjustments in factions’ size by
transforming congress votes into party body seats. This could strengthen the
mainstream decreasing the size of internal minorities, however there are no
additional ‘winner-take-all’ dynamics beyond this point.
Other two elements related to party organization show an opposite degree
of efficacy. The formal prohibition over the existence of factions does not retain
significant effects on factionalism. Often this blurry rule was adopted but not
really enforced. Parties in fact are voluntary associations (Rahat et al. 2008)
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that set up their own rules and, in a sense, they are free to decide which ones
to enact (Zincone 1972). Furthermore factional ban puts in place a prisoners’
dilemma paradox: even if all subgroups agreed on dissolving themselves, none
of them would be the first to demobilize. Although they acknowledge that the
whole party could be better off without factions,4 each one also knows that its
best strategy is to defect deciding to do not demobilize. In fact whenever its
opponent was the first to dissolve the faction would benefit from an increase in
its share of payoffs being able to exploit its growing bargaining power. We can
consider portfolio allocation as an example. When one faction disappears, all
the others increase their share of seats in party body, which in turn allow them
to augment their relative share of ministers (as shown in chapter 5).5 As this
feature is common knowledge, each faction will defect instead of complying
and will not follow the rule.
On the other side, democratic centralism proved to be relevant in halt-
ing factionalism both ex-ante and ex-post: denying room for internal dissent,
such undemocratic attribute decreases the likelihood of observing a contested
congress so that dissent (if exists) remains latent. Democratic centralism in
fact confines dissent only inside the party body. Once the conflict has materi-
alized it is hard to keep it within tolerable levels. Whenever dissidents decide
to challenge the mainstream during the congress the party is more likely to
break-up; the minority group will be whipped, increasing the probability of
a breakaway (or that of an expulsion). When internal disputes are brought
on the outside, to the broad public, the minority faction will have no options
other than exiting from the party.
4As described in paragraph 8.4, for instance, internal heterogeneity decreases the likeli-
hood of being involved in coalition governments reducing the whole amount of office payoffs
available to the party in the long run.
5Note that an organized faction, being able to mobilize its members and supporters,
would probably gain more votes during the congress than an ad-hoc tendency that was born
only few weeks before the internal election.
263
CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION
The last attribute provided by party statutes concerns the role of party
leader. We investigated whether her direct election, which increases leader’s
degree of autonomy establishing a different intra-party environment. Overall
leader autonomy seems to matter, and its effects are very relevant in shaping
the party. In some cases however these upshots are not directly yielded by this
rule. The method for selecting the leader proved to be important in interact
with other elements and in particular with factional preferences. To begin with
there is an impact on the patterns of portfolio allocation. Our findings demon-
strate that the direct legitimacy allows leaders to distribute payoffs on their
own, decreasing the degree of proportionality in portfolio allocation. They are
able to reward their followers increasing the share of ministers assigned to their
faction, even if we found only limited support for this claim. Conversely there
is clear evidence for the interaction between leader autonomy and factions’
policy positions. Independent leaders can revert to office allotment as a strat-
egy to preserve party unity, preventing (credible) breakaways carried out by
strong minorities. Indeed powerful minority factions are overpaid when office
payoffs are distributed by autonomous leaders.
This feature interacts with preferences. As the distance between one faction
and the party’s ideal point enlarges, the likelihood of its breakaway increases.
The leaders face this credible threat by catering potential splinter groups with
greater amounts of office rewards to compensate their lower share of policy
payoffs.
Leader’s autonomy and factional preferences interacts indeed. Beside port-
folio allocation, this interaction involves also the process of party position-
taking, as we discussed in chapter 6, where we proved that leaders are able to
exploit their direct legitimacy to get rid of factional constraints. In fact the
impact of factional ties is no longer significant among parties whose leaders
are directly elected, unless looming elections boost the need for party unity,
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bringing them to partially heed minorities’ stakes. In general however leaders
are less bounded in choosing the party line so that they can set more moderate
positions that prove useful to build ‘cartels’, enhancing leaders’ chances to get
in office.
Actually we did not find a direct positive impact of leader’s autonomy
on the likelihood to be involved in a coalition government, however several
results proved the existence of an indirect impact. First of all autonomous
leader are indeed able to set moderate positions that increase the probability
to get in office (see for instance model 4 in table 6.2 and footnote 23, chapter
6). Moreover greater autonomy allows leaders to halt the negative impact of
intra-party heterogeneity on cabinet membership. Although internal divergent
preferences harm the party’s chances to get involved in a coalition government,
this effect ceased to be significant among parties ruled by autonomous leaders.
Indeed strong leaders solve the problem of credible commitment generated by
heterogeneous factional preferences. Being more autonomous they can enact
strategies to solve internal disputes, for instance through a strategic allocation
of portfolios that erases any potential dissatisfaction bringing all the factions
to strike the coalition deal. In this way fractionalization does no longer reduce
party’s probability to reach an agreement to enter the cabinet.
We did not register any direct impact on fractionalization. The only effect
concerns the decrease in divisiveness observed within personal parties. Here
leader’s autonomy reaches its peak and the whole party shows a stronger degree
of cohesion and loyalty toward leader’s choices.
To conclude, direct election per se does not play a role in preserving party
unity while its effect is conditional on party system competitiveness.6 Overall
6Low competitive conditions decrease the likelihood of splits among parties ruled by
constrained leader, while they promote breakups when leader autonomy enlarges. The party
systems and party competition retain also other effects on factionalism. Apart from pushing
autonomous leaders to adopt moderate vote maximizing positions, as discussed above, we
observed that looming elections strengthen the need for party unity, increasing the incentive
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we did not find differences between autonomous and constrained leaders. How-
ever when controlling for competitiveness we observe that autonomous leaders
raise the likelihood of breakaways under low competitive systems, where the
need for unity is lower and leaders are more concerned with enhancing cohe-
sion or rewarding their followers to remain in power. Conversely, when unity
is an issue at stake leaders may take advantage of their autonomy to reward
potential splinter groups thus contributing to keep the party together,7 like
leaders bounded by inter-factional ties do.
Table 9.3 helps to summarize these findings focusing on the interaction
between preferences and rules. It describes, in brief, the different intra-party
dynamics existing in parties ruled by autonomous or constrained leaders.
Table 9.3: Differences in Intra-party Dynamics. Comparison between Parties
Ruled by Autonomous or Bounded Leaders
Party Leader Portfolio Position-taking Fission Government
Allocation Formation
Bounded Proportionality Tied to factional
preferences
Preserve unity
(through consen-
sual dynamics)
Lower chances to
get in office due to
intra-party division
Overpay followers
in low competitive
party systems
Autonomous Lower Proportion-
ality (particularly
in low competitive
party systems)
Factional prefer-
ences matter only
when elections
approach
Boost breakaways
in low competitive
party systems
Solve factional di-
vergences preserv-
ing party’s chances
to join the coalition
Overpay potential
splinter groups (as
a strategy to avoid
breakaways)
Free to set mod-
erate positions (to
build cartels)
Prevent splits
through portfolio
allocation (under
high competitive
conditions)
Enforce commit-
ment
Overpay followers Simplify the bar-
gaining
to set a platform on which all party factions may agreed. This incentive however seems
larger among leaders bounded by factional constraints, as discussed in chapter 6. Moreover,
low competitive conditions increase leader’s discretionality in portfolio allocation providing
advantages for the mainstream faction (chapter 5). See paragraph 9.2 for a summary of the
interactions between party system competitiveness and leader autonomy.
7They actually try to do it (see chapters 5 and 6) and their attempts are successful (as
shown in chapter 7).
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This summary explains that, overall, constrained leaderships tend to be
more associated with a sense of justice, in that all the payoffs are distributed
to each faction according to its strength although, when feasible, even bounded
leaders try to exploit a degree of discretionality. Consensual dynamics how-
ever does not necessarily provide advantages to the party insofar as internal
divisions seem to decrease the likelihood to get in office, lowering the total
amount of payoffs available to party factions.
Autonomous leaderships, on the contrary, tend to be more effective in rul-
ing the party; although we might find less proportional intra-party dynamics
that increase the splits in low competitive party systems, independent leaders
can easily allocate payoffs strategically, preventing harmful fissions and re-
ducing the disadvantages faced by divided parties during coalition bargaining.
Moreover, they are able to take advantage of their position using discretional-
ity to reward their followers and to build cartels, boosting the probability to
participate in the ruling coalition.
9.2 Findings and Implications
Going back to the game-theoretic model discussed in chapter 2, here we
resume the expectations generated by our theory to compare them with the
empirical findings of the analyses. By doing this, we can try to validate or
deny the general claims and we can make some final statements about the
implications of the present dissertation. Retrieving the parameters connected
with our theoretical framework sketched in table 2.3, table 9.4 compares their
expected and observed impact on three areas of intra-party politics. We try
to assess if, and to what extent, our theory helps to understand the actual
inter-factional dynamics on factionalism (voice, chapter 4), payoffs allocation
(compromise, chapters 5 and 6) and party fission (exit, chapter 7).
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Table 9.4: Validation of Theory
Parameter Description Voice Compromise Exit
Exp. Obs. Exp. Obs. Exp. Obs.
ε Exit cost – – – – 0 –
pi Trade-off + + + + + +
ω Breakup cost + n.a. + + – –
ν Voice cost – – – 0/– + +
AL Autonomous leader 0/– 0/– – – + 0
AL∗ω - in competitive system 0/– n.a. + + – –
BL Bounded leader + 0 + + – –
Impact of the parameters derived from the game-theoretic model (chapter 2)
Comparison between expected (Exp.) and observed effects (Obs.)
Voice – Factionalism, chapter 4. The ‘party unity and party fission’ game
and the theoretical framework developed around the degree of leader auton-
omy have been conceived mainly to explore distributive dynamics that prevent
splits, thus contributing to keep the party together. However the model pro-
duces implications also about the expression of internal dissent and the related
degree of factionalism. On this point the model yields expectations that have
been partially confirmed by the empirical test of hypotheses carried out in
chapter 4.
First of all, growing exit costs (ε) due to a strong party loyalty lessen fac-
tionalism. This happens for instance among personal parties, whose members
are so firmly tied to their leader’s thoughts that nobody tries to contested the
congress (minorities avoid to issue a challenge because they have no realistic
option apart from compliance). Larger values of pi raise the level of division.
Inside polarized parties a broader number of factions will be dissatisfied with
the status quo. Polarization in fact increases the cost of membership and de-
crease the value of party label. Internal subgroups will be more likely to revert
to voice as a device to enhance their own policy views and as an attempt
to bargain more favorable conditions by threatening to defect. In line with
the theory an increase in ν lowers voice. This happens for instance due to
disproportional internal rules or to centralized (closed list) and undemocratic
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structures (such as democratic centralism). Conversely preference voting pro-
vides opportunities for the persistence and propagation of factions.
While a branch of literature conceive factions as ‘power subgroups’ that
proliferate inside ruling parties to exploit the benefits of patronage, our theo-
retical model contends that, for the sake of preserving cohesion and government
effectiveness, parties in office tend to be less factionalized. The empirical re-
sults outlined in chapter 4 seem to confirm this argument as long as the number
of factions is lower among ruling parties.
Contrary to our assumptions, the ban on factions does not help to decrease
their number. This rule could be too faint to be enacted. Moreover even
if members agreed on dissolving factions none of them would be the first to
demobilize, in accordance with a prisoners’ dilemma logic.
To conclude, although we claimed that direct election of party leader should
decrease voice we did not find any effect of leader autonomy on the number
of factions (apart from that related to personal parties). As far as direct
election fosters leader’s strength in front of middle-level activists, one possible
explanation is that a larger number of potential challengers will contest the
leadership, to take advantage of the larger autonomy, while other factions will
gather together to increase the chances of winning the nomination, so that the
overall effect is null.
Compromise – Payoffs allocation, chapters 5 and 6. As far as portfolio
allocation is concerned, with a couple of exceptions all the other suggestions
provided by our model seem validated.
The literature on this topic argues that repeated dynamics foster the emer-
gence of intra-party cooperative norms, leading toward a more proportional
allotment of cabinet posts. Contrary to this general idea we assert that, as
time passes, the price for infringed loyalty (ε) growths thus defusing the black-
mail power of minorities and reducing the room for compromise. In chapter
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5 we observe that the effect of time on distribution dynamics is null and we
claimed that none of these two stimuli is prevailing. Although this upshot is
not in line with our expectation we contend that the impact of exit costs on
portfolio allocation is still there, as the effect of loyalty counterbalances that
of cooperation. Accordingly, this result does not utterly contradict our theory
(in chapter 7 we also provided additional arguments sustaining this idea).
Along the same vein, chapter 5 indicates that an increase in ν (due to
disproportional rules enacted within parties whose leadership wants to promote
cohesion) has no effect on fairness. However, disproportional intra-party rules
exert ‘per se’ mechanical (and probably psychological) unfair effects, reducing
the size of minority factions with respect to party mainstream. In this sense
they already convey a decrease in proportional dynamics. Beyond this point
however any additional ‘winner-take-all’ effect should be countervailed by an
increase in pi, as long as minority factions are underrepresented and could
credibly threaten to break apart. This will foster their leverage leading to an
overall null effect on allocation dynamics.
The relevance of pi on this point finds additional confirmation in the analy-
sis: medium-sized minority factions, whose distance from party mainstream is
wide, are overpaid in terms of ministers. Their lower amount of policy payoffs
(which boosts pi and provides them with a credible exit threat) is balanced by
an increase in their share of office payoffs, though only when their size is large
enough to pose a threat to party strength (raising ω).
In accordance with that, the analysis proves that large values of ω enhance
proportionality in portfolio allocation whereas in low competitive parliamen-
tary arenas (low ω) the party leader tends to rewards the mainstream faction
with a more than proportional quota o ministers.
The impact of leader autonomy too is in line with the suggestion proposed
by the theory: the degree of proportionality is lower among parties ruled by
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autonomous leaders who try to overpay their own faction more than bounded
leaders are able to do. However this is no longer true when party system
competitiveness boosts the need for party unity. In such context autonomous
leaders step back to a fair allocation or portfolios or take advantage of their
autonomy to overpay those factions whose threat of breakaway is credible and
harmful.
These two latter findings, related to leader autonomy and party system
competitiveness, are confirmed by the results displayed in chapter 6. In the
process of position-taking, constrained leaders have to consider the policy views
of all factions while autonomous leaders are free to set party position on their
own (and in fact tend to adopt platforms closer to the centre of the policy
space, increasing the possibility to build cartels to take part in coalition gov-
ernments). On the other side, when new general elections approaches the need
for party unity (ω) sharply increases. In view of that, the leadership sets party
platform taking into account the wills of all factions with a stronger degree of
consensualism.
Furthermore, in line with the propositions drawn from chapter 2, we observe
that these two features interact: although autonomous leader are free to get rid
of factional preferences, looming elections force them to bargain with internal
minorities to reach a compromise over party platform, in order to appeal to
the votes presenting a unified front.
These empirical results confirm the idea suggested by our theory: the need
for party unity, enhanced by competitive party systems (wide ω), is indeed
the primary source of factional cooperation and promotes the achievement of
a compromise between party factions.
Exit – Party fission, chapter 7. With respect to the determinants of fac-
tional breakaways, almost all the hypotheses formulated from the model pre-
sented in chapter 2 have been successfully tested. To start with, when ν
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growths we would expect more splits. Indeed centralized candidate selection
procedures (such as closed list PR) and severe party discipline (i.e., democratic
centralism) push dissenters outside the party.
Noticeably those elements that raise the cost of exit (ε) lower the proba-
bility of a fission. We found support for the effect exerted by disproportional
electoral systems, which act as barriers to exit. In addition party loyalty plays
a role: the partisan tie to symbols and party structure restraints members from
breaking away. When ε is larger than pi dissenting members would rather stay
within the party even if their share of payoffs is unsatisfactory.
Conversely large values of pi favor the occurrence of party splits. Factions
that are strongly underpaid can reasonably expect to increase their rewards
by leaving the party (net of the price of ε). In chapters 7 we proved that this
is true for office as well as for policy payoffs. In addition, the level of party
system competitiveness impinges on the rate of pi: overall, low competitive
conditions cut the incentive to leave the party.
However this last attribute interacts with leader autonomy and with leader
attitude towards unity or cohesion, which in turn is influenced by the cost ω.
Autonomous leaders in fact take advantage of non-competitive party systems
(small ω, small pi) to get rid of internal minorities and overpay their supporters.
As a result they boost the leverage of minorities (increase in pi) while ω is fixed
at low levels, raising the probability of a split (this is no longer true inside
parties ruled by bounded leaders that have to stick to a coalition deal, see
footnote 8, chapter 5).
Contrary to our claim we do not find an effect of leader autonomy ‘per se’,
however its impact is conditional on the features of party system: autonomy
favors an increase in exit when party system competitiveness decreases. Under
such environments in fact party leaders trade unity for cohesion. This seems
particularly true among parties in office; for the sake of promoting government
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effectiveness, ruling parties tend to get rid of dissenters enhancing cohesion at
the expense of party unity (see footnotes 33, 40 and 44, chapter 7). This result
in turn seems to revitalize the idea of party conceived as a minimum winning
coalition of factions (Leiserson 1968).
Overall almost all the hypotheses generated from the model find confir-
mation. Among the 21 propositions that can be derived from table 2.3 we
were able to test 19 of them. Looking at table 9.4 we found a full confir-
mation of our claims in no less than 15 cases. In other two (the impact of
loyalty and disproportional internal rules on payoffs allocation) we observed
an indirect support while in two cases only we report no effect, contrary to
what hypothesised (bounded leaderships do not appear to boost factionalism
and autonomous leaders, ‘per se’, do not encourage breakaways). Then, this
empirical test carried out across the chapters seem to provide a first validation
for the theory discussed in chapter 2.
The present work also shed light on the interaction between intra-party
politics and party system. From the empirical results discussed in chapter
8 we observe that factional politics affects several areas of political life, from
policy-making to government formation and electoral competition. Apart from
the indirect effect exerted by factions on party platform and payoffs alloca-
tion, intra-party heterogeneity seems to yield more direct effects on the party
system. In particular, it affects party cohesion during roll call votes and jeop-
ardizes party’s chances to get in office (unless a centralized leadership nullifies
the negative effects of internal polarization). In addition, intra-party division
may also damage the party in the electoral market when the internal strife
erupts in a party fission (which in turn alters party system fragmentation, po-
larization and competitiveness). To sum up, intra-party politics impacts on
policy change, political stability and government effectiveness.
Far from any prescriptive intent, the results of this work drawn some impli-
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cations that involve real world politics. A deeper knowledge about intra-party
divergent preferences and the effects of internal rules in fact might lead to a
better understand of factional bargaining and intra-party dynamics. Though
future researches should shed more light on our findings, we can fix some points
(summarized in table 9.5) that should be taken into account by political engi-
neers.
Table 9.5: Pros and Cons of Political Institutions Reforms
Feature Pros Cons
Preference Voting − Fragmentation + Factionalism
− Fission − Cohesion
Disproportional − Fragmentation − Accountability
Electoral System − Fission
− Blackmail
Discipline and Whip − Factionalism + Fragmentation
+ Cohesion + Fission
− Accountability
Leader Direct Election − Blackmail + Bonapartism
+ Effectiveness
Italy has long been dealing with political instability. The country faces
an astonishing fractionalization insofar as to the high number of parties cor-
responds an equally deeper degree of intra-party divisions. Nonetheless, any
attempt to reduce the number of parties has to deal with the peril of a growing
factionalism. As discussed in chapter 7, such efforts could be even neutralised
when party fusions are followed (or anticipated) by fissions.
On the other side, merging together groups that retain conflicting prefer-
ences might enhance rivalries between an increased number of factions (chapter
4), boosting instability in government negotiations and in the parliamentary
arena (paragraphs 8.3 and 8.4) or even leading to splits that cancel out the
initial decrease in party fragmentation. In this sense any attempt of reform
should include adjustments in rules that enable to keep factionalism under
control while preserving party unity.
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Electoral systems based on preference voting end up undermining the mono-
lithic party structure, fostering factionalism and internal competition (chapter
4). Conversely, PR based on closed list along with centralized selection of
candidates and party lists could contain the proliferation of factions but will
dramatically amplify the probability of party splits raising the number of par-
ties and increasing the instability in parliamentary arena. Disproportional
electoral rules instead prove to be effective in decreasing party fragmentation
while taking factionalism under control by avoiding the risk of degenerative
intra-party conflicts.
Altering intra-party statutes in turn could be another way to promote
changes in the political system, even though the impact of some rules is neg-
ligible. Far from playing a direct effect on factionalism some attributes may
contribute to foster loyalty, discipline and cohesion while avoiding the risk of
splits.
One of such features is the direct election of party leader, which proved to be
successful in keeping factions on a leash (chapter 6 and paragraph 8.4) without
any negative effect on party unity (at least in competitive party systems).
This reform emerges as a unifying factor providing the same effect played
by the introduction of primaries for candidate selection, though for opposite
mechanisms.
While primaries seem to mitigate the discontent of minorities leading to
more consensual dynamics (Hortala-Vallve and Mueller 2011) the direct elec-
tion of leaders strengthens their autonomy in spite of dissenters. This might
bring to cooperative dynamics whenever minorities are strong enough to threat
party unity (chapter 5). However an autonomous and charismatic leader might
also exploit her privileged status (Michels 1911) to get rid of internal opposi-
tion, as described in chapter 6, transforming the party in her personal property
(Calise 2010).
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Along the same vein, institutional reforms must not restore forms of party
system dominance, preserving high levels of party system competitiveness.
Besides several positive effects (for instance on corruption, e.g., Schleiter and
Voznaya 2011) competitiveness, by fostering the need for party unity, brings
autonomous leaders to engage in consensual and fair intra-party dynamics,
looking for a compromise that takes into account the stakes of all the party
members.
In this sense the need for a more stable political system should not be
detached from the demands for more democracy, accountability and represen-
tativeness in intra-party politics. Nonetheless intra-party democracy in some
cases turns out to be only a strategy to defang the activists (by formally
empowering party members) instead of granting a real representativeness to
members’ stakes.
That said, it does not matter whether democracy should exist even within
the parties or not, or whether system stability should be a priority in spite
of members’ representativeness. The question is how to find the better trade-
off. To achieve it politicians must take into account the relevance of internal
preferences and the potential impact of intra-party rules.
9.3 Direction for Future Research
Reading all the way through the chapters we note that the present analysis
provides an exhaustive and detailed discussion of intra-party dynamics covering
several domains of politics (as described in paragraph 1.3). Nevertheless we
left aside some topics that are linked to our work, even though their analysis
might lie beyond the scope of this dissertation. We will briefly recall some of
them in order to build bridges for future researches.
First of all, the whole analysis is carried out considering only a single di-
276
9.3. DIRECTION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
mension. Although this idea seems plausible as we already argued in chapter
6 (e.g., Budge et al. 2010), it would be profitable to account for factional bar-
gaining in a multidimensional policy space. This would be relevant to map the
conflict inside highly heterogeneous parties, like the PD, or to understand the
cooperation among factions that shared the same preferences on a unique or
several policy dimensions. For instance the attitude towards social policy ex-
isting within the DC, related to the common linkage with the Catholic Church,
could have been a source of party unity that counterbalanced contrasting views
on other dimensions. Something similar might concern single issue parties like
the Greens or the Northern League.
In this regard it would be of use to map policy heterogeneity and subgroups’
membership even within parties that usually hold unitary congresses or do not
hold congresses at all. In this way we can compare internal dynamics to check
whether divergent preferences, although non publicly expressed, contribute to
shape the party or if, to the contrary, minority’s claims are not taken into
account at all.
On the same vein, starting from the analysis of intra-party dynamics, future
works might contribute to the literature on intra-party democracy. Deepen-
ing our examination of party statutes new studies might improve on, building
an index that measures the internal degree of democracy that takes into ac-
count all the attributes provided by party rules (including candidate selection
procedure). This index in turn could prove useful to analyze political account-
ability comparing different party systems and to explain the level of citizens’
satisfaction within each of them.
As far as intra-party democracy is concerned future researches should im-
prove the study of leadership developing valid measures of leader’s strength;
this will allow to analyze intra-party politics as an interplay between party
leader, factions and grassroots, where the leader can be challenged by internal
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rivals (on this point the analysis of intra-party negative campaigning would be
of interest).
Along the same line, party primaries deserve more attention. Assuming
that leaders face challengers, we might want to evaluate whether intra-party
politics follows the logic of the selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al.
2003; see also Clark et al. 2011). In this sense, as far as factional politics
might require small winning coalition, we contend that an increase in the size
of the selectorate (from small committees to party members) conveys unfair al-
location of private goods (payoffs) and we found empirical evidence sustaining
this idea. Accordingly, when moving from leaders elected in small committees
(where each member could pivot between alternative potential leaders in order
to claim a fair share of payoffs) to leaders selected by party members (even
through closed primaries) we would expect to find more autonomy and a lower
amount of public good (party unity).
Our results are indeed in line with this theory. Accordingly we claimed that,
as far as intra-party politics is concerned, a small selectorate could be more
promising in terms of accountability and fairness than a large selectorate and
direct democracy (unless party system competitiveness, i.e., challengers coming
from outside the party, makes autonomous leaders compromise-oriented too).
Although we claim that party primaries have a negative impact on intra-
party representativeness, our data do not allow to control for potential differ-
ences between closed and open primaries. By appealing to a widespread tar-
get and increasing the heterogeneity of the whole ‘population’, open primaries
could also enlarge the size of the winning coalition (while closed primaries do
not). This might strengthen party unity (the public good, Hortala-Vallve and
Mueller 2011) and enhance fairness in payoffs allocation (the private goods)
wielding positive effects in term of intra-party competitiveness and responsive-
ness (but see Katz 2001). Hence we strongly recommend to extend the research
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carried out by this work investigating the actual impact of open primaries on
intra-party equilibriums.
Across the chapters, a couple of results were quite ambiguous. One concerns
the impact of factionalism on MPs voting behavior, which deserves further
investigation to better understand the role of factions as veto players, and
to assess which one among preferences and discipline is the key explanatory
element for factional voting behavior. In this sense matching text analysis and
roll-call data might lead to a better estimation of actors’ policy positions. Roll-
calls could be even more useful to map preferences in parties whose congresses
are uncontested.
In turn the effect of party system competitiveness and dominance deserves
should be deeper investigated in a dynamic setting. Moreover the effect of
heterogeneous preference on voters’ choice and the linkage between activists
and voters during party fissions need additional examination.
In the present work we left aside a few additional analyses. The work
on government formation could be deepened considering for instances how
factional disputes delay the duration of bargaining (Mershon 1994) and how
they affect budget policies and the distribution of outlays. Similarly it would
be interesting to deepen the studies on factional politics, linking preferences
and internal rules with pork barrel, patronage and corruption (e.g., Golden
and Chang 2001). In the same way we should take into account factionalism
and internal dynamics within a core party (Bogaards and Boucek 2010; Boucek
2012). Finally, factionalism could be analyzed to explain party formation and
termination.
Although the present dissertation is related to a single country, the findings
of our analysis and the empirical implications of our theoretical model provide
novel insights that allow to better understand intra-party dynamics in coun-
tries where factional politics matters. Among them we find Japan, France and
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many other political systems, but also, to a certain extent, Germany and the
UK (as discussed in chapter 1). However, in order to generalize our claims,
the present work could be developed and extended to other single case studies.
Furthermore, future researches should be carried out in a comparative per-
spective that investigates the shapes of factionalism and intra-party dynamics
within different parties and party systems.
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List of Italian Parties with
Acronyms and Abbreviations
Label English Name Original Name
ADN National Democratic Alliance Alleanza Democratica Nazionale
AN National Alliance Alleanza Nazionale
API Alliance for Italy Alleanza per l’Italia
CCD Christian Democratic Centre Centro Cristiano Democratico
CD Democratic Rally Concentrazione Democratica
CDR Christian Democrats for the Republic Cristiani Democratici per la Repubblica
CDU Unified Christian Democrats Cristiani Democratici Uniti
DC Christian Democratic Party Democrazia Cristiana
DL Democracy is Freedom – The Daisy Democrazia e` Liberta` – La Margherita
DN National Democracy Democrazia Nazionale
DS Democrats of the Left Democratici di Sinistra
FI Forward Italy Forza Italia
FDP Popular Democratic Front Fronte Democratico Popolare
FDS Force of the South Forza del Sud
FLI Future and Freedom for Italy Futuro e Liberta` per l’Italia
FV Federation of the Greens Federazione dei Verdi
IDV Italy of Values Italia dei Valori
LDS Socialists’ League Lega dei Socialisti
LN Northern League Lega Nord
continued on the next page
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ABBREVIATIONS
Label English Name Original Name
MPA Movement for Autonomies Movimento per le Autonomie
MSI Italian Social Movement Movimento Sociale Italiano
MUIS Unitarian Movement of Socialist Initiative Movimento Unitario di Iniziativa Socialista
NPSI New Italian Socialist Party Nuovo Partito Socialista Italiano
NS We the South Noi Sud
PCI Italian Communist Party Partito Comunista Italiano
PCL Communist Workers Party Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori
PD Democratic Party Partito Democratico
PDA Action Party Partito d’Azione
PDCI Party of Italian Communists Partito dei Comunisti Italiani
PDL People of Freedom Popolo della Liberta`
PDS Democratic Party of the Left Partito Democratico della Sinistra
PID Populars of Italy Tomorrow Popolari di Italia Domani
PLI Italian Liberal Party Partito Liberale Italiano
PPI Italian Popular Party Partito Popolare Italiano
PRC Communist Refoundation Party Partito della Rifondazione Comunista
PRI Italian Republican Party Partito Repubblicano Italiano
PS Socialist Party Partito Socialista
PSDA Sardinian Action Party Partito Sardo d’Azione
PSDI Italian Socialist Democratic Party Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano
PSI Italian Socialist Party Partito Socialista Italiano
PSIUP Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity Partito Socialista Italiano di Unita` Proletaria
PSLI Italian Socialist Workers Party Partito Socialista dei Lavoratori Italiani
PSU Unitary Socialist Party Partito Socialista Unitario
SA The Left – The Rainbow La Sinistra – L’Arcobaleno
SC Critical Left Sinistra Critica
SD Democratic Left Sinistra Democratica
SDI Italian Democratic Socialists Socialisti Democratici Italiani
SEL Left Ecology and Freedom Sinistra Ecologia e Liberta`
SU-PSI United Socialists – PSI Socialisti Uniti – PSI
SVP South Tyrolean People’s Party Su¨dtiroler Volkspartei
UDC Union of Christian and Centre Democrats Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e di Centro
UDEUR Union of Democrats for Europe Unione Democratici per l’Europa
UDS Socialist Democracy and Unity Unita` e Democrazia Socialista
ULIVO The Olive Tree L’Ulivo
UP Popular Unity Unita` Popolare
US Union of Socialists Unione dei Socialisti
USI Independent Socialist Union Unione Socialista Indipendente
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Factions’ Positions and
Confidence Intervals
Factions’ Positions within each Party Congress along with a 90% Confidence
Interval of the Estimates. Values efer to the Left-Right Scale. Negative Values
express Left-wing Positions
Congress L/R Position 90% Confidence Interval
AN 2002
D-Destra 1.459044 1.485683 1.432405
Destra Sociale 1.093735 1.144662 1.042807
Nuova Alleanza 1.054985 1.094671 1.015299
Destra Protagonista 1.047826 1.093606 1.002046
DC 1954
Iniziativa Democratica -0.10293 0.140836 -0.3467
Forze Sociali -0.25895 -0.07443 -0.44347
DC 1959
Primavera 0.044498 0.202993 -0.114
Centrismo Popolare -0.4425 -0.33624 -0.54876
Nuove Cronache -0.49352 -0.31728 -0.66976
Dorotei -0.56809 -0.46694 -0.66923
Base -0.67718 -0.55135 -0.80301
continued on the next page
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Congress L/R Position 90% Confidence Interval
DC 1962
Centrismo Popolare 0.641803 0.698768 0.584839
Linea Moro-Fanfani 0.210654 0.28651 0.134799
DC 1964
Impegno Democratico (Dorotei) 0.316847 0.487083 0.146611
Centrismo Popolare -0.23121 -0.10856 -0.35385
Forze Nuove -0.32324 -0.21761 -0.42886
Nuove Cronache -0.35662 -0.23211 -0.48113
DC 1967
Pontieri (Tavianei) 0.373126 0.518119 0.228132
Base -0.07593 0.007413 -0.15927
Impegno Democratico (Dorotei) -0.13272 0.019215 -0.28465
DC 1969
Forze Libere 1.16876 1.242064 1.095455
Ponte 0.593023 0.698929 0.487116
Impegno Democratico (Dorotei) 0.296835 0.393225 0.200444
Nuove Cronache 0.278839 0.368514 0.189163
Morotei 0.041232 0.140069 -0.0576
Base e Forze Nuove -0.05006 0.005196 -0.10532
Nuova Sinistra -0.072 0.026217 -0.17021
DC 1980
Forze Nuove 0.366017 0.481962 0.250073
Iniziativa Popolare (Dorotei) 0.04033 0.143144 -0.06248
Nuove Cronache -0.14284 0.008392 -0.29407
Area Zac e Andreottiani -0.22031 -0.10931 -0.33131
Amici di Prandini -0.43351 -0.25608 -0.61095
DC 1982
PAF (Piccolo-Andreotti-Fanfani) 1.864879 1.888122 1.841637
Area De Mita 1.236874 1.285403 1.188345
Area Forlani 0.985618 1.07242 0.898817
continued on the next page
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Congress L/R Position 90% Confidence Interval
DC 1984
Impegno Riformista (Scotti) e Forze Nuove 1.363929 1.397582 1.330275
De Mita 0.907559 1.013135 0.801983
DC 1986
Andreottiani 1.991661 2.01807 1.965252
De Mita 1.156328 1.229845 1.082811
Forze Nuove 1.076898 1.115697 1.038099
DC 1989
Nuove Cronache 1.269407 1.326826 1.211988
Primavera 0.684833 0.817315 0.552351
Forze Nuove 0.460728 0.516572 0.404883
Area del Confronto (Base) 0.089685 0.169675 0.009695
Azione Popolare (Dorotei) -0.1364 -0.07538 -0.19742
DS 2000
Veltroniani -0.34151 -0.23741 -0.4456
Sinistra Ds -0.42636 -0.33845 -0.51426
DS 2001
Liberta` Eguale (Liberal Ds) 0.043891 0.088681 -0.0009
Riformisti (Fassino) -0.16876 -0.12746 -0.21005
Correntone (Sinistra Ds) -0.25832 -0.19951 -0.31714
DS 2005
Ecologisti Ds 0.541943 0.578301 0.505586
Riformisti (Fassino) 0.218535 0.257227 0.179843
Sinistra Ds per il Socialismo -0.22081 -0.17017 -0.27145
Correntone (Sinistra Ds) -0.22448 -0.16613 -0.28283
DS 2007
Riformisti (Fassino) 0.299215 0.349348 0.249082
Socialisti ed Europei 0.031947 0.08301 -0.01912
Correntone (Sinistra Ds) -0.09264 -0.01597 -0.16931
FV 2008
Progetto Ecologista Federalista 0.984066 1.066869 0.901263
Ecologisti e Riformisti 0.903524 0.979039 0.828008
Futuro 0.153346 0.22287 0.083821
continued on the next page
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FV 2009
Futuro 0.649128 0.717027 0.581229
Nuovi Verdi Nuovo Ulivo 0.56409 0.690028 0.438152
Ecologisti per la Costituente 0.320015 0.435168 0.204862
MSI 1965
Sinistra 1.098466 1.194647 1.002284
Spiritualisti 0.937569 1.043872 0.831265
Unita` 0.508837 0.642314 0.37536
MSI 1977
Linea Futura 1.843722 1.877652 1.809792
Destra Popolare 1.434709 1.494799 1.374619
Unita` nella Chiarezza 1.181517 1.248977 1.114057
MSI 1979
Spazio Nuovo 1.751017 1.766837 1.735197
Continuare e Rinnovare 1.502459 1.52852 1.476397
MSI 1987
Andare Oltre 1.699732 1.723975 1.67549
Destra in Movimento 1.654327 1.677449 1.631205
Impegno Unitario 1.557026 1.610413 1.503639
Proposta Italia 1.466879 1.499151 1.434608
Nuove Prospettive 1.461168 1.499067 1.423269
Destra Italiana 1.349408 1.404746 1.294071
MSI 1990
Andare Oltre 0.73048 0.775861 0.685099
Destra in Movimento 0.652029 0.678661 0.625396
Nuove Prospettive 0.606023 0.651643 0.560404
Impegno Unitario 0.493075 0.555647 0.430502
Proposta Italia 0.464933 0.507376 0.422491
Destra Italiana 0.415289 0.459649 0.37093
NPSI 2003
Maggioranza (De Michelis) 0.468652 0.518261 0.419044
Socialismo e Liberta` 0.409608 0.513195 0.30602
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Congress L/R Position 90% Confidence Interval
NPSI 2005
Unita` e Rinnovamento 0.364814 0.410932 0.318697
Maggioranza (De Michelis) 0.121822 0.180006 0.063638
PCI 1989
Riformisti (Occhetto) -0.66631 -0.62925 -0.70337
Cossuttiani -1.24124 -1.20618 -1.27629
PCI 1990
Riformisti (Occhetto) -0.93862 -0.88885 -0.9884
Rinnovamento (Ingrao) -1.04965 -0.99408 -1.10522
Cossuttiani -1.39972 -1.34384 -1.45561
PCI 1990
Antagonisti e Riformatori -0.83808 -0.76843 -0.90773
Per il Partito Democratico della Sinistra -1.03121 -0.96029 -1.10212
Per la Rifondazione Comunista -1.12998 -1.07255 -1.18742
PD 2009
Cambia l’Italia (Marino) 0.895547 0.932423 0.858671
Area Democratica (Franceschini) 0.890285 0.922231 0.858339
Riformisti e Democratici (Bersani) 0.588933 0.642131 0.535735
PDA 1946
Maggioranza (Codignola) -0.5467 -0.38866 -0.70475
Democrazia Repubblicana -0.9333 -0.54904 -1.31756
Autonomisti (Lombardi) -1.3212 -0.88709 -1.75532
PDCI 2008
Unire la Sinistra -0.28469 -0.23255 -0.33683
Comunisti e Comuniste -0.99195 -0.94852 -1.03538
PLI 1966
Minoranza -0.05876 0.102814 -0.22034
Maggioranza -0.06283 0.09192 -0.21757
PLI 1969
Italia Liberale 1.449138 1.479245 1.419031
Presenza 0.954442 0.998675 0.91021
Liberta` Nuova 0.497743 0.582455 0.41303
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PLI 1971
Presenza 1.13387 1.212801 1.05494
Rinnovamento 1.098191 1.139679 1.056702
Italia Liberale 0.953366 1.027506 0.879225
Liberta` Nuova 0.265224 0.433559 0.09689
PLI 1973
Italia Liberale 1.456425 1.500153 1.412698
Rinnovamento 1.374896 1.409857 1.339935
Presenza 0.677456 0.80292 0.551992
Liberta` Nuova 0.056205 0.226116 -0.11371
PLI 1974
Italia Liberale 1.382144 1.452421 1.311866
Rinnovamento 1.162102 1.203217 1.120987
Concordia 0.7087 0.864972 0.552428
Liberta` Nuova 0.307407 0.44167 0.173144
Unita` Liberale 0.062677 0.371199 -0.24584
Presenza -0.20775 -0.03132 -0.38418
PLI 1976
Autonomia Liberale 1.135356 1.235552 1.035161
Democrazia Liberale e Liberta` Nuova 0.780794 0.88382 0.677767
PLI 1979
Autonomia Liberale 1.025126 1.119371 0.93088
Democrazia Liberale 0.644463 0.79558 0.493347
PLI 1981
Nuove Iniziative 1.407666 1.48469 1.330642
Autonomia Liberale 1.222621 1.336616 1.108626
Democrazia Liberale 0.9578 1.03362 0.88198
PLI 1984
Nuove Iniziative 1.687732 1.732815 1.642649
Autonomia Liberale 1.3084 1.348183 1.268618
Democrazia Liberale 0.913655 0.989825 0.837485
PLI 1986
Nuova Democrazia Liberale 1.267091 1.393315 1.140867
Politica delle Liberta` 1.242215 1.476801 1.007628
continued on the next page
288
APPENDIX B. FACTIONS’ POSITIONS AND CONFIDENCE
INTERVALS
Congress L/R Position 90% Confidence Interval
PLI 1988
Progetto Liberale 1.545205 1.620091 1.47032
Nuova Democrazia Liberale 1.419383 1.461151 1.377615
Politica delle Liberta` 1.213491 1.303871 1.123111
PRC 1996
Bertinottiani e Cossuttiani -1.65048 -1.60896 -1.69201
Progetto Comunista -1.69118 -1.65867 -1.72369
PRC 1998
Pontieri -0.73156 -0.48376 -0.97936
Cossuttiani -1.12543 -0.9816 -1.26926
Bertinottiani -1.4339 -1.31912 -1.54868
Progetto Comunista -1.90545 -1.83168 -1.97922
PRC 1999
Bertinottiani -1.3623 -1.33076 -1.39383
Progetto Comunista -1.94549 -1.92768 -1.9633
PRC 2002
Progetto Comunista -2.02456 -2.01159 -2.03752
Bertinottiani -2.12725 -2.11631 -2.13819
PRC 2005
Essere Comunisti -1.30026 -1.26219 -1.33834
Bertinottiani -1.41344 -1.34735 -1.47953
Sinistra Critica -1.49916 -1.45979 -1.53853
Falce e Martello -1.60312 -1.56711 -1.63913
Progetto Comunista -1.90193 -1.87638 -1.92748
PRC 2008
Pacifisti -0.9056 -0.84357 -0.96763
Rifondazione Per la Sinistra -1.05695 -1.01694 -1.09696
Rifondazione in Movimento -1.28998 -1.25182 -1.32814
Falce e Martello -1.36915 -1.32713 -1.41117
L’Ernesto -1.57714 -1.53897 -1.6153
PRI 1950
Minoranza -0.89741 -0.62686 -1.16795
Maggioranza -1.2807 -0.97888 -1.58252
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PRI 1952
Maggioranza -0.64111 -0.44822 -0.834
Sinistra Repubblicana -1.42395 -1.17991 -1.66799
PRI 1954
Sinistra Repubblicana -1.03067 -0.82214 -1.23919
Maggioranza -1.05419 -0.89071 -1.21767
PRI 1956
Minoranza -0.13007 0.102029 -0.36217
Maggioranza -0.44984 -0.29731 -0.60237
PRI 1958
Unione Democratica -0.62423 -0.4385 -0.80995
Sinistra Repubblicana -1.12898 -0.92233 -1.33563
Maggioranza -1.17106 -1.00894 -1.33319
PRI 1960
Maggioranza -0.75133 -0.59502 -0.90764
Unione Democratica -0.89322 -0.68476 -1.10169
Sinistra Repubblicana -0.90833 -0.70723 -1.10943
PRI 1965
Destra 0.059085 0.188346 -0.07018
Maggioranza -0.57298 -0.38728 -0.75868
PRI 1968
Maggioranza -0.80026 -0.64348 -0.95705
Minoranza -0.83361 -0.69012 -0.9771
PRI 1984
Maggioranza 0.582068 0.698544 0.465592
Sinistra Repubblicana 0.400917 0.55332 0.248514
PRI 1987
Sinistra Repubblicana 1.016489 1.132776 0.900202
Base 0.314384 0.418078 0.21069
Maggioranza 0.094476 0.230134 -0.04118
PRI 1989
Sinistra Repubblicana 0.217558 0.405171 0.029944
Maggioranza 0.128819 0.304511 -0.04687
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PS 2008
Unita` Identita` Autonomia e Sinistra Socialista 0.477024 0.524201 0.429847
Prima la Politica 0.247721 0.33353 0.161911
Un Nuovo Inizio 0.06582 0.153484 -0.02184
PSDI (PSLI) 1948
Maggioranza -0.88527 -0.76772 -1.00282
Sinistra -1.42855 -1.28936 -1.56774
PSDI 1957
Democrazia Socialista -0.93143 -0.80036 -1.0625
Autonomia Socialista -1.07786 -0.99976 -1.15595
Fedelta` Socialista -1.16277 -1.0641 -1.26145
Unita` Socialista -1.22229 -1.1284 -1.31618
PSDI 1959
Autonomia e Unita` Socialista -0.70292 -0.60252 -0.80333
Democrazia Socialista -0.78663 -0.64299 -0.93026
Rinnovamento Socialista -0.79571 -0.67784 -0.91358
Centrosinistra -0.93436 -0.88324 -0.98548
PSDI 1962
Iniziativa Socialdemocratica -0.4892 -0.33965 -0.63875
Centrosinistra -1.007 -0.94737 -1.06663
Rinnovamento Autonomia e Unita` Socialista -1.00984 -0.95408 -1.0656
PSDI 1974
Democrazia Socialista 0.130791 0.191825 0.069756
Rinnovamento -0.02612 0.200245 -0.25249
Maggioranza -0.24421 -0.09261 -0.39582
PSDI 1976
Socialismo Democratico 0.058287 0.306575 -0.19
Sinistra Socialdemocratica -0.56642 -0.36448 -0.76837
PSDI 1982
Socialismo Democratico 1.086165 1.114666 1.057663
Sinistra Socialdemocratica 0.777116 0.819669 0.734563
Sinistra Riformista 0.529498 0.593854 0.465142
continued on the next page
291
APPENDIX B. FACTIONS’ POSITIONS AND CONFIDENCE
INTERVALS
Congress L/R Position 90% Confidence Interval
PSDI 1987
Prospettiva Socialista Democratica 1.078622 1.150074 1.00717
Iniziativa Socialdemocratica 0.458467 0.542114 0.374821
PSDI 1989
Autonomia Socialdemocratica 0.282067 0.352475 0.21166
Iniziativa Socialista -0.63268 -0.50124 -0.76413
PSI 1946
Iniziativa Socialista -1.22752 -1.06759 -1.38746
Critica Sociale -1.28284 -1.11821 -1.44746
Base (Sinistra) -1.40143 -1.21991 -1.58295
PSI 1947
Concentrazione Socialista (Critica Sociale) -0.93963 -0.80524 -1.07403
Sinistra -1.25024 -1.12735 -1.37314
Iniziativa Socialista -1.48961 -1.3982 -1.58103
PSI 1948 (Jan)
Autonomisti -1.16378 -1.00297 -1.32459
Fronte -1.44416 -1.32573 -1.5626
Liste Separate -1.45709 -1.34128 -1.5729
PSI 1948 (Jul)
Per il Socialismo -1.15795 -1.06402 -1.25188
Riscossa Socialista -1.47544 -1.39676 -1.55412
Sinistra -1.5952 -1.52837 -1.66203
PSI 1949
Per il Socialismo -1.3833 -1.29107 -1.47554
Per il Partito e la Classe -1.42129 -1.35015 -1.49243
Sinistra -1.86065 -1.81457 -1.90673
PSI 1959
Alternativa Democratica -0.9693 -0.92657 -1.01204
Autonomia -1.35067 -1.32024 -1.38111
Sinistra -1.52821 -1.50125 -1.55517
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PSI 1961
Alternativa Democratica -1.17569 -1.14476 -1.20662
Autonomia -1.34419 -1.29979 -1.38859
Sinistra -1.38606 -1.35805 -1.41406
PSI 1963
Autonomia -1.13249 -1.10353 -1.16146
Sinistra -1.43178 -1.40004 -1.46352
PSI 1965
Autonomia -0.78757 -0.7169 -0.85825
Sinistra Socialista -0.99181 -0.93629 -1.04733
PSI (PSU) 1968
Rinnovamento Socialista -0.25559 -0.17619 -0.335
Autonomia -0.52009 -0.45302 -0.58717
Riscossa e Unita` Socialista -0.65095 -0.57881 -0.72309
Impegno Socialista -0.71212 -0.63196 -0.79228
Sinistra Socialista -0.93808 -0.87505 -1.0011
PSI 1978
Riformisti (Craxi) 0.326119 0.360212 0.292027
Sinistra per l’Alternativa -0.07566 -0.00062 -0.15069
Presenza Socialista -0.33449 -0.2422 -0.42678
Unita` e Autonomia per l’Alternativa -0.58677 -0.50828 -0.66526
PSI 1981
Riformisti (Craxi) 0.470275 0.501876 0.438675
Sinistra per l’Alternativa -0.01699 0.051091 -0.08507
Presenza Socialista -0.26096 -0.19185 -0.33007
Sinistra Socialista -0.38106 -0.32356 -0.43857
PSIUP 1972
Per la Confluenza nel PSI -1.18405 -1.12556 -1.24253
Continuita` e Rinnovamento Nuovo PSIUP -1.20445 -1.14676 -1.26214
Per la Confluenza nel PCI -1.4575 -1.41363 -1.50137
UDC 2007
Popolari Liberali 1.233613 1.290021 1.177204
Maggioranza 0.858187 0.885997 0.830376
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